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This Article develops an agency costs theory of the law of private trusts,
focusing chiefly  on donative trusts.  The agency costs approach offers fresh
insights into recurring  problems in trust law including, among others, modi-
fication and termination, settlor standing,  fiduciary litigation, trust-invest-
ment law and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal, the role of so-called
trust protectors, and spendthrift trusts.  The normative claim is that the law
should minimize the agency costs inherent in  locating managerial  authority
with the trustee and the residual claim with the beneficiaries, but only to the
extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions  of the settlor.
Accordingly, the use of the private trust triggers a temporal agency problem
(whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor's original  wishes) in addi-
tion to the usual agency problem that arises when risk-bearing  and manage-
ment are separated  (whether the trustee/manager  will act in  the best interests
of the beneficiaries/residual  claimants).  The positive claim is that, at least
with respect to traditional  doctrines, the law conforms to the suggested nor-
mative approach.  This Article draws on the economics of the principal-agent
problem and the theory of the firm, and it engages the ongoing debate about
whether trust law  is closer to property law or contract law.  Although the
analysis  focuses  on donative trusts, it  should be amenable to extension in
future work to commercial and charitable  trusts.
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INTRODUCTION
Agency cost theories of the firm  dominate  the modern literature
of  corporate  law  and  economics..  Meanwhile,  the  private  express
trust, an entity from which  the corporation  traces its  roots,
2  has been
left  largely  untouched  by  agency  cost  analysis.3  Yet,  in  an  echo  of
Adolph  Berle and Gardiner  Means's  famous  critique  of the  corpora-
tion's "separation  of ownership  and control,"4  the  central  feature  of
the private  trust is that it "separate [s]  the  benefits of ownership from
the burdens of ownership."5  This implies that many of the analytical
tools supplied by the agency cost theories of the firm, which are rou-
tinely applied  in  the  economic  analysis  of corporate  law,  should  be
similarly applicable  to the underdeveloped  economic  analysis  of trust
law.6  Indeed, problems of shirking and monitoring, the  driving con-
cerns of agency cost analysis, abound in trust administration.  Accord-
ingly,  this  Article  develops  an  agency  costs  theory  of  trust  law  as
organizational law, here focusing on donative private trusts.  The anal-
I  See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,  Theory of the Firm:  Managerial  Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,  3J. FIN. ECON.  305 (1976);  see also Armen  A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz,  Production,  Information Costs, and  Economic Organization,  62 AM.  ECON.  REV.
777  (1972);  Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON.  288
(1980);  Eugene F. Fama & Michael  C. Jensen, Agency Problems and  Residual Claims, 26J.L. &
ECON.  327  (1983)  [hereinafter  Fama  & Jensen,  Residual Claims]; Eugene  F.  Fama  &
Michael C. Jensen,  Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J.L. & ECON.  301  (1983)  [herein-
after  Fama  & Jensen,  Separation]; Symposium,  Contractual Freedom  in  Corporate Law, 89
COLUM.  L. REv.  1395-1774  (1989).  See generally STEPHEN  M.  BAINBRIDGE,  CORPORATION  LAW
AND  ECONOMICS  §  1.5,  at 26-38  (2002)  (discussing  various economic  models of business
organizations).  For  the  classic  exposition  in  the  legal  literature,  see  FRANK  H.  EASTER-
BROOK  &  DANIEL  R.  FISCHEL,  THE  ECONOMIC  STRUCTURE  OF CORPORATE  LAw  (1991).
2  See Edward Rock  & Michael  Wachter, Dangerous  Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and Interdoctrinal  Legal Transplants,  96 Nw. U. L. REV.  651,  655-57  (2002); Joseph T. Walsh,
The Fiduciary  Foundation  of Corporate  Law, 27J. CORP. L. 333, 333-35 (2002);  see also 3 FREDE-
RIC  W.  MAITLAND,  Trust and Corporation, in THE  COLLECTED  PAPERS  OF  FREDERIC  WILLIAM
MAITLAND  321,  395 (H.A.L.  Fisher ed.,  1911)  (stating "that the  connection  between Trust
and Corporation is  very ancient").
3  Prior  systematic  applications  of agency  cost analysis  to  trust  law  are  scarce.  The
principal  exception is A.I. Ogus,  The Trust as Governance Structure,  36  U.  TORONTO  L.J.  186
(1986).  This  is not to say, however, that agency  cost analysis has not occasionally  informed
specific  analyses.  See, e.g., AdamJ. Hirsch,  Trusts  for Purposes: Policy, Ambiguity, and Anomaly
in the Uniform Laws, 26  FLA.  ST.  U. L.  REV.  913, 928  (1999);  Adam J. Hirsch  & William  KS.
Wang, A  Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68  IND.  L.J.  1, 28-30  (1992);Jonathan  R.  Ma-
cey, Private Trusts  for the Provision  of Private  Goods, 37 EMORY LJ. 295, 315-21  (1988);  Stewart
E.  Sterk, Jurisdictional  Competition To Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:  R.IP.  for the R.A.P.,
24  CARDOZO  L.  REv.  2097, 2111-14  (2003).
4  ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR.  & GARDINER  C.  MEANS,  THE  MODERN  CORPORATION  AND  PRI-
VATE  PROPERTY  5  (1932).
5  1  AUSTIN WAKEMAN  SCOTT  &  WILLIAM  FRANKLIN  FRATCHER,  THE  LAW  OF  TRUSTS  §  1,
at 2  (4th ed.  1987)  [hereinafter  ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS].
6  See Henry  Hansmann  & Ugo Mattei,  The Functions  of Trust Law: A  Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  434,  435  (1998)  (noting that the "literature  ...
tends to be doctrinal rather than...  functional in perspective"); Ogus, supra note 3, at 186
(noting the "neglect" of the trust by  the law-and-economics  movement).
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ysis  should be  amenable  to  extension  in future  work  to  commercial
and  charitable  trusts.7  The  present Article's  contribution  is  the  sys-
tematic application  of agency  theory to  the  law of donative  trusts.
Consider a  stylized  example.  In  the  prototypical  donative  trust,
the settlor ("S")  in effect contracts with  the trustee  ("T")  to manage  a
portfolio of assets  in the  best interests  of the beneficiaries  ("BI"  and
"B2," collectively  the "Bs"),  subject  to  the  ex ante restraints  imposed
by the  settlor.8  Hence,  using  the  vocabulary  of agency  in  economic
rather than  legal parlance,  T can be  viewed  as  the agent of S; but T
can  also be  viewed  as  the agent  of BI  and  B2.  To  the  extent that T
might slight or ignore what S would have wanted in the ongoing man-
agement  of the  trust,  we  have  a problem  of agency  costs  in  the S/T
relationship.  But to the  extent that T might slight or ignore what B1
and B2  want  in  the  ongoing  management  of the  trust, we  have  the
usual agency  problem when risk-bearing  (here by Bi  and B2)  is sepa-
rated from management  (here by T).  So where  the  corporate  form
presents one dominant source of agency costs  (the shareholder/man-
ager relationship),  the trust presents two.  This means that even if the
vocabulary for the economic analysis of trust law will be similar to that
of the economic analysis of corporate law, the underlying analysis will
be  different.  Given  the  trust's  independent  significance  in  donative
transfers,  commercial  transactions,  and  capital  markets, 9  this should
not be surprising.
That S saddled her transfer to BI and B2 with the friction of com-
peting principal-agent relationships  is  the  core  insight that  animates
the agency costs analysis.  This Article's normative claim is that the law
should minimize  the agency costs inherent in locating managerial  au-
thority with  the trustee  (T)  and  the  residual  claim  with  the  benefi-
ciaries (Bi  and B2),  but only to the extent that doing so is consistent
with the ex ante instructions of the settlor (S).  This qualification  gives
priority  to  the  settlor over  the beneficiaries  as  the  trustee's  primary
principal.'0  The  positive  claim  is  that, at least  with  respect  to  tradi-
7  On extensions  to charitable trusts, see  infra notes  188, 248, 314 and accompanying
text. On extensions  to commercial  trusts, see infra notes 13-14,  153, 309-10 and accompa-
nying text.
8  SeeJohn  H. Langbein,  The Contractarian  Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE  L.J. 625
(1995);  see  also Edward  C.  Halbach, Jr.,  Uniform Acts,  Restatements, and Trends in American
Trust Law at Centuy's End, 88  CAL.  L. REv. 1877,  1881  (2000)  (noting that developments in
modern  trust law have  emphasized  flexible  management "in the pursuit of the best inter-
ests of trust beneficiaries  within  the settlor's  legally permissible  objectives").
9  See, e.g.,  Henry Hansmann  & Ugo  Mattei,  Trust Law in the United States.  A Basic Study
of Its Special Contribution,  46 AM.J.  COMp.  L.  133,  133  (1998);  sources cited in infra note  14.
10  For a brief derivation of the basic goal, see infra note 136.  In a sense, this Article is
a  (long) answer  to the question posed by Allen and Kraakman: "If the trustee relationship
is analogized  to the agency  relationship, whom should we  view as the principal?"  WILLIAM
T. ALLEN &  REINIER  KRAAKIA.,  COMMENTARIES  AND  CASES ON  THE  LAW OF BusINESS ORGANI-
ZATION  § 2.3.3,  at 38  (2003);  see also id. at 36 (comparing trust law and agency law).  Note,
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tional  doctrines,1"  the  law  conforms  to  the  suggested  normative
approach.
12
Theoretical  and  practical  payoffs  to  the  agency  costs  approach
abound.  On  the  theoretical  side,  this  approach  points  to  a further
research agenda for the  economic analysis  of trust law.  Beneficiaries
assume the role of risk-bearing residual claimants  (at least in the con-
text  of donative  trusts13),  and  important  questions  for  research  in-
clude the following:  When and why do individuals choose  to organize
their relationships, both commercial and donative, by reference to the
law of trusts rather  than  some  other branch  of organizational  law?14
What is the private trust's default governance arrangement, and why is
that arrangement  the default?  Does the law do a good job of supply-
ing the  terms  for which  the  relevant  parties  would  have  bargained
with full information  and low negotiation  costs?  And, for that matter,
however,  that under  traditional  doctrine  the settlor,  even  if living,  cannot enforce  the
terms  of the trust, see infra Part IV.B.3.  Hence  the length of the answer.
11  Analysis  of  modern  reforms,  such  as  asset  protection  trusts,  see,  e.g.,  Stewart  E.
Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom  ?, 85  CORNELL L. REv.  1035  (2000),
and the abrogation of the Rule Against Perpetuities,  see, e.g.,Joel  C.  Dobris, TheDeath of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends-An  Essay, 35  REAL  PROP.  PROB.  & TR.  J.
601  (2000);Jesse  Dukeminier  & James  E. Krier,  The Rise of the Perpetual  Trust, 50  UCLA L.
REv. 1303  (2003); Sterk, supra note 3; Angela M. Vallario,  Death  by a Thousand Cuts: The Rule
Against Perpetuities,  25 J.  LEGIS.  141  (1999);  Note,* Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, 116 HA-v.  L.  REV.  2588  (2003),  requires consideration  not only of agency costs  analy-
sis,  but  also  reference  to  the  political  economy  of modern  trust  law  reform  and  the
dynamics  of the domestic and international  regulatory competition  for trust business.  See
Robert  H.  Sitkoff & Jonathan  L.  Corsico, Jurisdictional  Competition  for Trust  Business:
Follow  the  Money  (unpublished  manuscript, on  file with author).
12  This Article is therefore in superficial tension with Jonathan Macey's  argument that
common  law  trust doctrines do  not promote  efficiency.  See Macey,  supra note  3,  at  296.
For a variety  of institutional  reasons  that Jeffrey  Gordon  has lucidly described,  trends  to-
ward efficiency in trust law reflecta blend of common law and statutory reform.  SeeJeffrey
N.  Gordon,  The Puzzling  Persistence of the Constrained  Prudent  Man Rule, 62  N.Y.U.  L.  REv. 52
(1987).  For further discussion,  see  Sitkoff & Corsico,  supra note  11.
13  See discussion  infra Parts III.D  & IV.A.  The parenthetical  qualification  is necessary
because  in contrast to  the settlor  of a typical donative  trust,  "the settlor  in  a commercial
trust  almost  always  retains  a  residual  interest."  Steven  L.  Schwarcz,  Commercial Trusts as
Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery,  58  Bus. LAW.  559,  562  (2003).
14  See Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at  560,  573-84  (comparing  commercial  trusts  with
other forms of business organization);  see also Michael  Bryan,  Reflections on Some Commercial
Applications of the Trust, in  KEY  DEVELOPMENrs  IN  CORPORATE  LAW  AND  TRUSTS  LAW 205-26
(Ian  Ramsay  ed.,  2002)  (discussing  the  increased  commercial  utility  of the  trust  form);
Hansmann & Mattei,  supra note 6,  at 472-78 (comparing  the trust form and the corporate
form); John  H. Langbein,  The Secret Life of the Trust: The  Trust as an Instrument of Commerce,
107 YALE  L.J.  165,  189  (1997)  (discussing  the many  commercial  uses  of the trust form);
Steven L. Schwarcz,  Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations:  An Invitation to Comparatists,
13 DuwEJ.  COMP.  & INrT'L L. 321,  321  (2003)  (stating that "trusts are increasingly  employed
as business  organizations  in a wide range  of commercial  and financial  transactions  in  the
United States").  In particular,  the trust  plays a critical  role  as a special  purpose  entity  in
structured  finance  transactions.  See, e.g.,  Edward  M.  lacobucci  & Ralph A. Winter,  Asset
Securitization  and Asymmetric Information  (Apr. 15,  2003)  (unpublished  manuscript, on
file  with  the Cornell  Law  Review);  Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at 564-65.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
who are the  relevant parties?  What is the role of markets-including
labor, product, and capital15-in  all of this?  Because  trusts are chiefly
governed  by state  law,  is  there  a  regulatory  competition  among  the
states, and  if so,  to  what end?16
On  the  practical  side,  agency  cost  analysis  offers  fresh  insights
into recurring problems  in trust law including, among others, modifi-
cation  and  termination,  settlor standing, fiduciary  litigation,  trust-in-
vestment law and the duty of impartiality,  trustee removal, the  role of
so-called  trust protectors,  and spendthrift  trusts.  On  several  of these
and other  issues,  there  is  divergence  between American  and English
law.  Thus,  a further  benefit  of the  agency  costs  approach  is  that  it
provides  a framework  for evaluating  the  competing  Anglo-American
views.
This  Article  is  organized  as  follows.  Part  I  situates  the  analysis
within  the  current  trust law  literature.  More  specifically,  Part  I  ad-
vances  the  claim  that classifying  trust  law  as  organizational  law,  and
subjecting it to agency cost analysis, is the logical next step in the nas-
cent economic analysis of the donative private trust.  Thus, this Article
does  not  advance  the  inherently  dubious  claim  that  all  prior  ap-
proaches  to  the  trust should  be discarded.  On  the  contrary,  the in-
sights arising out of the debate whether trust law  is closer to contract
law  or  property  law  point  to  the  viability  of  the  agency  costs  ap-
proach.17  In  Part II, the  Article  briefly  reviews  the agency cost theo-
ries  of the  firm  and  the  economics  of the  principal-agent  problem.
Both  underpin this Article's agency  costs approach  to  trust law.  Part
III  identifies  and then illuminates,  through  agency  cost analysis,  the
key relationships between  the parties who have an interest in the trust
property  or  its  management.  Finally,  Part  IV  develops  the  Article's
positive  and  normative  claims with  reference  to  illustrative doctrines
including, but not limited  to,  the  recurring  issues mentioned  above.
In  so doing, Part IV helps to  illuminate some of the  endogenous  gov-
15  See Robert  H. Sitkoff,  Trust Law,  Corporate Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J.
CORP.  L.  565  (2003).
16  See Dukeminier & Krier, supra  note  11; Sterk, supra  note  11,  at 1037-38; Sterk, supra
note  3, at 2098;  Sitkoff & Corsico,  supra note  11.
17  The ensuing  agency costs  analysis  owes  some of its stimulation  to a  pair of recent
articles, the first by John  Langbein and  the second  by Henry  Hansmann  and Ugo  Mattei.
See  Langbein,  supra note  8;  Hansmann  &  Mattei,  supra note  6;  cf  Henry  Hansmann  &
Reinier  Kraakman,  The Essential Role of Organizational  Law, 110  YALE  L.J.  387,  416  (2000)
(describing  trust  law  as  a  form  of organizational  law);  Thomas  W.  Merrill  & Henry  E.
Smith,  The Property/Contract  Interface, 101  CoL  uM.  L.  REv. 773, 843-49  (2001)  (same); Ogus,
supra note 3, at 188 (discussing agency costs in private  trusts).  Its more general inspiration
is  the nexus of contracts models of the firm.  See sources cited supra note  1;  see also discus-
sion  infra Part II.
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ernance  considerations  relevant  to  the  initial  choice  to  make  use  of
trust law rather than  some  other branch  of organizational  law. t,
I
TRUST  LAW  AS  ORGANIZATIONAL  LAW
This Part advances  the claim that trust law  blends features famil-
iar from both property and contract law.  Hence  trust law is properly
classified, and best understood, as organizational  law.  This Part there-
fore builds  on the debate whether trust law is more closely related  to
contract  law or property  law.  Early  participants in  this debate, which
has been ongoing for over  100 years, include Frederic Maitland  (who
took a  contractarian  perspective),  Austin  Scott  (who took  a  proprie-
tary perspective),  and Harlan  Fiske Stone  (who took a contractarian
perspective). 19  More  recently, in both  the United States  and abroad,
commentators  have  shown  renewed  interest  in the  debate, 20  and  in
18  Although admittedly relevant to the choice between  organizational forms, this Arti-
cle puts the exogenous  tax and bankruptcy features of the  private trust to the side (they are
exogenous  in that they stem from the tax and bankruptcy codes rather than trust law).  For
discussion,  see  Langbein,  supra note  14,  at 180-81;  Schwarcz, supra note  13, at 581-83.
19  On  the  "dialogue"  between  Maitland  and  Scott, see  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at
644-46 (collecting and describing their publications);  see also Harlan  F. Stone, The Nature of
the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17  COLUM.  L. REV.  467  (1917).
20  For modern American  manifestations,  see  Gregory  S.  Alexander,  The Dead Hand
and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN.  L. REV.  1189,  1196-97 & n.13 (1985);
Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek,  Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the Uniform Trust
Code and Other Current  Law: Does a Contractual  Lense Help Clarify the Rights of Beneficiaries?, 67
Mo.  L. REV.  241,  244-46  (2002);Joel  C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust
at the New Millennium, or, We Don't Have to Think of  England Anymore, 62 ALB.  L.  REV. 543, 546
n.22 (1998);  Michael A. Heller,  The Boundaries of Private  Property, 108 YALE  L.J.  1163,  1178 &
n.73  (1999);  Merrill & Smith, supra note  17, at 844  n.248; see also ELIAS  CLARK  ET AL.,  GRA-
TUITOUS  TRANSFERS:  WILLS,  INTESTATE  SUCCESSION,  TRUSTS,  Givrs,  FUTURE  INTERESTS,  AND
ESTATE  AND  GiFrt  TAXATION  454-56  (4th  ed.  1999);  JOEL C.  DOBRIS  ET  AL.,  ESTATES  AND
TRUSTS 476-77 (2d ed. 2003); RICHARD  POWELL, POWELL  ON  REAL  PROPERTY  1 513[3], at 41-
141-50  (Michael  Allan Wolf ed.,  rev.  2003);  Gregory  S.  Alexander,  The  Transformation  of
Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800-1914, 5 L.  & HIST.  REv.  303,  336-50  (1987).  For modern
English  manifestations,  see  RICHARD  EDWARDS  &  NIGEL  STOCKWELL,  TRUSTS  AND  EQUITY
16-29 (5th  ed. 2002);  GRAHAM  MOFFAT  ET  AL.,  TRUSTS  LAW:  TEXTS  AND  MATERIALS  190-95
(3d  ed. 1999);  PAUL  TODD  &  SARAH  WILSON,  TEXTBOOK  ON  TRUSTS  §§ 2.2,  2.3,  at 50-69
(6th  ed.  2003); Joshua  Getzler, Legislative Incursions into Modern Trusts Doctrine in England:
The  Trustee Act  2000 and the  Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act  1999, 2  GLOBAL JURIST
TOPIcS  Art.  2,  at 6-14  (2002)  [hereinafter  Getzler, Legislative Incursions]; Joshua Getzler,
Patterns of Fusion, in  THE  CLASSIFICATION  OF  OBLIGATIONS  157,  164-67  (Peter  Birks  ed.,
1997)  [hereinafter  Getzler, Patterns]; George  L. Gretton,  Trusts Without Equity, 49 Ir'L  &
COMP.  L.Q. 599,  603-08  (2000); David  Hayton,  Developing the Obligation Characteristic  of the
Trust, 117  L.Q. REV. 96,  1008 (2001);  Neil Jones, Trusts in England  After the Statute of Uses: A
View from the  16th Century,  in  ITINERA  FIDUCIAE:  TRUST  AND  TREUHAND  IN  HISTORICAL  PER-
SPECTIVE  173,  192-96  (Richard  Helmholz  & Reinhard  Zimmerman  eds.,  1998);  Paul Mat-
thews,  From Obligation to Property, and Back Again? The Future of the Non-Charitable Purpose
Trust,  in  EXTENDING  THE  BOUNDARIES  OF  TRUSTS  AND  SIMILAR  RING-FENCED  FUNDS  203,
203-41  (David Hayton ed.,  2002)  [hereinafter EXTENDING  THE  BOUNDARIES]; Jonathan  Hil-
liard,  On the Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship-A Reply  to Professors Matthews and Parkin-
son, 17 TOLLEY'S  TR.  L.  INT'L 144  (2003); Michael  Macnair,  The Conceptual  Basis of Trusts inCORNELL IAW REVIEW
particularJohn Langbein,  Henry Hansmann, Ugo Mattei, and Reinier
Kraakman  have infused  it with  greater  economic sophistication.
2 1
A.  Trust Law  as Property  Law
Trust law  is  most frequently  classified  as  a  species  of property
law.22  For example,  the  1959  Restatement (Second) of Trusts character-
izes the "creation of a trust ...  as a conveyance  of the beneficial inter-
est  in  the  trust  property  rather  than  as  a  contract."23   Gregory
Alexander  recently  distinguished  the  trustee's  fiduciary  obligations
from those of corporate and other fiduciaries on the ground that the
fiduciary relationship in  trust law is "property-based."24  A leading En-
glish  treatise  contends  that  the  law  of trusts  "is  at  the  heart  of the
common  law of property."25  The first two  volumes  of the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, published  in  final form in 2003,  retain  the view that
the  beneficiaries'  stake  in  a  trust  is  in  the  nature  of  a  property
interest.
26
However,  merely  classifying  trust  law  as  property  law,  without
coupling that classification with a functional analysis of the trust's pro-
prietary  or in rem features, does little to advance  our substantive un-
derstanding  of why trust law takes  the form that it does.27  To be sure,
the Later 17th and Early 18th Centuries, in ITINERA  FIDUCIAE,  supra, at 207, 221-29;  R.C.  No-
lan,  Property in a Fund,  120  L. Q. REV.  108,  111-17  (2004).  The debate manifests  elsewhere
as well,  both within  the common  law countries,  see Patrick Parkinson, Reconceptualising  the
Express Trust, 61  CAMBRIDGE  L.J.  657  (2002)  (Australia);  C.E.F. Rickett,  The  Classification of
Trusts, 18 N.Z.  U. L. REV.  305 (1999)  (New  Zealand),  and without, see Stefan Grundmann,
The Evolution of Trust and Treuhand in the 20th Century, in ITINERA  FIDUCIAE,  supra, at 469,
471-78  (Germany).
21  See Langbein,  supra note  8;  Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note  17;  Hansmann  &
Mattei,  supra note  6.
22  See Langbein,  supra note  8, at 643-46;  see also EUGENE  F.  SCOLES  ET AL.,  PROBLEMS
AND  MATERIALS  ON  DECEDENTS'  ESTATES  AND  TRUSTS  605-06  (6th  ed.  2000);  Parkinson,
supra note  20,  at 657-58.
23  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS,§  197 cmt. b  (1959);  see Langbein, supra  note  8,
at 648-49.
24  Gregory  S.  Alexander,  A  Cognitive Theory  of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL  L.
REV.  767,  768 &  n.7  (2000);  see also Getzler,  Legislative Incursions, supra note  20, Art.  2,  at
10-14  (similar  analysis by an  English  trust scholar);  cf  Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 570-82
(comparing  the fiduciary  obligation  in corporate  law and trust  law).
25  ROBERT  A.  PEARCE  & JOHN  STEVENS,  THE  LAW  OF  TRUSTS  AND  EQUITABLE  OBLIGA-
TIONS  V (3d  ed.  2002).
26  See, e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  § 5(i)  & cmt. i  (2003)  (stating that con-
tracts to  convey or  for the benefit of third  parties are  not trusts).
27  See Hansmann  &  Mattei,  supra note  6,  at  435  ("While  there  is  an  extensive  legal
literature on the institution of the trust, that literature-whether  domestic  or comparative
in  focus-tends  to  be  doctrinal  rather  than  broadly  functional  in  perspective.");  id. at
435-38  (discussing  the  benefits  of a  functional  analysis  of  trust  law);  see  also Langbein,
supra note 8, at 643-69 (discussing suppression  of the contractarian  perspective and noting
the functional  correspondence  between trust and contract); Sarah Worthington,  The  Com-
mercial Utility of the Trust Vehicle, in  EXTENDING  THE  BOUNDARIES, supra note 20,  at 135  (not-
ing the  general lack of functional  analysis of trusts).
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the existence of specifically identified property (the trust res)  is neces-
sary for trust formation.28  But continuing to deem trust law a species
of property  law  on  that basis,29  or  to  do  so  because  of the  private
trust's origin in the conveyance  of land, obscures  not only the  trust's
proprietary functions, but also its highly enabling, elastic, flexible, and
default  nature  with  respect  to  in  personam  relations.  As  Scott's  fa-
mous  treatise  observes,  "[t]he  duties  of the  trustee  are  such  as  the
creator  of the trust may choose to impose; the interests of the benefi-
ciaries  are such as  he may choose  to confer  upon them."
3 0
Accordingly,  the task for the functional  study of trust law should
be  to  identify  the  trust's  in  rem,  proprietary  elements  and  then  to
illuminate  how  they  have  been  blended  with  its  in  personam,  con-
tractarian elements.  As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith  recently ob-
served,  the modern  law of trusts offers many of the in rem benefits of
property law while simultaneously  offering much  of the in personam
flexibility of contract  law.
3'
B.  The  Contractarian  Challenge
In  an  important  recent  article, John  Langbein  offered  a  func-
tional account of trust law that challenged  the traditional view by con-
tending  that  trust  law's  contractarian  elements  predominate.  To
Langbein,  "the deal  between settlor and  trustee  is functionally indis-
tinguishable from the modern third-party-beneficiary contract.  Trusts
are  contracts."3 2  In  comparison  to  the  meaning  of contractarian  as
the  term  is  used  in  the  literature  of corporate  law  and  economics,
Langbein's contractarian  approach  is more closely allied with the law
of contracts than with the "nexus of contracts" metaphor that informs
28  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §  74  (1959);  IA  SCOTT  ON TRUSTS,  supra note 5,
§ 74, at 428-32;  see alsoJane B. Baron,  The Trust Res and Donative  Intent, 61  TUL. L. REv. 45,
47-50  (1986)  (describing the "res requirement").  This is  an important difference between
the  trust and a  life  insurance  contract.  The  insurance  company,  unlike  a trustee,  is  not
required  to  segregate  assets.  See,  e.g.,  JESSE  DUKEMINIER  &  STANLEY  M.  JOHANSON,  WILLS,
TRUSTS,  AND  ESTATES  332  n.2  (6th ed.  2000).
29  See IA SCOTT ON TRUSTS,  supra note  5, § 74, at 428-32; Parkinson, supra note 20, at
658-59,  663-67;  Rickett,  supra note  20,  at 308-09;  see also Baron, supra note  28,  at 50-70
(criticizing traditional justifications for the res requirement without analyzing whether the
requirement  is functional);  cf Langbein,  supra note 8,  at 627  ("In truth, the trust is a deal,
a bargain about how  the trust assets are  to be  managed and  distributed.").
30  1 Scorr  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5, §  1, at 2.
31  See Merrill  & Smith,  supra note  17,  at 843-49;  see also Henry  Hansmann  & Reinier
Kraakman,  Property,  Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibil-
ity of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL  STUD.  373, 375  (2002);  cf  FRANCIS  S.  PHILBRICK,  PROPERTY  150-60
(1939);  Hayton, supra note 20, at 107-08.  A further useful feature of trust law is its amena-
bility  to the creation  of exotic beneficial interests without dividing legal title.  See, e.g.,  Mer-
rill & Smith, supra note 17,  at 848-49;  Heller, supra note  20, at 1178.
32  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 627;  see  also Parkinson,  supra note  20, at 659  (arguing
'that  the law of trusts is better conceptualised  as a species of obligation rather than being
understood as a form  of property ownership").
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the agency cost theories of the firm. 33  On this view, the basis for the
rights and remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee-which is to
say  the  law  of  trust  governance-might  be  understood,  for  exposi-
tional purposes,  as  a third-party beneficiary  contract between  the set-
tlor and trustee.
34
Langbein's  analysis implies that trust law's  role is  to offer a set of
standardized  terms  that minimize  transaction  costs  for the  deal  be-
tween  the  settlor and  the  trustee.  By  invoking  the  law of trusts,  the
settlor and the trustee need only record the extent to which their deal
deviates from the default governance  regime.35  This view has  two im-
portant normative  implications.  First, trust law's  default governance
regime, including most critically the fiduciary obligation of the trustee
to the  beneficiaries, 36  should  reflect  the  terms for which  the  parties
would likely have bargained  with  low negotiation  costs and  full infor-
mation.  Second, courts should employ an intention-seeking approach
on questions  of interpretation.3 7  Thus, with  respect to matters  of in-
ternal trust governance,  Langbein demonstrates the positive and nor-
mative  power  of  the  sort  of  hypothetical  bargain  analysis  that  is
familiar from both  contract and corporate  law and economics. 3 8
For purposes of understanding  the  relevance  of trust  law  to the
dealings  of the  trust's  principal parties  with  outsiders,  however,  the
model  of the  trust as functionally  equivalent  to a third-party  benefici-
ary contract encounters difficulty.  In the usual third-party beneficiary
contract,  the rights of the parties and third-party beneficiaries  do not
touch the rights  of other nonparties.  But regulating the relationships
with outsiders of the trust's insiders (the trustee, the beneficiaries, and
the settlor)  is a  key feature of trust law 39 -- one  that implicates  some-
33  Compare Langbein,  supra note  8, at 627  ("Trusts are  Contracts."),  with BAINBRIOGE,
supra note  1, at 28  ("As  used by contractarians,  however, the  term  [nexus of contracts]  is
not limited  to those  relationships  that constitute  legal  contracts.").  See Melvin  A.  Eisen-
berg,  The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual  Nature of the Firm,
24J.  COR'. L. 819, 822-23  (1999); see also discussion  infta Part II.C; sources cited supra note
1.
34  See Langbein,  supra note  8, at 627.  One  might think of the  rights and duties  im-
posed by the trust instrument as stemming not from trust law but rather from the  law of the
trust.  Cf E.  ALLAN  FARNSWORTH,  CoNTRAcTs  §  7.1,  at 425-26  (3d ed. 1999)  (distinguishing
between  "contract law" and the "law  of the contract").
35  See Langbein,  supra note 8,  at 660; see also Ogus, supra  note 3,  at 206-07  (noting the
"transaction  costs savings"  provided  by  trust law's  default rules).
36  See discussion  infra Part IV.D.
37  See infra note  110 and accompanying  text.
3-8  See, e.g.,  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling  Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99  YALE  L.J.  87,  89-91  (1989)  (collecting  illustrative  examples  of
such  analysis);  see Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 630, 663-64.
39  This is the crucial contribution of Hansmann  and Mattei.  See Hansmann  & Mattei,
supra note 6, at 466;  see also Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note 17, at 390 ("[T]he essential
role  of all forms of organizational  law  is to  provide for the creation  of a pattern of credi-
tors'  rights-a form of 'asset  partitioning'-that could not practicably be established other-
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thing of an in  rem  dynamic.  This  includes  the  law of trustee  insol-
vency  (an  exceedingly  rare  phenomenon  in  donative  trusts  but  an
important  consideration  for  commercial  trusts) ;40  spendthrift  trusts
(the  more  common  problem  of beneficiary  insolvency) ;41  equitable
tracing principles; 42 and the continuity of the office of the trustee de-
spite  turnover  in  its  occupant.43  Explanation  of these  features  re-
quires  acknowledgement  of trust law's proprietary  features.  Thus,  as
Langbein  concluded,  "[t]rust  is  a  hybrid  of  contract  and  property,
and  acknowledging  contractarian  elements  does  not  require  disre-
garding  property components  whose  convenience  abides. 44
C.  Asset Partitioning and Organizational  Law
In  an  article  subsequent  to  Langbein's  that  explored  the  func-
tional  relevance  of trust law's  proprietary  features, Henry  Hansmann
and Ugo Mattei argued "that it is precisely the property-like aspects of
the trust that are the principal contribution of trust law."'45  This is not
to  say that they  took up the mantle  of Austin Scott.  To the  contrary,
they "agree with Langbein that, so far as the relationships between  the
settlor, the  trustee, and  the beneficiary  are concerned,  trust law adds
very little  to  contract  law." '46  Rather,  they argued that  the important
wise."  (footnote  omitted));  Hansmann  &  Mattei,  supra note 9,  at  147  ("[T]he important
contribution  of trust law lies  not in  its ordering, via default  rules of contract, of the rela-
tionships among  the three principal  parties to a trust-like  relationship.  ..  but rather in its
ordering  of  the  relationships  between  those  persons  and  third  parties  with  whom  they
deal.").  For further discussion  of this function  of trust law, see  infra Part I.C.
40  Langbein called the law of trustee insolvency "the weak  point of contractarian anal-
ysis."  Langbein,  supra  note  8, at 667; see also Hansmann  & Mattei,  supra note 6, at 454-61,
469-72  (noting that the transaction  costs of using contract to protect  the trust assets from
an insolvent trustee's creditors  "would often be prohibitively high");  Merrill & Smith, supra
note  17, at 846-47  (discussing  third party information  processing costs and  trustee insol-
vency).  On  the relevance of insolvency to commercial  trusts, see Schwarcz,  supra  note  13,
at 581-83.
41  See generally RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §§ 149-62  (1959)  (discussing spend-
thrift trusts);  infra Part IV.C.2  (same).  Although  the law of contracts  sometimes  allows the
promisee  (the  role  played by the  settlor in  Langbein's  model)  to disable  the  third-party
beneficiary from assigning her chose in action  to another, see FARNSWORTH,  supra note 34,
§  11.4, at 717-18, it does not allow the promisee to disable the third-party beneficiary from
alienating that interest to both voluntary and involuntary creditors.  See Hansmann  & Mat-
tei,  supra note  6,  at 452-53  & n.58.
42  See infta Part IV.C.1.
43  See infra Part III.B.  In fairness, however, many contracts  provide for assumption or
assignment  to  deal  with  the  turnover  problem.  See,  e.g.,  FARNSWORTH,  supra note  34,
§§  11.1-11.11.
44  Langbein, supra  note 8, at 669.  Maitland's conclusion is similar.  A beneficial inter-
est in a trust "is something far better than  the mere benefit of a promise."  MAITLAND,  supra
note  2,  at 353.  Note also the exclusion  of the declaration of trust from Langbein's analysis.
See Langbein, supra note 8,  at 672-75; see also Farkas  v. Williams,  125 N.E.2d 600  (Ill.  1955)
(holding a  trust declaration  to  be a valid inter vivos  trust).
45  Hansmann  & Mattei,  supra note  6, at 469.
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contribution  of trust  law  is  its  ability  "to  facilitate  an  accompanying
reorganization  of rights and responsibilities  between the three princi-
pal parties  [setfior, trustee, and beneficiary]  and third parties, such as
creditors,  with  whom  the  principal  parties  deal."47  Hansmann  and
Mattei refer in particular to "the use of trust law to shield  trust assets
from claims of the  trustee's  personal creditors."4 8
Thus Hansmann and Mattei stressed the importance  of trust law's
"asset partitioning" function.49  The partitioning of assets provided for
by trust law allows  the  trustee  to  deal separately with creditors  of the
trust  property and those of his  or her own  personal  property.  With
respect to all creditors, the law of trusts in effect (though not formally,
at least not yet50 ) splits  the  trustee into  "two  distinct legal  persons:  a
natural person contracting on behalf of himself, and an artificial per-
son acting on behalf of the beneficiaries."51  This creation of two  dis-
tinct  legal  persons  could  not  feasibly  be  reproduced  with  explicit
contracting.52  Asset  partitioning  therefore  represents  an  important
difference  between  organizational  forms  and  simple  contractual  ar-
47  Id. at 472;  see also id. at 451-64  (outlining the manner by which trust law organizes
the relationships  between various  parties).  Although  this analysis  identifies an important
proprietary aspect  of trust law,  it remains insufficient  to support  the broader  claims  that
"organizational  law  is  much  more  important  as  property  law  than  as  contract  law,"
Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note  17, at 390, or that "[p]rivately prepared standard form
contracts" could match the drafting efficiencies  of the present system of public provision of
default rules for trust governance,  Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6,  at 449.  True, in the
absence of trust law the parties could  incorporate  the language of the  Restatement's fiduci-
ary provisions into their deal.  See id. at 448.  But the viability of that approach depends on
the  existence  of ample judicial  exegesis  of the  Restatement's text.  Precedent  is  a  public
good,  and  the  terms of a  privately prepared  contract  can be  duplicated  by  anyone.  See
EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note  1,  at  35;  see also Marcel  Kahan  &  Michael  Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in  Corporate Contracting  (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83
VA.  L.  REv.  713  (1997);  Michael Klausner,  Corporations,  Corporate Law, and Networks of Con-
tracts, 81  VA.  L. REv.  757 (1995);  Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?,  5-6 (Ill.  Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03-11, 2003),  available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=451060.
48  Hansmann  & Mattei,  supra note  6,  at 438; see  id. at 454-61.
49  This contribution  may be understood as a specific application  of a broader project
on  organizational  law by  Hansmann  and Reinier  Kraakman.  See Hansmann &  Kraakman,
supra note  17, at 414-17; Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note  31,  at 405-07.
50  See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  2 cmt. a & rep. notes  §  2 cmt.  a;  Halbach,
supra note  8,  at  1882  ("Without abandoning  the basic  definition of a  trust as a fiduciary
relationship,  there appear to be subtle but practically significant departures from the tradi-
tional concept that  a trust is not an 'entity."');  see also Tatarian  v. Commercial Union  Ins.
Co., 672 N.E.2d  997,  1000 (Mass.  App. Ct. 1996)  (analogizing  the trust at issue  to a corpo-
ration  and  treating the  trust as a  separate  entity);  cf Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at 574-75
(discussing recognition  of trusts  as legal  entities).
51  Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note  17,  at 416.
52  See Hansmann  &  Mattei,  supra note  6,  at 466  (noting  that significant  transaction
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rangements. 53  The former have an external proprietary or in rem di-
mension  that  complements  their  internal  contractarian  or  in
personam  features.
By providing a functional  explanation for, and a specific identifi-
cation  of,  the  essential  proprietary  dimension  of  trust  law,  the
Hansmann  and  Mattei  project  may  be  harmonized  with  Langbein's
contractarian  approach.  Taken  together,  they  show  that  the  law  of
trusts, like  the law of other organizations,  offers a careful blending of
in rem  and  in  personam  features.  This implies  that, going forward,
the study of the law of private trusts should more closely resemble the
study  of other  organizational  forms,54  an  endeavor  in which  agency
costs  analysis  abounds.
D.  The  Rise  of the  Managerial  Trust
The  empirical  observation  that  the  modern  use  of the  private
trust increasingly  resembles the use of other organizational forms pro-
vides  further support  for  treating  trust  law  as  organization  law.  As
Langbein and others have demonstrated, the private trust has evolved
from  a vehicle  for conveying  and preserving  ancestral  land  into  an
organizing  device  that allows owners  of property  to ensure  the ongo-
ing and intergenerational professional  management of their wealth. 55
This evolution  in the  use of the trust stems  from the  liberalization  of
testamentary freedom,  the lifting of feudal restrictions  on land trans-
fer, and the shift in modern  wealth away from land.56
Accordingly,  in  addition  to  classic  but still  relevant  context-spe-
cific  rationales  such  as  minimizing  taxes  and  asset  protection,  the
modern  donative  trust is also used more  generally to bring together
portfolio management  skills with  investment capital.  The  use of pro-
fessional  fiduciaries  is reported  to be on the rise.57  The default rules
53  See Hansmann  & Kraakman,  supra note  17, at  391-98;  see also George  G. Triantis,
Organizations  as Internal Capital  Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral  and Trusts in
Commercial and Charitable  Enterprises, 117 HARv.  L.  REv.  (forthcoming 2004).
54  For a specific application  of this general point, see Richard  W. Painter, Contracting
Around Conflicts in a Family Representation: Louis Brandeis and the Warren Trust, 8 U.  CHI.  L.
SCH.  ROUNDTABLE  353, 367-69  (2001).
55  See  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 632-43;  see,  e.g.,  MOFFAT  ET  AL.,  supra note  20,  at
24-36;  Edward C. Halbach, Jr.,  The Uses and  Purposes of Trusts in the United States, in MODERN
INTERNATIONAL  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  TRUST  LAw 123,  133-38  (David  Hayton ed.,  1999).
56  SeeJohn  H. Langbein,  The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission,
86 MICH.  L.  REV.  722  (1988)  (discussing  historical  changes  in  family wealth);  MOFFAT  ET
AL.,  supra note  20, at 33 ("The significance for trusts law of this shift in the nature of family
wealth-holdings-that is, from land (predominantly)  to investment assets as well as land-
can  scarcely be  overstated.").
57  See Alexander, supra note 24, at 775 ("Today,  the vast majority of trusts are adminis-
tered  by  large  financial  institutions,  such  as  trust  companies and  trust  developments  of
commercial  banks."); Langbein,  supra note  8, at 638  ("Private trustees still abound, but the
prototypical  modern  trustee  is  the fee-paid professional,  whose  business  is  to  enter into
2004]CORNELL LAW REVIEW
governing  trust  investment  now require  something  of a  total  return
investment  strategy  consistent  with  modern  portfolio  theory.58  The
fiduciary obligation has eclipsed limitations on the trustee's powers as
the  primary tool for aligning the  interests  of the  trustee, who  in the
modern private trust is vested with vast discretion, with the interests of
the beneficiaries. 59  All  of this supports  the view  that, going forward,
the study of trust law should more closely resemble the study of other
organizational  forms.  This  is  perhaps  clearest  with  respect  to  the
problem  of agency  costs  in the  modern managerial  trust.
II
ECONOMIC  FOUNDATIONS
For those unfamiliar with  the agency cost theories of the firm or
the  economics of the principal-agent problem,  this Part offers a brief
overview.  The goal  is to provide  context for the subsequent applica-
tion of these  ideas to  the  trust.
A.  The Theory of the Firm
In his 1937 essay,  The Nature of the Firm,  Ronald Coase endeavored
to  understand  why  some  economic  activity  took  place  within  firms
rather  than  in open  market  transactions. 6 0  Coase's  insight was  that
such activity would be  organized within firms when the expected  costs
of allocating  resources  by  internal  direction  were  less  than  the  ex-
pected costs of undertaking the same activity in an open-market trans-
action. 6 1  Coase  therefore  demonstrated  the  salience  of transaction
costs.  From  this  beginning  have  evolved  at  least  three  different
though  complementary approaches  to the  theory of the firm.
The transaction  costs approach,  which  is  most closely associated
with Oliver Williamson  and is probably the most direct descendant of
Coase's essay, focuses on the boundary between the firm and the mar-
and carry out trust agreements.");  see also Peering into Trust Industry Archives, 115 TR. & EST.
452,  504 (1976)  (describing  such changes within  the trust profession).  Several  readers of
earlier  drafts of this  Article  questioned  the  empirical  basis  for  this  claim.  Although  the
claim warrants further investigation, the specific point is not critical to the ensuing agency
costs analysis.  Thus this empirical study will remain  a project for another  article.  See gener-
ally Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 587-88  (discussing  the feasibility  of empirical study  in  trust
law).
58  See discussion  infra Part IV.A.2.
59  See Langbein,  supra note 8, at 637-43;  see alsoJohn  H. Langbein,  The Uniform Trust
Code:  Codification of the Law of Trusts in the  United States, 15  TOLLY's  TR.  L.  INT'L  66,  71
(2001)  (noting  the statutory trend  toward "maximum  trustee  empowerment").
60  R.H.  Coase,  The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMiCA  386  (1937).  For a  general  intro-
duction to Coase's theory and to other theoretical approaches  to the firm, see  Oliver Hart,
An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89  COLUM.  L. REv.  1757  (1989).
61  Coase,  supra note  60, at 390-93.
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ket.62  Property rights theories of the firm are "very much in the spirit
of the  transaction  cost  literature  of Coase  and  Williamson,  but  dif-
fer[ ] by focusing attention on the role of physical,  that is, nonhuman,
assets in a contractual  relationship. ' 63  The core relationships  that ag-
gregate  into  the  trust as  an organizational  form,  however,  are gener-
ally open-market  transactions  rather than  intra-firm  transfers.64  This
suggests that neither the transaction  costs nor the property rights ap-
proaches  are  as  immediately  relevant  to  the  present  project  as  the
agency cost theories.
Agency  cost theories  of the  firm model organizations  as webs  of
express, implied,  and metaphorical  contracts  among  individuals with
conflicting  interests.  At the center of this web  is an organizing legal
construct.65  The critical  insight of this so-called "nexus of contracts"
approach was  to demonstrate  the  importance  of principal-agent eco-
nomics for the study of organizations.  As Jensen and Meckling put it,
"[in]any  problems associated with  the  inadequacy of the current  the-
ory  of the  firm  can  also  be  viewed  as  special  cases  of the  theory  of
agency relationships."66  The agency cost theories of the firm focus on
the problems  of shirking and monitoring that stem from information
asymmetries  within  the  organization's  component  relationships.  A
brief review  of the economics  of agency  is  therefore  in order.67
62  See OLIVER  E.  WILLIAMSON,  THE ECONOMIC  INSTITUTIONS  OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS,  MAR-
KETS,  RELATIONAL  CONTRACTING  15-42  (1985).
63  Hart, supra note  60, at  1765;  see,  e.g.,  Sanford J.  Grossman  &  Oliver  D.  Hart,  The
Costs and Benefits of Ownership:  A Theory of Vertical and  Lateral  Integration,  94 J. POL.  ECON.  691
(1986);  Oliver Hart &John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98J. POL.  ECON.
1119  (1990).
64  See Rock  & Wachter, supra note 2,  at 664-66.
65  SeeJensen  & Meckling,  supra note  1, at 310 &  n.12; sources  cited supra note  1.
66  Jensen & Meckling,  supra note 1, at 308; see also Fama, supra note 1, at 291; Fama &
Jensen,  Separation, supra note  1, at 307-11.
67  For  accessible  and  relatively  nonmathematical  introductions  to  principal-agent
modeling,  see  HAL  R.  VARIAN,  INTERMEDIATE  MICROECONOMIcs:  A  MODERN  APPROACH
667-88  (6th  ed.  2003)  [hereinafter  VARIAN,  INTERMEDIATE  MICROECONOMICS];  PAUL  MIL-
GROM  &  JOHN  ROBERTS,  ECONOMICS,  ORGANIZATION  AND  MANAGEMENT  166-247  (1992);
Kenneth J. Arrow,  The Economics of Agency,  in PRINCIPALS  AND  AGENTS:  THE STRUCTURE  OF
BUSINESS  37-51  (John W.  Pratt & Richard J.  Zeckhauser  eds.,  1985); Kathleen  M.  Eisen-
hardt, Agency  Theory: An  Assessment  and Review,  14 ACAD.  MGMT.  REV.  57  (1989).  Several
formal  introductions  are  also  generally  accessible.  See  DAVID  M.  KREPS,  A  COURSE  IN
MICROECONOMIC  THEORY 577-719  (1990);JF-AN-JAcQUES  LAF o  r  & DAVID  MARTIMORT,  THE
THEORY OF  INCENTIVES:  THE  PRINCIPAL-AGENT  MODEL  (2002);  ANDREU  MAS-COLELL  ET  AL.,
MICROECONOMIC  THEORY  477-510  (1995);  HAL  R.  VARIAN,  MICROECONOMIC  ANALYSIS
440-71  (3d  ed.  1992)  [hereinafter  VARIAN,  MICROECONOMIC  ANALYSIS].  Important  schol-
arly statements  include Sanford J. Grossman  &  Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal
Agent  Problem,  51  ECONOMETRICA  7  (1983);  Bengt  Holmstr6m,  Moral Hazard and  Ob-
servability, 10  BELLJ.  ECON.  74  (1979);  Stephen  A. Ross,  The Economic Theory of Agency:  The
Principal's  Problem, 63 AM.  ECON.  REV.  134  (1973);  Steven Shavell,  Risk Sharing  and Incentives
in the Principal  and Agent Relationship, 10 BELLJ.  ECON.  55  (1979).  Finally, for discussion by
legal  scholars  of  the  applicability  of  principal-agent  modeling  to  legal  problems,  see
HOWELL E. JACKSON  ET AL.,  ANALYTICAL  METHODS  FOR  LAWYERS 88-100  (2003); Eric A. Pos-
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B.  The Economics of Agency
Using  the  vocabulary  of agency  in  economic  rather  than  legal
parlance, 6 8  agency problems  are caused  by the  impossibility of com-
plete  contracting when  one  party  (the  agent)  has  discretionary  and
unobservable decision-making  authority that affects  the wealth  of an-
other party (the principal).  When the agent's effort  is unobservable,
ex post enforcement of the ex ante bargain, no matter how detailed it
may be,  is impractical.  The problem  is that the principal  will be una-
ble  to  ascertain  whether  the  agent's breach  or an  exogenous  factor
caused a disappointing  result.  Thus, unless there  is  a perfect  correla-
tion between the agent's effort and the project's observable  profits, in
which  case  a good or bad return would  conclusively show  the level  of
the  agent's  effort,69  it  will  be  difficult  for  the  principal  to  prevent
shirking by the  agent.  This is the problem  of "hidden action," some-
times called "moral hazard."70  The problem is one of post-contractual
asymmetric  information.
71
Real  estate  agents  are  a  common  illustration  in  the  literature.
Consider an agent working on a five percent commission.72  Assuming
that the property  owner cannot feasibly monitor the agent's  daily ac-
tivities,  then the  agent will  have  no incentive  to  put in  even  $10  of
additional effort to increase the sale price by $100,  as the payoff to the
agent of the extra  effort  is  only  $5.  However,  the  $10  of additional
effort would have been in  the principal's  best interests.  If the parties'
interests were perfectly aligned  (as would be the case if the agent were
also the  property owner),  then the agent would have  undertaken  the
ner, Agency  Models in  Law and Economics, in  CHICAGO  LECTURES  IN LAW AND  ECONOMICS  225
(Eric A. Posner  ed.,  2000).
68  The  difference  is  that a  principal-agent  relationship  in  law requires  a  showing of
control.  See  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  AGENCY  §  1 (1958);  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF
AGENCY§  1.01  & cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2,  2001); cf  ALLEN & KRAAKmAN,  supra note 10,
§  2.3.3,  at  36  (stating  that  "the  trustee  is  ordinarily  not  subject  to  the  control  of  the
beneficiary").
69  See MAS-COLELL  ET  AL.,  supra  note  67, at 478-79; Robert  Cooter & BradleyJ. Freed-
man,  The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character  and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U.  L.
REv.  1045,  1048-51  (1991).
70  See MAS-COLELL  ET  AL.,  supra note  67,  at 477  n.1  (defining  "moral hazard").
71  A nice statement may  be found at LAFFONT  &  MARTIMORT,  supra note 67, at  3:
The starting point of incentive  theory  corresponds to  the problem of dele-
gating a task to an agent with  private information.  This private information
can  be of two  types:  either the agent can take an action unobserved  by the
principal,  the case  of moral hazard  or  hidden action; or  the agent  has some
private knowledge  about his cost or valuation  that is ignored by  the princi-
pal,  the  case of adverse selection or  hidden knowledge.
See alsoJACKSON  ET AL.,  supra note  67,  at 50-58.
72  This illustration is  borrowed  from Frank Easterbrook  and Daniel  Fischel.  See EAS-
TERBROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note  1, at 91;  Frank H.  Easterbrook  & Daniel R. Fischel,  Corpo-
rate Control Transactions,  91  YALE  L.J.  698,  701  (1982);  see  also Posner,  supra note  67,  at
225-29  (discussing  real  estate brokerage  contracts  from an  agency theory perspective).
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$10  effort.  The agent's failure  to do so leads to  a welfare  loss.  True,
the  divergence in this example  is an  artifact of the five percent com-
mission;  a  higher  commission-say,  fifteen  percent-would  have
solved the problem here.  But no compensation scheme short of trans-
ferring complete  ownership of the  project to the agent will  solve the
incentive  problem  in  all  possible  scenarios  when  the  agent's  efforts
are unobservable.
The  losses to  the parties  that stem  from such a misalignment  of
interests are called agency costs.  The Jensen and Meckling definition
is ubiquitous  in the legal literature:  Agency  costs refers  to the sum of
the costs of the principal's "monitoring expenditures,"  the costs of the
agent's "bonding expenditures,"  and  the  "residual loss"  as  measured
by the  "dollar equivalent of the  reduction  in welfare  experienced  by
the  principal"  as  result of the  divergence  in  the  principal's  and  the
agent's interests. 73  In the foregoing  example,  the  lost $100  increase
in the sale  price would count as residual  loss.
C.  Agency  Costs and Organizational  Forms
Returning  to  the  agency  cost theories  of the firm,  the arresting
insight of the Jensen and Meckling nexus of contracts model was that
the study of organizational  forms involves, more concretely,  the study
of clusters or webs of discrete principal-agent relationships.74  Accord-
ingly,  subsequent research  has  explored  the  effectiveness  of various
devices, legal and otherwise, at minimizing agency  costs within differ-
ent organizational forms.  This literature has also thrown  light on the
governance  features  that  distinguish  different  organizational  forms
from each other.75  In particular, the literature  of enterprise organiza-
tions  has explored  managerial  labor  markets,76  incentive  compensa-
tion,
77  alienable  residual  claims,7 8  flexible  sharing  rules and mutual
monitoring, 7 9  the  market  for  corporate  control  (i.e.,  the  takeover
73  Jensen  & Meckling,  supra note  1, at 308.
74  See supra notes 65-66 and  accompanying  text.
75  See,  e.g., Eugene  F.  Fama & Michael  C. Jensen,  Organizational  Forms and Investment
Decisions, 14J. FIN.  ECON.  101,  117-19  (1985);  Fama &Jensen,  Separation, supra note  1, at
311-21.
76  See, e.g.,  Fama, supra note  1, at 294-95.
77  See,  e.g., Kevin J. Murphy,  Executive Compensation, in 3B  HANDBOOK  OF  LABOR  EcO-
NOMICS  2485  (Orley  Ashenfelter  &  David  Card eds.,  1999);  Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk  et al.,
Managerial  Power  and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.  L. REv.
751  (2002);  Symposium,  Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market, 7 J.
Acc-r.  & ECON.  3  (1985);  Tod Perry  & Marc  Zenner,  CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Share-
holder Alignment or Shareholder Expropriation?,  35  WAKE  FOREST  L.  REv.  123  (2000).
78  See, e.g.,  Fama & Jensen,  Residual Claims, supra note  1, at 332-33.
79  See id. at 335-36  (discussing  professional  partnerships).
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market),80  disclosure  rules,81 and liability  rules such  as fiduciary  du-
ties,s2  as devices for minimizing agency costs.
The  trust, although  amenable  to  such  analysis,  has not similarly
been subjected  to  systematic  agency cost analysis. 83
III
THE AGENCY  COSTS  MODEL
In  comparison  to the  agency  costs  approach  to  corporate  law,84
the agency costs approach  to trust law is both simpler and more com-
plex.  It is simpler because the trust is a less complicated  organization.
This  makes  the  agency  cost  analysis  and  reckoning  the hypothetical
bargain  of the  principal  parties easier.  The  analysis  is more  compli-
cated,  however, because  the  actions of those individuals  interested  in
the  trust are  not metered  by  price signals  from  efficient  capital  mar-
kets. 85  Moreover,  the  law  regularly  subordinates  the  interests  of the
beneficiaries  as  residual  claimants  to  the  dead-hand  interests  of the
settlor, an  outgrowth  of the  frequently  paternalistic  function  of the
donative trust.
8 6
A.  The Contractarian  Nexus
The  trust is more than a simple contract between  private parties.
It is an organizational form with in rem as well as in personam dimen-
sions.  Thus, like  the corporation and other organizational  forms, the
trust  blends  external  in  rem  asset  partitioning  with  internal  in  per-
sonam  contractarian  flexibility.  The  trust's internal relationships  are
contractarian not only because the  law supplies default terms around
which  the parties may contract, but also because  the  underlying gov-
80  See,  e.g.,  Henry  G.  Manne,  Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.  POL.
ECON.  110  (1965);  see also, e.g.,  Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk,  The Case Against Board Veto  in Corpo-
rate Takeovers, 69  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  973  (2002);  Symposium,  The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientific Evidence, 11J. FIN.  ECON.  5  (1983).
81  See, e.g.,  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel  R. Fischel,  Mandatory Disclosure  and the Pro-
tection of Investors, 70  VA.  L.  REV.  669  (1984);  Paul  G.  Mahoney,  Mandatory Disclosure as a
Solution to Agency  Problems, 62  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  1047  (1995).
82  See, e.g., Daniel  R. Fischel  & Michael Bradley,  The Role of Liability Rules and the Deriva-
tive  Suit in  Corporate Law:  A  Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,  71  CORNELL  L.  REV.  261
(1986);  infra notes 290-97  and  accompanying  text.
83  See supra note  3  and accompanying  text.
84  The clearest example is the model of the corporation  as a nexus of contracts, which
was  most  notably advanced  in the legal literature  by  Easterbook  and Fischel.  See EASTER-
BROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note  1, 1-39;  Frank H. Easterbrook  & Daniel R. Fischel,  The Corpo-
rate Contract,  89  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1416  (1989).
85  See generally Sitkoff, supra  note 15, at 568-72.  The trust has this in common with  the
close  corporation.  See Frank  H.  Easterbrook  & Daniel  R. Fischel,  Close Corporations and
Agency  Costs, 38 STAN.  L.  REV.  271,  274-77  (1986).
86  See,  e.g.,  Mary  Louise  Fellows,  Spendthrift Trusts: Roots and Relevance for Twenty-First
Century Planning,  50 REc. Ass'N B.  CI'y N.Y.  140,  149-64 (1995);  infra note  136 and accom-
panying  text.
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ernance problems  that stem from the asymmetric  information  of the
parties  are amenable  to principal-agent  modeling.
True,  there  is  tension between  the  contractarian  metaphor  and
the  position  of  the  beneficiary.  Beneficiaries  are  not  normally
thought to give  ex ante consent, and  typically  they are in  no position
to bargain.  Moreover, as discussed in Part I,  there remains much de-
bate about whether the beneficiaries'  stake in the trust is a contract  or
property right.87  But even if the beneficiaries do not literally contract
with the other principal parties, and even if the beneficiaries'  stake is
doctrinally more proprietary than contractarian,  contractarian princi-
pal-agent  modeling nonetheless  illuminates  the  problems  of govern-
ance  relevant  to  the  beneficiaries'  welfare.  From  an  economic
perspective,  hidden  action  (and  possibly  hidden  information)
abounds, so trust governance  must confront  both  incentive and  risk-
sharing problems.88
Accordingly, greater insight into the nature and function of trust
law will  come from a conception  of the  trust as a de facto  entity that
serves as the organizing  construct for an aggregation of contractarian
relationships.  This vision  of the trust is analogous  to the Jensen  and
Meckling nexus of contracts model of the firm.89  As was the case with
their analysis  of the corporation,  this conception  of the trust implies
the viability of agency cost analysis for trust law.
To  return  to the  exemplary  trust described  in the  Introduction,
which  was settled by S for the benefit of BI and B2  with T as trustee,
the  constituent  relationships  include,  but are  not  limited  to,  those
between:
1.  S and T;
2.  T and the Bs;
3.  S  and the  Bs;
4.  T and T's creditors;
5.  the  Bs and the  Bs'  creditors;
6.  S  and S's creditors;
7.  S  and the  trust protector  (who will  be introduced  later);90
87  See discussion  supra Part  L.A-B.
88  See generally Eisenhardt,  supra note  67, at 58-59  (discussing situations amenable  to
agency  cost analysis).
89  Jensen  and Meckling  argued  that most  organizations,  including the  corporation,
could  be  characterized  as  a  "legal  fiction[,]  . . . [an]  artificial  construct  under  the  law
which  allows certain  organizations to  be treated as individuals."  Jensen & Meckling, supra
note  1, at 310 n.12. These  entities  "serve  as a nexus for  a set of contracting relationships
among individuals."  Id.  at 310  (emphasis omitted);  cf  EASTERBROOK  &  FiSCHEL, supra note
1, at  11-12  (discussing  the various  contractual  relationships  that form corporations);  Al-
chian & Demsetz, supra note 1, at 777-78  (describing the firm as a "centralized contractual
agent in a  team productive  process"  (emphasis  omitted)).
90  See infra Part W.B.4.
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8.  the  Bs and the  trust protector;
9.  T and T's agents  (to whom  T delegates  authority);  and
10.  T's  delegates and  the Bs.9'
The  dominant  (and  sometimes  conflicting)  relationships  exist  be-
tween  S  and T and between  the  Bs and T.
Distilling  the  trust  into  its  constituent  relationships  brings  into
view the applicability of hypothetical bargain analysis and the econom-
ics  of the  principal-agent  problem.  Both  the  relationship between  S
and T and the relationship  between  the  Bs and T might be  modeled
on  the  principal-agent  scheme.  The  former  presents  the  temporal
agency  problem that helps  distinguish  the economic  analysis  of trust
law from  that of corporate  law.92  The  latter presents  the  traditional
agency  problem  when  risk-bearing  is  separated  from  management.
This  means  that there  is  potential for considerable  tension  between
T's loyalty  to S  and T's loyalty  to  the Bs.  As  we  shall see in  the next
Part, American  law  resolves this  tension  by  requiring T to  maximize
the welfare of the Bs within the ex ante constraints imposed by S.  This
is  to  say  that,  under  the  American  approach  (but not  necessarily
under the English approach)  the donor's intent controls.
91  See, e.g.,  In  re Bond  & Mortgage  Guar. Co.,  103  N.E.2d  721  (N.Y.  1952)  (discussing
the  relationship  between  the  trustee's  agent,  in  this  case  the  trustee's  lawyers,  and  the
beneficiaries);  Surrogates Court Decision of Interest: In re Kellogg, N.Y.L.J.  Dec.  30,  1999, at 25
(same).  The importance of the relations  that fall  into these  last two categories, numbers 9
and  10 above,  has increased with the assimilation of portfolio theory into modern prudent
investor standards.  Current law now permits, and might even require,  amateur trustees  to
delegate  investment authority to professionals.  Langbein  calls this phenomenon  the "frac-
tionation of trusteeship."  John H. Langbein,  The Uniform Prudent  Investor Act and the Future
of Trust Investing, 81  IOWA  L. REv.  641,  665-66  (1996)  [hereinafter Langbein,  The  Uniform
Prudent  Investor Act]; see RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS:  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  RULE  §  171  &
cmt. f  (1992);  UNIF.  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  AcT  §  9,  7B U.L.A. 280  (2000);John  H. Langbein,
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59  Mo.  L.  REv.  105,  115-16  (1994);
see also Langbein,  supra note 59,  at 72-73;  accord P. J. REED  &  R.  C. WILSON,  THE  TRUSTEE
AcT  2000: A  PRACTICAL  GUIDE  11  (2001)  (highlighting  the similar shift in prudent investor
rules in  the United  Kingdom).  These scenarios might be amenable  to modeling as a com-
mon  agency.  For examples  of such  modeling and  discussions  of common  agency, see  B.
Douglas Bernheim & Michael  D. Whinston,  Common Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA  923  (1986);
Joel  S.  Demski  &  David  Sappington,  Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents, 33 J.
ECON.  THEORY 152  (1984);  Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELLJ.  ECON.  324
(1982);  Bengt Holmstr6m  & Paul Milgrom,  Multitask Principal-Agent  Analyses: Incentive Con-
tracts, Asset Ownership, and  Job Design, 7J.  L. ECON.  & ORG.  24  (1991);  Hideshi  Itoh, Incen-
tives To Help in Multi-Agent Situations, 59  ECONOMETRICA  611  (1991).
92  The temporal  agency problem  also distinguishes the economic analysis of trust law
from that of agency  law.  Legal  agency requires  the ongoing existence of a principal under
whose control  the agent acts.  This enables the agent to seek clarification  from the princi-
pal and  facilitates the principal's  monitoring of the agent.  See sources cited  supra  note  68.
Not surprisingly,  the  lack  of monitoring  by  disabled  principals  of agents acting  under  a
durable  power  of attorney  is  a  cause  for concern.  See Carolyn  L.  Dessin,  Acting as Agent
Under a Financial  Durable  Power of Attorney: An  Unscripted Role, 75  NEB.  L.  REV.  574,  584-88
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B.  The  Office of the  Trustee
The office of the trustee is in effect (though not formally) a sepa-
rate  entity from  the  trustee personally.93  This  separate  entity-like  ef-
fect, which stems from the trust's partitioning of assets, implicates  an
in rem  dynamic,  as it is  effective against nonparties  to the  trust.  The
de facto office of the trustee serves as the organizing hub for the vari-
ous relations  that aggregate  into the  trust.94
With respect to creditors, turnover within the office of the trustee
or the  personal  insolvency of a particular  trustee  does not affect the
continuity of the trust.  Deals struck by a prior trustee, while acting  as
trustee,  bind  successor  trustees  to  the  extent  that  they would  have
been  enforceable  against the  prior trustee. 95  The prior trustee,  how-
ever,  has no office-based  liability  to  the  trust's  creditors  once  out  of
office.  No trustee, whether in or out of office, has personal liability to
the  trust's  outside  creditors  unless he  or  she  personally  guaranteed
the obligation. 96  And the personal creditors of an insolvent trustee-
a rather rare phenomenon  in  donative  trusts, but an important con-
sideration for commercial  trusts-have no recourse  against the assets
of the trust.
97
The rules that govern the trustee's liability toward creditors of the
trust  property  tend  to  be  mandatory with  respect  to  the settlor, but
default with  respect  to  the  trustee  and  those  with whom  the  trustee
deals.98  They are mandatory with  respect to the settlor, because  as  to
93  More  precisely,  the office  of trustee  is  in effect  a separate  legal  person.  See supra
notes 49-53 and accompanying text.  In contrast to corporate  law, in trust law there are few
if any  prescriptions  regarding  the  required  structure  for  the  (albeit  de  facto)  fictitious
separate  entity.
94  Cf David Hayton,  The  Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in MODERN  INTERNA-
TIONAL  DEVELOPMENTS  IN  TRUST  LAw,  supra note  55,  145,  155-57  (discussing the  office  of
the trustee and noting that continuity of the trust is unaffected by "the death or dissolution
of a trustee"); Worthington, supra note 27,  at 155-57 (discussing  the separate rights of the
trustee's creditors  and  the trust's creditors).
95  See,  e.g.,  Schroeder  v.  CMC Real Estate Corp., 510 N.E.2d  1045,  1048-49  (Ill.  App.
Ct. 1987); Wood v.  Potter, 289 N.W. 131,  133-34  (Mich.  1939). The qualification  addresses
the possibility  of self-dealing or other grounds for voiding the transaction.  The failure of a
successor  trustee to  pursue  such  remedies would  be  an independent breach  of trust.  See
infra note  101  and accompanying  text.
96  See,  e.g.,  UNII.  TRUST  CODE  §  1010(a),  7C U.L.A.  227 (Supp. 2003).  The traditional
rule of personal  liability unless otherwise  provided, see 3A ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS,  supra  note 5,
§ 261,  at 417;  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §  265  & cmt. a (1959),  can be understood
as a penalty  default that forces trustees  to disclose that they are operating in a representa-
tive rather  than  an  individual  capacity.  See Hansman  &  Mattei,  supra note 6,  at  459-61;
Merrill  & Smith, supra note  17,  at 846-47.
97  See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 454.  See generally Macnair, supra  note 20, at
224-29  (discussing  the  evolution  of  trustee  liability);  Worthington,  supra note  27,  at
155-58  (reviewing  the rights  of the beneficiaries and of the creditors of the beneficiaries,
trustee, settlor, and  the trust property).
98  See, e.g.,  UNIF. TRUST CODE  §  1010(a),  7C U.L.A. 227 (Supp. 2003);  id. § 105(b) (11)
("The terms of a trust prevail over [common  and statutory law] except...  the rights under
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the  settlor  these  rules  have  an  in  rem  quality-they  touch  on  the
rights of outsiders.99  They are, in contrast, default with  respect to the
trustee and outside creditors, because as to these parties the rules con-
cern only in personam matters-they touch only the rights of insiders.
Parties may fix  their rights with  respect  to  each other, but when  the
rights  of  outsiders  become  involved,  the  law  limits  the  parties'
flexibility.
The rules of trustee  liability toward beneficiaries  are quite differ-
ent.  But these differences follow naturally from the nexus of contracts
model of organizational forms, which implies that it is the trustee per-
sonally who agrees  to  manage  the assets held  by the trustee  as trustee.
Thus,  the beneficiaries  may seek to surcharge  a trustee  personally for
breach of trust not only while the trustee  is in office, but also  after the
trustee has  been sacked.  Removal  does not extinguish  the  trustee's
personal  liability  for  breaches  committed  while  in  office.100  The
breaching  trustee's successor,  however, is not personally  liable  to the
beneficiaries for the prior trustee's breach unless the successor unrea-
sonably  fails to  discover and  rectify the  prior breach.  Liability  in  this
scenario,  however, stems from  the  successor  trustee's  own breach  in
unreasonably failing to  address her predecessor's blunder. 10 1
The  rules  of  internal  trust  governance,  which  determine  the
rights inter se of the beneficiaries, the settlor, and the trustee, are for
the most  part default as  to the settlor. 10 2  That not  all of these  rules
are default, however, suggests that there is a mandatory foundation of
trust governance  law.  Indeed,  as  Langbein  explains,  even  though  a
Sections  1010 through  1013 of a  person other  than a  trustee or beneficiary.");  id. Art. 10
gen.  cmt.  ("The  settlor  may  not limit the  rights  of  persons  other  than  beneficiaries  as
provided in Sections 1010 through  1013.").  See generally  John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules
in  the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw.  U.  L.  REV.  (forthcoming 2004)  (comparing mandatory  and
default  rules  in  trust  law);  Langbein,  supra note  59,  at  76-79  (analyzing  the  UTC's
mandatory features); David M.  English, Is There a Uniform Trust Act in Your Future?, PROB.  &
PROP.  25,  27 (Jan./Feb. 2000);  cf  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS §  263  (1959)  (discuss-
ing  trustee  liability to  third parties);  3A  SCOTT ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  § 263,  at 423-32
(same).
99  On similar reasoning agency law does not allow principals  to opt out of liability to
third parties for  the  acts of agents for which  the agents  have apparent authority.  See, e.g.,
RESTATEMEN-T  (SECOND)  OF AGENCY  §§  159-61  (1958).
100  As a  practical matter, this liability is often fixed in  an accounting proceeding made
incident to  the removal  action.
101  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS §  223 (1959);  3 SCoTT  ON TRUSTS,  supra note
5,  § 223, at 395-96.  This explains why many professionally  drafted trustee succession  provi-
sions  absolve  the successor from  this audit responsibility.  Without such  absolution,  many
potential successors  would decline  to serve.  See VALERIE J. VOLLMAR  ET  AL.,  AN  INTRODUC-
TION TO  TRUSTS AND  ESTATES  1072-73  (2003); Charles F.  Gibbs & Collen F.  Carew, Liability
of Successor Fiduciary  for its Predecessor,  N.Y.L.J.  1 (Mar.  18,  2003).
102  See,  e.g.,  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §  105,  7C  U.L.A.  139  (Supp. 2003);  Langbein,  supra
note 8,  at 651,  660-63.
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settlor may opt out of individual fiduciary duties, she cannot authorize
a bad faith  trusteeship  or oust fiduciary law  in its  entirety.'0 3
Part of the explanation for these limits  is the obvious agency cost
consequences  of  giving  the  trustee  unfettered  discretion.  Hence
these limits serve  a protective  and cautionary function  for the settlor
who might otherwise  unwittingly swamp  her beneficiary in an agency
costs  morass.  However,  this  explanation  is  incomplete,  because  the
protective  and  cautionary  function  could  probably  have  been
achieved  with  a penalty default.1 0 4
Further justification  for  these  mandatory  elements  lies  in  the
need  to  ensure  that  third  parties  who  transact  with  the  trustee  can
easily ascertain  whether property in the  possession of the  trustee  be-
longs  to  the  trustee  personally,  is  held  in  trust,  or  is  held  in  some
other  limited  form  such  as  an  equitable  charge. 1 0 5  There  is  a
mandatory  irreducible minimum of trust governance, in other words,
not only  to  serve  a  protective  and cautionary  function,  but also  be-
cause on  this  issue  the in  personam  (i.e.,  internal  governance)  con-
verges  with  the in rem  (i.e.,  external  relations). 1 0 6  As  the  Delaware
Supreme Court put it in a recent opinion: "A trust in which there is no
legally binding  obligation  on  a  trustee  is  a  trust  in  name  only  and
more  in  the  nature  of  an  absolute  estate  or  fee  simple  grant  of
property.
° 10 7
C.  The Relative  Position of the Settlor
The settlor's intent to create  a trust is  a prerequisite  to trust for-
mation. 1 0 8  This  means  that  Langbein's  third-party  beneficiary  con-
tract between  the settlor and the trustee  is the trigger for the cascade
of individual  relationships  that compose  the trust.  The settlor-trustee
relationship  is indeed contractual,  as settlors  and trustees are  free  to
103  See Langbein,  supra note 98.
104  See,  e.g.,  Ayres  & Gertner, supra note 38,  at 95-107;  see also infra note  116 and  ac-
companying  text (discussing exoneration  clauses).
105  Cf  Merrill  &  Smith,  supra note  17  (discussing  the third  party  information  costs
associated with various forms of property and contract rights).  An equitable  charge is cre-
ated when  one  party  transfers  property  to  another,  not subject  to a  fiduciary  obligation
(indeed the  transferee  is  permitted to benefit  personally from  the transferred  property),
but nevertheless  subject to  the right of a third party to  receive  a payment from the  trans-
feree.  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  5(h)  & cmt.  h  (2003);  RESTATEMENT  (SEC-
OND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  10 & cmts.  a-b (1959);  1 ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note 5,  §§  10,  10.3,
10.4;  see, e.g.,  Ogle  v.  Durley, 77  So.2d 688, 691-92  (Miss.  1955).
106  See Langbein,  supra note  98;  supra Part LB-C;  infra Part  V.C.
107  McNeil  v. McNeil,  798 A.2d  503, 509  (Del.  2002).
108  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD) OF  TRUSTS  §  13  (2003);  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF
TRUSTS  § 23  (1959);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  § 402(a) (2),  7C  U.L.A.  158  (Supp. 2003).
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dicker  over the  terms  of the  trust, such  as  compensation,  even  if in
fact they do not.'0 9  This  leads to three points.
First, when interpreting  the  trustee's  obligations  under the  trust
instrument, an intention-seeking  standard  is normatively  desirable."1 0
This prescription  follows from the  principle  that in the  case of a vol-
untary transaction  between  competent  adults,  the joint intent of the
parties  carries  a  presumption  of  Pareto  optimality."1'  Not  surpris-
ingly,  the  new  Restatement  (Third)  of Property for  donative  transfers
points in  this direction,1 2  a positive  trend that is  consistent with the
idea of the settlor as the dominant principal.  Moreover, for the usual
transaction-costs-savings  reasons,  the  underlying  law  of trust govern-
ance should supply those terms for which  the majority of settlors and
trustees  would  have  bargained  if they had  full  information  and  low
negotiation  costs. 11 3  As  Langbein  has noted,  "[t]he proper  question
becomes:  What was  the  intention of the parties  to  the  trust deal  re-
specting  this  point, and  if they did not articulate  their intention  on
this matter, which default rule captures  the likely bargain  they would
have  struck  had they thought about it.""1
4
Second,  given the  potential  informational  asymmetries  between
repeat-player  trust  lawyers  and  institutional  fiduciaries  on  the  one
109  See,  e.g.,  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 639,  651;  see also Getzler,  Legislative Incursions,
supra note 20, Art. 2, at 4 (discussing terms that professional  trustees often insert into trust
instruments).  Several  readers  of earlier  drafts objected  to  the foregoing  analysis  on the
ground  that, in  practice,  settlors simply  do not dicker with  trustees.  But  a lack of actual
bargaining between  settlors and  trustees  does  not negate  the contractual  nature  of their
underlying  relationship  any  more than  the  lack of actual  bargaining  between  insurance
companies and insureds negates the contractual  nature of that relationship.  All  that a lack
of bargaining suggests is that either  (i) the terms of the forms used by corporate fiduciaries
approximate  median  preferences  or  (ii)  the  process  suffers  from  the  more  common
problems  of standard  form contracts and disparities  in party sophistication.  See infra note
117  and accompanying  text.  Likewise,  a lack of actual bargaining  with  amateur trustees,
such as family members, implies only that amateurs  are motivated by altruism or a sense of
familial loyalty rather  than fees  or the  other terms  of the deal.
110  Langbein,  supra note 8,  at 663-64; see also Halbach,  supra note  8,  at 1881  (noting
that  giving  effect  to  the transferor's  intentions  is  a "pervasive  theme"  in recent  trust law
development);  cf. Hayton,  supra note 20,  at  96  (predicting that trust law will  continue  to
evolve toward further respect for the settlor's wishes); Parkinson, supra note 20, at 676-82
(discussing  the implications  of an  obligation-based conception  of the trust).
III  See,  e.g.,  EASTERBROOK  &  FISCHEL,  supra note  1, at 22-25,  145;  RICHARD  A. EPSTEIN,
SIMPLE  RULES  FOR  A  COMPLEX  WORLD  80-82  (1995).
112  "The controlling  consideration  in  determining  the  meaning  of  a donative  docu-
ment is the donor's intention.  The donor's intention  is given  effect  to the maximum  ex-
tent allowed  by  law."  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROPERTY:  WILLS  AND  OTHER  DONATIVE
TRANSFERS  §  10.1  (2003).
1 13  See RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAW  §  15.6,  at 454  (6th ed.  2003);
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 38, at 89-91  (collecting scholarly statements);  see also POSNER,
supra,  §  4.1,  at 96, §  14.3, at 413,  §  14.7, at 427-28  (discussing  transaction costs, interpreta-
tion, and  majoritarian default  rules).  This is  an implication  of R.H.  Coase,  The Problem of
Social Cost, 3J. L.  & ECON.  1  (1960).
114  Langbein,  supra note 8,  at 664.
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hand, and settlors  on the other, there  is  room as a normative matter
for  the  occasional  information-forcing  default  rule.1 15  As  a  positive
matter, such penalty defaults do exist.  Perhaps the most salient exam-
ple  concerns  clauses  that exonerate  the  trustee  from  liability  to  the
beneficiaries for breach  of trust.  Before enforcing these clauses, espe-
cially  in  cases where  the  trustee  was  also  the  settlor's  lawyer,  courts
often require  a showing that the settlor had affirmative  knowledge  of
the  clause  and  its  meaning.' 16  By  ensuring  transparency,  the  rule
helps  to  ensure that the  clause  was  not unwittingly embraced  by  the
settlor. 1  17
Third, in contrast to the founder of a corporation or a commer-
cial trust, 1 8  the settlor of a donative  trust receives  no direct price  sig-
nal about the  quality of the governance  arrangement  to which  he or
she agrees with the trustee.119  There  is no public  offering for benefi-
cial  interests  in  a  donative  trust, and  potential  beneficiaries  do not
purchase  their rights from  the settlor.  The only price signal in dona-
115  See, e.g.,  Ayres  & Gertner, supra note  38,  at 94.  The informational  asymmetry  be-
tween  trust lawyers  and settlor-clients  is  a separate  source  of agency  costs,  discussion  of
which  is beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally  John C. Coates  IV, Explaining Varia-
tion in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lauyers, 89  CAL.  L.  REV.  1301  (2001)  (discussing agency
costs  between  corporate  clients and lawyers).
116  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  § 222(3)  & cmt. d (1959);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE
§  1008(b) & cmt., 7C U.L.A. 226-27  (Supp. 2003)  ("Subsection  (b) responds to the danger
that the insertion  of such  a clause  by the fiduciary or its agent may have been undisclosed
or inadequately  understood  by the settlor.");  3  SCOTT ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  § 222.4,  at
393-95;  see also Comm. on the Modernization  of the Tr. Act, Report on Exculpation Clauses in
Trust Instruments, 22  EST.  TR.  PENSIONS J.  55  (2003)  (discussing  Canadian  trust  law's ap-
proach to exculpation clauses); David Hayton, English Fiduciary  Standards and Trust Law, 32
VAND.J.  TRANSNAT'L  L. 555, 580  (1999)  (describing the requirements for validity of exemp-
tion  clauses  under  English  law);  Langbein,  supra note  98  (describing  exemption  clause
disclosure  rules  as  antifraud  and  intent-serving  measures);  Langbein,  supra note  59,  at
74-75  (discussing the  UTC's exculpation  clause  provisions).
117  In other words,  unsophisticated  settlors who do  not read  or  understand  the  fine
print present  the standard  form  contract problem.  See,  e.g., Todd  D.  Rakoff,  Contracts of
Adhesion: An  Essay in Reconstruction, 96  HARv.  L.  REv.  1174,  1179  (1983);  see  also Lewis A.
Kornhauser,  Unconscionability in Standard  Forms, 64  CAL.  L.  REV.  1151  (1976)  (suggesting
that even  where  exchanges  are "untainted by failures  in the bargaining process,"  they can
still "suffer  from  ...  unfair  clauses").  More  generally,  regulation  of exculpatory  clauses
relates  back  to  the  need  to  ensure  clear  lines  of property  ownership  for  outsiders with
whom the trustee  might deal.  See supra notes  102-07 and  accompanying  text.
118  See  Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at  562-63  (comparing  commercial  and  donative
trusts).
119  Cf Jensen  & Meckling,  supra note  1, at 313.
[T]he  owner  will  bear the entire wealth  effects  of these expected  costs  so
long  as  the  equity  market  anticipates  these  effects.  Prospective  minority
shareholders  will  realize  that the  owner-manager's  interests  will  diverge
somewhat  from  theirs, hence  the price  which  they will  pay for shares  will
reflect  the monitoring  costs  and  the  effect  of the divergence  between  the
manger's  interest and  theirs.
Id.; see also Sitkoff, supra note  15, at 570-72  (discussing  the relevance  of capital markets  to
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tive  trusts  regarding  potential  governance  structures-the  level  of
compensation, if any, demanded by the trustee-is both weak and am-
biguous. 12 0  In conjunction with  the potential for informational  asym-
metries,  the  lack  of  a  direct  price  signal  bolsters  the  case  for  the
occasional  information-forcing  default rule and, in some cases, possi-
bly even justifies disregarding  the expressed  intent of the settlor.
121
None  of this  is  to  suggest  that settlors are  uninterested  in  the
quality of the  trust's governance  regime.  On the contrary,  a common
purpose in settling a trust in the first place, tax exigencies and control-
ling  personalities  aside, 122  is  to  maximize  the  beneficiaries'  welfare.
The point of the prior paragraph is merely that settlors do not receive
the  sort of price  signals from  thick markets  that would force them  to
internalize  the  costs and benefits  of the  governance  arrangement  to
which they have agreed with the trustee.  To paraphrase  the condition
posited by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel as necessary for skep-
ticism  about a term in  the  related context of the  corporate  contract,
the consequences for beneficiary welfare of the trust terms might "not
have been appreciated  by"  the settlor.123
D.  Beneficiaries  as  Residual Claimants
The  trustee and  those  who conduct business with  the trustee  as
trustee have fixed claims on the trust corpus that generally have prior-
ity over the claims of the beneficiaries.  Trustees  are free  to negotiate
for their own fee schedules or other terms designed  to  protect their
interests, 124 and those who  do business with  the  trustee over trust as-
sets can likewise  protect themselves  by contract.  Beneficiaries  of don-
ative  trusts,  however,  are  limited  to  taking  so  much  as  the  trust
instrument  allows  out of whatever  is left of the  trust's assets when all
120  The signal  is weak  in  both directions.  Professionals often  have  company-wide  fee
schedules, and amateurs such  as family members often serve without commission.  See supra
note  109.
121  See Langbein,  supra note 98.
122  Anecdotes from practitioners suggest that some settlors are so control-oriented that
their chief motivation  is to maintain  dominance  over their family after death, seeking not
just to minimize  taxes,  but sometimes  even  sacrificing that goal  in  order to maintain  con-
trol  over  the  beneficiaries'  behavior.  See,  e.g.,  B.  Douglas  Bernheim  et  al.,  The  Strategic
Bequest Motive, 93J.  POL. ECON.  1045  (1985)  (discussing strategic  intergenerational  trans-
fers);  see also infra note 208  and accompanying  text.
123  EASTERBROOK  & FiSCHEL,  supra note  1, at 31;  see also id. at 17, 23-25;  cf Langbein,
supra note 98.
124  See supra note  109  and accompanying  text.
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other  claims  are settled.
125  That  is,  as  residual  claimants,  they bear
the residual  risk.
126
To  say that  the  beneficiaries  are  the  residual  claimants  is  to  say
that managerial decisions are inframarginal for all the relevant players
except for the beneficiaries.  This may provide  an agency costs  expla-
nation for the rule in irrevocable  trusts that only the beneficiaries may
sue the trustee for a breach of trust.127  The same  reasoning may also
explain  why  the  default  fiduciary  obligations  of the  trustee  are  de-
signed  to  create  incentives  for the  trustee  to  manage  the trust  from
the  beneficiaries'  (and  hence  the  marginal)  perspective.  Moreover,
now that the  trust form  is used for more than intergenerational  con-
veyances and the preservation of ancestral  land, status as a trust bene-
ficiary  brings  both  greater  potential  risk  and  greater  potential
reward. 128
Against  the  foregoing  it  might be  argued  that,  because  private
trust beneficiaries are nothing more than passive recipients of a dona-
tive  transfer, the analogy to Jensen and Meckling's nexus of contracts
metaphor  is  inappropriate.  Indeed,  even  though  acceptance  (which
can  be  implied)  is a  required  element of every  gift,
129  trust  benefi-
ciaries do not give consent to their status as such in the same way that
parties  give  consent  to  a  literal  contractual  relationship.  But  the
nexus  of contracts  model  is just that, a  model.  The  economics  of
agency provides  a helpful framework for understanding the  law's de-
fault solutions to problems of governance presented  by the trust form
of organization.
An important further benefit of the agency costs approach  is that
it invites  comparison  of the  trust to other organizational  forms.  This
expands  the  potential  for  drawing  on  empirical  insights,  albeit  by
analogy.  Thus far the typical trust law empirical project has been com-
parative.  Although  the  common  law trust  is  uniquely  Anglo-Ameri-
125  The  limitation to  donative  trusts  is necessary  because  in  the commercial  context,
the beneficiaries  are  typically investors in trust certificates  that, like debt, only entitle them
to a  return  of their investment  plus  interest.  Any surplus value  goes  back  to  the settlor,
who  is  the  residual  claimant  in  such  an  arrangement.  See  Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at
562-63.
126  See Fama  & Jensen,  Residual Claims, supra note  1,  at 328  ("The residual  risk-the
risk of the difference  between stochastic  [i.e.,  variable]  inflows of resources  and promised
payments to agents-is borne  by those who contract for the rights to  net cash flows.");  cf
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,  supra note  1, at 67-70 (discussing the nature of residual  claims in
the context of voting rights in  corporations).
127  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §  200 (1959);  3 SCOTT ON TRUSTS,  supra note
5,  §§ 200,  200.1.  But see infra Part  V.B.3.
128  See Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 642.
129  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROPERTY  WILLS  AND  OTHER  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS
§ 6.1  & cmt. i  (2003).
2004] 647CORNELL LAW REVIEW
can, 1 30  there  is nontrivial variation across the  common law nations. 31
Furthermore,  there  are  clear  payoffs  to  studying  how  the  non-com-
mon  law countries  have  adapted  to  their nominal  lack of an explicit
trust law.132  Because of the difficulty in obtaining good data on trusts
in practice,  however,  this  comparative  approach  tends to  be qualita-
tive rather than quantitative. 
133  In contrast, thick capital markets pro-
vide  ample  data  for  quantitative  analysis  of  theoretical  predictions
about the impact of corporate law on shareholder welfare. 
1 3 4  Accord-
ingly,  analogical  comparisons  to  the  empirical  literature on whether
specific  corporate  governance  mechanisms  improve  investor  welfare
might help  inform  the  analysis  of whether  specific  trust governance
mechanisms  might likewise  improve  beneficiary welfare.
IV
APPLICATIONS  OF  THE  MODEL
By  reference  to  illustrative  applications,  this  Part  demonstrates
the  positive  and  normative  analytical  power  of the  agency  costs  ap-
proach.  The  normative  claim  is  that the  law  should  minimize  the
agency costs  inherent in  locating managerial  authority with  the  trus-
tee  and  the residual  claim with  the  beneficiaries,  but only to  the ex-
tent that  doing  so  is  consistent  with  the  ex  ante  instructions  of the
settlor.  This qualification  gives priority  to the settlor over the benefi-
ciaries as  the trustee's primary principal.  To  return to  the exemplary
trust settled  by S for the  benefit  of BI  and  B2 with  T  as trustee,  the
claim  is that T should maximize  the welfare  of BI  and B2,  subject to
130  Note,  however,  that many civil  law countries  have  long had  trust-like  devices.  See
Richard Helmholz & Reinhard Zimmermann,  Views of Trust and Treuhand: An Introduction,
in ITINERA  FIDUCIAE,  supra  note  20, at 27,  27-31;  see also Adair Dyer, International  Recognition
and Adaption of Trusts: The Influence of the Hague Convention, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L  L. 989,
1013-16  (1999)  (discussing  the adoption  of trust-like  forms in civil  law countries);  Mauri-
zio Lupoi,  The Civil Law  Trust, 32 VAND. J.  TRANSNAT'L  L. 967,  971-76  (1999)  (describing
various  "civil  trust" forms);  Donovan Waters,  Private Foundations (Civil Law)  Versus  Trusts
(Common Law), 21  EST. TR.  & PENSIONSJ.  281,  295-308  (2002)  (same); cf Jeffrey A. Schoen-
blum,  The Hague Convention on Trusts: Much Ado About  Very Little, 3 J. IT'L TR.  &  CORP.
PLAN.  5  (1994).
131  Examples are  discussed  infra Part IV.B.1,  IV.C.2.
132  See Helmholz  & Zimmermann, supra note  130, at 30-31;  see also Hansmann  & Mat-
tei,  supra note 6,  at 435-36  (discussing  increased  recognition  of trust-like  institutions  in
civil law countries and stating that "the trust is likely to become the most important  contri-
bution of the common  law tradition to the European system of private law" (footnote omit-
ted));  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 669-71  (discussing "nontrust" legal systems);  MAuRIzIO
Lupoi,  TRUSTS:  A  COMPARATIVE  STUDY  267-86  (Simon  Dix  trans.,  2000)  (same);  DAVID
JOHNSTON,  THE ROMAN  LAW  OF TRUSTS  (1988)  (same); cf Waters, supra note  130, at 292-83
(discussing  civil  law trust-like  forms).
133  See Langbein, supra note  14, at  178; Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 587-88.
134  See,  e.g.,  Sanjai  Bhagat & Roberta  Romano,  Event Studies and the Law: Part I:  Tech-
nique and Corporate  Litigation,  4 AM.  L.  & EcON.  REV.  141  (2002);  Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Event  Studies and the Law: Part II:  Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4  AM.  L.  &
ECON.  REV.  380  (2002).
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the  ex ante limits imposed  by S.  Consequently,  the  optimal solution
to the Bs-T principal-agent  problem, which would be for the Bs to sell
the residual claim  to  T (doing so would  solve both  the incentive  and
risk-sharing  problems) ,135  is  foreclosed  by  the settlor's  choice  of the
trust  over  an  outright  transfer.  Given  the  primacy  of honoring  the
settlor's intentions, the best that the law of trust governance can hope
for  is  a second-best  solution  to the  Bs-T agency  problem. 1 36
The positive claim  is that, at least with respect to  traditional doc-
trines, the law conforms  to the suggested  normative approach.  As Ed-
ward  Halbach,  the  Reporter  for the  new  Restatement (Third) of Trusts
recently  observed,  a "theme"  in  modem  trust law  "is  flexibility  and
efficiency  in  the  pursuit  of the  best  interests  of  trust  beneficiaries
within  the settlor's  legally permissible  objectives."'
137
A.  Donative  Beneficiaries  as Residual  Claimants
Agency  cost  analysis  prompts  the  classification  of donative  trust
beneficiaries  as residual claimants. 1 3 8  Claims on the assets of the trust
by all  the other relevant parties-most notably the  trustee  and those
with whom  the trustee transacts  as trustee-are usually set by express
contract  and  have  a  higher  priority  than  the  beneficiaries'  claims.
Like the residual claimants in any other organizational  form, donative
trust beneficiaries therefore bear the residual  risk of good or bad per-
formance.  Managerial  decisions  regarding  the  trust's  assets  are  in-
framarginal  to  all  but  the  beneficiaries.  The  emergence  of  the
managerial  trust,  moreover,  has  enlarged  the  range  of  the  benefi-
ciaries'  potential  risk  and  reward. 139  In  this  respect,  modern  trust
beneficiaries  are  beginning  more  closely  to  resemble  the  residual
135  See MAS-COLELL  ET  AL., supra note 67, at 482-83.  This assumes that T is either risk-
neutral or at least  less risk-averse  than the Bs.  See infra Part IV.A.3.
136  This  solution  is  second  best  from  the  perspective  of  the  beneficiaries  ex  post.
American law, however, is more concerned with  the ex ante perspective of the settlor.  The
normative  analysis therefore  assumes that the  goal  is to  maximize  the  expected  utility of
the  settlor.  The settlor's  expected utility,  in  turn,  is assumed  to  depend  on  the  settlor's
(paternalistic)  view of the beneficiaries'  expected  utility.  Further exposition of this point,
including  development of a formal model,  is beyond the scope of this Article.  Note,  how-
ever,  that there  are numerous  complexities  that surround  this  issue,  including  the rele-
vance of the beneficiaries'  own view of their utilities-something  to which, as we shall see,
English  law  gives greater  attention.  See infta notes  211-17  and  accompanying  text.  For
further discussion  of the economics of altruism  and deferred  gifts, see, for example,  EIc
A. POSNER,  LAw AND  SOCIAL  NORMS  55-62  (2000); Louis Kaplow, A  Note on Subsidizing Gifts,
58J. PUB.  ECON.  469  (1995);  Richard A. Posner,  Gratuitous  Promises in Economics and Law, 6
J.  LEG.  STUD.  411  (1977);  Steven  Shavell,  An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts,
20J. LEG.  STUD.  401  (1991);  sources cited in  infra note  196.
137  Halbach, supra note  8,  at  1881.
138  See supra Part III.D.
139  See supra note  128  and accompanying  text.
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claimants of other organizational forms than the trust beneficiaries  of
yore.
Yet today's prototypical  donative  trust beneficiaries  have some in-
teresting characteristics,  relevant to reckoning the  probable intent of
the settlor, that distinguish  them from the residual claimants of other
organizational  forms.  In view of these  characteristics and the relevant
agency cost analysis,  this section explains the  operation of three rules
of private trust governance  as consistent with the likely preferences  of
the parties.  These  distinguishing characteristics  therefore  reflect  im-
portant empirical assumptions that underpin the hypothetical bargain
encoded in traditional  trust doctrine. 40  When choosing an organiza-
tional form,  one  looks  for the  form  in  which  the  default empirical
assumptions  about risk-preferences,  the number of residual claimants,
and other relevant factors most closely  resemble one's own  situation.
Doing  so minimizes  the transaction  costs of customizing  the form  to
fit one's particular needs. 141
1.  The Duty of Impartiality
Trust law facilitates the creation  of residual  claimants  with  inter-
ests  adverse  to  each other.  The still  classic  example,  here  described
with  reference  to the exemplary  trust first discussed  in the Introduc-
tion, is a trust for the lifetime income benefit of one party  (BI)  with
the remainder  principal  benefit to another  (B2).  As  residual  claim-
ants,  the overall interests of BI  and B2 are grossly aligned on matters
such  as  self-dealing  or  embezzlement  by  T.  But often  their  specific
interests  in the day-to-day management of the trust will not be congru-
ent.  The most obvious  example is  that BI  should prefer income-pro-
ducing  investments  while  B2  should  prefer  capital  appreciation.
142
This creates  "conflicts  among the claim holders of different states be-
cause alternative  decisions shift payoffs across states and benefit some
claim  holders at the  expense of others."
1 43
Trust law's  amenability  to  residual  claimants  with  adverse  inter-
ests poses a challenge for crafting an effective  governance regime, be-
cause  the preference  set  of the residual claimants,  in whose interests
140  Cf Leo E.  Strine, Jr.,  The Inescapably  Empirical  Foundation of the Common Law of Corpo-
rations, 27  DEL. J.  CORP.  L.  499  (2002)  (noting  some  of the  empirical  assumptions  that
underpin  various corporate  law doctrines).
141  See, e.g.,  Ogus, supra note  3,  at  187.
142  See, e.g.,  Dennis v. R.I.  Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.2d 893, 895-96 (1st Cir. 1984)
(holding  that  a trustee  acted improperly  in  favoring  the  income  beneficiaries  over  the
remainder beneficiaries);  Dobris, supra note 20, at 569-71  (noting that the Uniform Princi-
pal and Income Act "created a meaningful  principal and income  problem for a number of
trustees");  see also Joel  C.  Dobris,  Why  Trustee Investors Often Prefer Dividends to Capital Gain
and  Debt Investments to Equity-A Daunting  Principal  and Income Problem, 32 REAL  PROP.  PROB.
& TR. J. 255  (1997)  (discussing the tension between  income and remainder beneficiaries).
143  Fama  & Jensen, Residual Claims, supra note  1, at 329.
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the trust should be managed, may not be coherent.  Corporate law, by
comparison,  assumes  that  all  shareholders  share  the  basic  aim  of
profit maximization  (their preferences are said to be "single-peaked").
This  assumption  elides  the  problems  of  agenda  manipulation  and
cycling.
144
Trust  law's  evolutionary  response  for  aggregating  the  otherwise
conflicting interests of different classes  of beneficiaries  is the fiduciary
duty of impartiality. 145  This duty  requires  the  trustee  to "act impar-
tially in investing, managing, and distributing the  trust  property, giv-
ing  due  regard  to  the  beneficiaries'  respective  interests.1 46  Thus,
under the  default arrangement, T cannot justify an action  as benefit-
ing BI  or B2  exclusively.  Instead,  T must justify her decisions in rela-
tion  to  the  aggregate  welfare  of  B1  and  B2  as  a  class.  The  trust's
residual  claimants'  interests are made coherent in  effect by directing
the trustee to act with a view to  their needs rather  than their individ-
ual  wants;  balance  is  the  overarching  directive  of  the  duty  of
impartiality.
147
This appears  consistent with  the  settlor's probable  intent.  True,
in the foregoing  example  one might argue  that S rated  BI's position
as superior  to B2's because  S  gave  BI  an  immediate benefit but gave
B2 only the remainder on the death of BI.  But that seems a thin basis
for concluding that S wanted T  to prefer  the interests  of BI  over the
interests of B2.  If S had such a preference,  it would have been simple
enough to put something to that effect in the trust instrument.  In the
absence of such language, given the gratuitous basis of the traditional
private  trust, we  assume  that S wanted T to exercise discretion  in bal-
ancing  the  interests  of the  named  beneficiaries,  favoring  BI  or  B2
only if the later context justified doing so. 148  This stands  in contrast
to  the  law  of  corporations,  which  requires  managers  to  favor  the
144  See  Frank H.  Easterbrook  &  Daniel  R.  Fischel,  Voting in  Corporate Law,  26 J.L.  &
ECON.  395,  405-06  (1983);  Roberta  Romano, Answering the  Wrong Question: The  Tenuous
Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1599,  1611-12  (1989);  Robert  H.
Sitkoff,  Corporate  Political  Speech, Political  Extortion, and the Competition  for Corporate Charters,
69 U.  CHI.  L. REV.  1103,  1110 n.28  (2002).
145  See Halbach,  supra note  8,  at 1912-13.
146  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §  803, 7C  U.L.A. 204  (Supp.  2003);  see also RESTATEMENT  (SEC-
OND)  OF  TRUSTS  §§  183, 232  (1959).
147  See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS:  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  RULE  § 227  cmts.  c  &  i
(1992);  Edward  C.  Halbach, Jr.,  Significant Trends in the  Trust Law of the  United States, 32
VAND.  J.  TRANSNAT'L  L.  531,  549  (1999)  [hereinafter  Halbach,  Significant Trends]; Edward
C. Halbach, Jr.,  Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 27  REAL  PROP.  PROB.  & TR. J.
407, 441-44 (1992)  [hereinafter Halbach,  Trust Investment]; Halbach, supra note 8, at 1913.
148  Thus, balance  does not require equal treatment.  In fact, the trustee  "has consider-
able discretion in preserving the balance between the beneficiaries."  3A Sco-rr  ON TRUSTS,
supra  note 5, §  232, at 7.  For example, T could lawfully  tip the balance in favor of BI  if BI
was  S's widow  and B2  was  a distant cousin.  "There  is  ...  no absolute rule  on this  matter
and  under  some  circumstances  [favoring  the  life  or  remainder  beneficiaries]  might  be
justified."  Id.
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claimant with the most residual claim in the case of conflict,149 though
of course  within  the  same  class  of stock  all  shareholders  must  be
treated equally. 150  Trust law's duty of impartiality applies both within
and  across beneficiary  classes.
From  this  perspective  the  duty  of impartiality  is  both  a  critical
feature of trust governance and  a salient distinguishing characteristic
of trust law as organizational law.  It is critical, because without it often
there would be no coherent  set of residual  claimants in  whose  inter-
ests  the  trust's  managers  should  operate.  And  it  is  a  salient  distin-
guishing  characteristic,  relevant  to  choice  of form  for  commercial
transactions, 15 1  because  the duty is not an explicit part of the  default
fiduciary  obligation in most other organizational  forms.
Courts therefore  have  considerable  experience  in  applying  trust
law  to the  problem of balancing the interests of residual  claimants of
different classes.  Especially for commercial transactions, this might be
a reason to choose  the deal reflected within trust law's default govern-
ance  regime  over  those  offered  by the  default  governance  arrange-
ments  of other organizations. 152  As  Steven  Schwarcz  has  explained,
one  "should consider  using the  trust form  of business  organization
where  residual  claimants  do  not expect  management  to  favor  their
class  of claims over senior claimants.'
' 53
2.  Total Return Investing
The  modern  trend  toward  total  return  investing  complements
the  duty  of impartiality.1 54  Motivated  by  the  teachings  of modern
portfolio  theory, 155 total return investing has been  codified in  the re-
149  See,  e.g., Zahn  v. Transamerica  Corp.,  162  F.2d 36, 46  (3d Cir.  1947);  BAINBRIDGE,
supra note  1,  § 7.4, at 342;  ROBERT  CHARLES  CLARI,  CORPORATE  LAW  §  14.5,  at 636  (1986).
150  The clearest  application  of this principle  is the  rule against non-pro-rata distribu-
tions, which prevents  controlling shareholders  from favoring themselves.  See,  e.g.,  Sinclair
Oil Corp.  v.  Levien, 280 A.2d  717,  721-22  (Del.  1971);  BAINBRIDGE,  supra note  1, § 7.4, at
338-42.
151  See Schwarcz,  supra note  13, at  575-80.
152  Reasoning along similar lines, Fischel and  Langbein  have suggested  "that the duty
of  impartiality  should be  imported  into  pension  law"  as  a  response  to  the  frequency  of
adverse  interests  among pension fund beneficiaries.  Daniel Fischel  & John H. Langbein,
ERISA's Fundamental  Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55  U.  CHI.  L.  REv.  1105,  1121
(1988).  Courts  have  followed  this  suggestion.  SeeJOHN  H.  LANGBEIN  & BRUCE  A.  WOLK,
PENSION  AND  EMPLOYEE  BENEFIT  LAw  680,  848  (3d ed.  2000).
153  Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at 579.
154  See,  e.g.,  Lyman W. Welch,  Brave New  World of Total Return Laws, TR.  & EST.,  June
2002, at 24.
155  See,  e.g.,  JONATHAN  R.  MACEY,  AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  MODERN  FINANCIAL  THEORY
17-31 (2d ed.  1998).  For early applications to trust-investment law, see Gordon, supra note
12;  BEVIS  LONGSTRETH,  MODERN  INVESTMENT  MANAGEMENT  AND  THE  PRUDENT  MAN  RULE
(1986);  John  H.  Langbein  &  Richard  A.  Posner,  Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law,
1976  Am.  B.  FOUND.  RES.  J. 1; John  H. Langbein  & Richard  A.  Posner, Market Funds and
Trust-Investment Law: II, 1977 Am.  B. FOUND.  RES. J. 1;  see also Harvey E. Bines, Modern Portfo-
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cent  revisions  to  the  prudent  investor standards  that  underpin  trust
law's  fiduciary  duty of care. 156  The  basic  idea  is that trustees  should
craft  a  diversified  portfolio  in  light  of its  balance  of overall  (rather
than investment-specific)  risk and potential  return. 157  A contempora-
neous  reform,  which  revised  the  definitions  of "principal"  and  "in-
come,"  made  the  boundary  between  the  two  porous. 15 8  Together,
total return  investing and  more flexible  definitions  of principal  and
income  have  the potential  to  ease  the  tension between  lifetime  and
remainder beneficiaries by refocusing the  trustee's balancing of their
interests  on  a  more  transparent  margin-namely,  the  allocation  to
"principal" or "income"  of the trust's  total return  receipts.1 59
The  1997 Uniform  Principal  and Income Act  refocuses  the ten-
sion between  capital appreciation  and present income production  on
the  trustee's  ex  post power  to  adjust  the  classification  of specific  in-
vestment returns within the total return portfolio as income  or princi-
pal.1 60  The so-called  unitrust,161 which  is  an alternative  to equitable
adjustment  that provides  a  specified  percentage  of the  trust  corpus
each year to  the income beneficiaries  with the remainder left for the
"principal" beneficiaries, 162 likewise eases the tension  between  capital
appreciation  and income  production.
lio  Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine,  76 COLUM.  L. REv. 721
(1976)  (discussing  portfolio  theory in  the context of investment  management).
156  See Halbach,  Significant Trends, supra note  147,  at 546; Langbein,  supra note  91; see
also  Joel  C.  Dobris,  Speculations on  the Idea of "Speculation"  in  Trust Investing: An  Essay, 39
REAL  PROP.  PROB.  & TR. J. (forthcoming 2004)  (discussing  the role of "speculation" mod-
ern  trust-investment  law).
157  See  UNIF.  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  ACT §§ 2-3,  7B  U.L.A.  289-98  (2000);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS:  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  RULE  §  227(a)  (1992);  see alsoJohn  H.  Langbein,
The New American Trst-Investment Act, 8 TOLLY'S  TR. L. INT'L 123,  123-24  (1994).  Damages
in surcharge actions for imprudence should likewise  reflect the total return imperative.  See
Sitkoff, supra note  15, at 583-87.
158  UNIV.  PRINCIPAL  &  INCOME  ACT (1997  Act),  7B  U.L.A.  131  (2000).
159  See Halbach, supra note 8, at 1913-14;  see also Langbein,  The Uniform Prudent Investor
Act,  supra note 91,  at 666-69  (discussing the tension between  modem investment theories
and traditional  distinctions  between  principal  and income).  For further economically-in-
formed  discussion  of principal  and income, see Gordon,  supra note 12,  at 99-112.
160  UNIF.  PRINCIPAL &  INCOME ACT  (1997 Act)  §§  103-04, 7B U.L.A.  139-43 (2000).  See
generally  Joel C. Dobris,  New Forms of Private Trusts for the Twenty-First Centuy-Principal  and
Income, 31  REAL  PROP.  PROB.  &  TR.  J.  1  (1996)  (proposing means  to  alleviate tension  be-
tween  conflicting  beneficiary  interests); Joel C.  Dobris,  The Probate World at the End of the
New Century: Is a New Principal  and Income Act in Your Future?, 28 REAL  PROP.  PROB.  & TR. J.
393  (1993)  (discussing proposed  reforms  to principal and  income allocation  rules).
161  See, e.g.,  DEL.  CODE ANN.  tit. 12,  § 3527  (2001);  N.Y. ESTATE  POWERS  &  TRUSTS  LAW
§ 11-2.4  (McKinney  Supp.  2004).
162  See,  e.g., Jerold  I.  Horn,  Prudent Investor Rule,  Modern Portfolio Theory,  and Private
Trusts: Drafting  and Administration  Including the  "Give-Me-Five" Unitrust, 33 REAL  PROP.  PROB.
& TR.J. 1, 30-33, 36-46  (1998);  Langbein,  The  Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note  91,
at 669;  Robert  B. Wolf, Total Return Trusts-Can Your Clients Afford Anything Less?, 33 REAL
PROP. PROB.  & TR.J.  131  (1998);  cf Joel C.  Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfolio Theory, and
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With  equitable  adjustment or a unitrust, the  higher the  total re-
turn, the better all the beneficiaries  do.' 63  The unitrust does so with
less discretion  and so a reduced potential for agency costs.  But it less
perfectly  aligns  the  interests  of  the  income  and  principal  benefi-
ciaries, because a disproportionate  share of the potential  upside from
higher risk investments will accrue  to the principal  beneficiaries.  Eq-
uitable adjustment somewhat better aligns  the beneficiaries'  interests,
but it increases  the potential for agency  costs ex post because it gives
the trustee additional discretion ex ante.  Still,  the exercise  of this dis-
cretion  is  more transparent  than  the  traditional  approach  of hiding
the problem behind the portfolio's initial allocation between income-
producing  and capital-appreciating  investments.
In  any of its  forms,  the  trend  toward  total  return  investing, like
the duty of impartiality, can be understood  as the sort of agency-costs-
minimizing rules to which the parties probably would have agreed had
bargaining been feasible.  Indeed, before these reforms, opting out of
the  prior prudent  investor standards  was  not  uncommon  in profes-
sionally  drafted  instruments. 164  Authorization  for the  trustee  to  in-
vade principal for the benefit of the income beneficiaries was also not
uncommon.
165
3.  Risk  Tolerance and the Duty of Care
In the paradigmatic  donative trust, the residual claimants  are risk
averse  (imagine widows and orphans).  Because  there is no well-devel-
oped market for beneficial  interests in trusts, 166 the beneficiaries  can-
not  easily  diversify,  and  when  diversification  is  unavailable,  the
standard economic assumption  is that of risk averseness.1 67  Owing to
the  trend  toward  professional  trustees,  however,  the  typical  modern
trustee-whether  a sophisticated individual,  such  as a trust lawyer,  or
an institution,  such  as a bank-is likely to be less  risk averse than the
typical beneficiary. 168  Corporate trustees are by definition risk neutral
College, University, and  Foundation  Decisions on Annual Spending  from Endowments: A  Visit to the
World of Spending Rules, 28  REAL  PROP.  PROB.  & TR. J.  49  (1993).
163  See generally MAcEY,  supra note  155,  at 77-80  (describing  the advantages of a more
flexible  trust-investment  law).
164  See POSNER,  supra note  113,  § 15.6, at 455;  Getzler,  Legislative Incursions, supra note
20,  Art. 2,  at 3-4;  Gordon,  supra note  12,  at 75-76  & n.99.
165  See,  e.g.,  Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. N.Y. City Cancer Comm.,  144 A.2d  535, 538-37
(Conn. 1958)  (holding that the trust instrument authorized the trustee  to invade principal
for  the income beneficiary).
166  See infra note 278  and accompanying  text.
167  See VARIAN,  INTERMEDIATE  MICROECONOMICS, supra note 67, at 228; Eisenhardt, supra
note  67, at  60-61.  Behavioral  studies  are critical  of this  assumption.  See,  e.g.,  Nicholas
Barberis & Ming  Huang, Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Individual  Stock Returns, 56J.
FIN.  1247,  1254  (2001).
168  Note,  however,  that the individual  agents of an institutional  fiduciary who  are  as-
signed to manage a particular  trust are  likely  to be  risk-averse.  But this is an agency prob-
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(this is the standard assumption for business organizations),  and indi-
vidual trustees are able to diversify  and in some cases are even able to
insure  against loss.
1 69
This  is not to suggest  that trustees are  indifferent  to risk  or that
beneficiaries  will  never  prefer  aggressive  portfolios  and  high-risk  in-
vestments.  Rather,  the  point concerns  the  relative  discounts,  if any,
that the parties assign  to expected values in  the face of uncertainty.
70
The basic intuition  is that individuals who cannot diversify have a dis-
taste for volatility and prefer instead lower expected returns with less
risk of a substantial  loss.  This is  true even if the  probability  that the
substantial  loss  will  materialize  is  relatively  small.  The  more  risk
averse  an investor is,  the more likely the investor will prefer a smaller
but certain  sum  (say,  $100)  over  the chance  to  obtain  a  larger  sum
(say, $200)  even if the  larger sum, when  discounted  by its  probability
(say,  60%),  is  still larger than the  smaller but certain sum  (here  $120
versus  $100).
The  disparity in the  trustee's  and the beneficiaries'  attitudes  to-
ward  risk that stems  from  this  institutional  design  poses  a challenge
for trust governance.1 7   In  the absence  of the fiduciary obligation  or
other  corrective  mechanisms,  trustees  would  often  be  less  averse  to
volatility than the beneficiaries. 17 2  Trust law's  particular flavor of the
fiduciary  duty  of care  can  be understood  as  an answer  to  this  chal-
lenge.1 73  Care in trust law is the functional equivalent of the objective
reasonable person standard in tort law.174  The trustee must "exercise
such care and  skill as  a man of ordinary prudence  would  exercise  in
lem within the institution's organizational structure, and analysis of that problem is beyond
the scope of this Article.
169  Legal malpractice insurance, for example,  is available with coverage for negligence
in fiduciary administration.
170  Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen's textbook provides a clear introductory explana-
tion of this concept.  See ROBERT  COOTER & THOMAS  ULEN,  LAW AND  ECONOMICS  49-55 (4th
ed. 2004);  see also VARIAN,  INTERMEDIATE  MICROECONOMICS,  supra note 67,  at 224-29.
171  Agency  relationships,  in  other  words,  present  both  incentive  and  risk-sharing
problems.  See, e.g.,  Eisenhardt, supra note 67,  at 58.
172  Commissions are often  set as a percentage  of the trust corpus.  See, e.g.,  N.Y. SuRR.
CT.  PROC.  AcT  § 2309  (McKinney  1997);  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 639,  651.  There  is,
however,  an emerging  trend, supported by academics,  toward a reasonable compensation
standard.  See CAL. PROB.  CODE  §  15681  (West 1991); RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS §  38
(2003);  UNIF.  TRUST CODE  §  708,  7C U.L.A.  197  (Supp. 2003);  Halbach,  supra note  8,  at
1909.  See generally  VOLLMAR  ET AL.,  supra note  101,  at 1059  (describing  various  compensa-
tion schemes);  Gordon,  supra note  12,  at 82-83 (discussing  trustee  compensation).
173  See Frank H. Easterbrook  & Daniel R. Fischel,  Contract and Fiduciary  Duty, 36J.L. &
ECON.  425, 437  (1993).
174  See UNIF.  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  AcT  § 1 cmt.,  7B  U.L.A. 287  (2000);  Langbein,  supra
note  8,  at  656.  See generally Cooter  & Freedman,  supra note  69,  at  105-58  (comparing
"reasonable"  care  in tort and  fiduciary  law).
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dealing with his own property.' 75  This duty counsels  caution, which
is  what undiversified,  risk-averse  beneficiaries  would  prefer.  Accord-
ingly, the frequent observation that portfolio management by trustees
in  practice  is  overly  cautious  likely  reflects  some  combination  of too
much  deterrence from  the duty  of care  and a selection  effect in  the
initial choice of cautious  trustees by the settlor.
176
The  contrast  between  the operation  of the  duty of care  in trust
law and in corporate law  is instructive. 177  In corporate  law, the busi-
ness judgment  rule requires  deference  to  the ordinary business  deci-
sions of management unless  they are  tainted by a conflict  of interest
or are so unreasonable  as to amount to gross negligence.' 7   This is a
loose constraint, 179 but the business judgment rule  is justifiable from
an agency costs perspective  in view of the different context in which it
operates.  Corporate  law  draws  from  portfolio  theory a  paradigmatic
shareholder who is diversified. i80  And diversified  (risk-neutral)  share-
holders are advantaged  by the business judgment rule because insulat-
ing managers from  liability in the absence of egregious  conduct helps
175  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  174  (1959);  see also RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF
TRUSTS:  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  RULE  § 227 cmt.  d  (1992).  See generally  Joshua Getzler, Duty of
Care, in  BREACH  OF  TRUST  41  (Peter  Birks  & Arianna  Pretto  eds.,  2002)  (discussing the
development of the duty  of care  in  English  law).
176  See,  e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note  11,  at  1335  ("Trustees have  long been  risk
averse, conservative  investors.").  Conservatism  might also stem from  the common law  rule
of unanimity  in  trustee  decisionmaking.  See DUKEMINIER  & JOHANSON,  supra note  28,  at
918;  Ogus, supra note 3,  at 209-10.  This lends support  to the  rejection of the unanimity
requirement by the Uniform Trust Code,  see § 703, 7C U.L.A. 191  (Supp. 2003),  and by the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, see §  39  (2003),  as does  the observation  that in practice  many
drafters likewise reject the unanimity requirement.  There has been considerable statutory
activity  in  this  area.  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  39 rep.  note cmt.  a  (2003);
UNIF.  TRUSTEE'S  POWERS ACT  § 6(a),  7C U.L.A. 429 (2000);  DUKEMINIER  &JOHANSON,  supra
note 28,  at 918 n.5.
177  See Gordon,  supra note  12, at 94-96; Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 574-79.
178  See,  e.g.,  Brehm v. Eisner,  746 A.2d  244, 264 & n.66  (Del.  2000); BAINBRIDGE,  supra
note 1, § 6.4,  at 269-83.  The United Kingdom  has in  practice,  though admittedly not in
name, something of a business judgment  rule.  See BRIAN R.  CHEFFINS,  COMPANY LAw:  THE-
ORY,  STRUCTURE,  AND  OPERATION  313  (1997).
179  Of course,  one  must be careful  about accepting  doctrinal labels as  conclusive  on
the issue of whether prudence  in  trust law and  business judgment in  corporate law beget
different  outcomes.  There  is  ample  authority  for  deferential  review  of  trustee  decision-
making, see,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  187  (1959),  and  the business judg-
ment rule  is  not  an  abdication  of  the judicial  function  by  the  courts.  Cf  Stephen  M.
Bainbridge,  The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine 6-9, 14-19  (Univ. of Cal.,
L.A.,  Sch. of Law, Law &  Econ. Research Series, Working Paper No. 03-18, 2003),  available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=429260.  Still,  the  different emphases  in the canonical  state-
ments are telling.  Further, even though numerous courts have found a breach of the duty
of care by a trustee,  see, e.g.,  2A SCorr ON TRUSTS,  supra note 5,  §  174, cases  holding that a
manager  of a publicly-traded  corporation breached  the duty of care  are almost nonexis-
tent.  See,  e.g.,  BAINBRIDGE,  supra note  1,  §§ 6.2,  6.4;  ALLEN  &  KRAAKMAN,  supra  note  10,
§ 8.4.2, at 254.
180  See,  e.g.,  WILLIAM  W.  BRATrON,  CORPORATE  FINANCE  120  (5th  ed.  2003).AN AGENCY COSTS THEORY OF TRUST LAW
offset  the  managers'  incentives-including  large  investments  of
human  capital and  personal  wealth in  the firm-to avoid  risk.1 81
Trust law,  in contrast, assumes  that the  beneficiaries  are not di-
versified, so the trustee's default duty of care  is set at the more restric-
tive reasonable person standard.  Viewed  in this manner, the different
understandings  of the  duty of care  in  corporate and  trust law  reflect
different  expectations  regarding  internal  and  external  diversifica-
tion.1 82  In donative  trusts diversification for the  residual claimants  is
usually obtained internally.
83
Of course,  given  their other holdings,  some  beneficiaries  might
be diversified irrespective  of the trust portfolio.  For this reason mod-
ern prudent investor standards require the trustee  to consider the risk
tolerance  of the  trust's  particular  beneficiaries  in  crafting  the  trust
portfolio. i 8 4  Young  scions  of great  wealth  can better  absorb  higher
volatility  than  elderly  widows  of modest  means.  So  a  "trust  whose
main  purpose  is  to  support  an  elderly  widow  of modest  means  will
have  a  lower  risk tolerance  than  a  trust to  accumulate  for  a young
scion of great wealth."'1 8 5
B.  The Settlor-Beneficiary  Tension
In light of the agency cost considerations  on both sides, this sec-
tion explores four examples of how the law balances the  ex post pref-
erences  of the  beneficiaries  with  the  ex  ante  wishes  of the  settlor.
Consider once again  the exemplary  trust presented above, which  was
181  See Joy v.  North,  692 F.2d 880,  886 & n.6  (2d Cir. 1982);  BAINBRIDGE,  supra note  1,
§ 6.3, at 259-63;  EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note  1, at 93-102; Peter V. Letsou, Implica-
tions of Shareholder  Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business
Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT  L.  REV.  179,  182  (2001).
182  For a complementary  analysis, see Rock  & Wachter,  supra note  2, at 652-71.  Note
also  that managerial  decisions  regarding  a portfolio of liquid assets are easier  to  monitor
than decisions regarding  net present value  of a corporation's  operating assets.  See Macey,
supra note  3,  at 317-19;  Hansmann  & Mattei,  supra note  6, at 477.  Exogenous factors  im-
pact the results of the latter, whereas the former can be compared to the performance of a
hypothetical  prudent portfolio, thereby netting out secular market trends.  For further dis-
cussion and  references,  see  Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 583-87.
183  Hence the  trustee's duty to diversify  the  trust portfolio.  See UNIF.  PRUDENT  INVES-
TOR  ACT  §  3,  7B  U.L.A. 296-98  (2000);  Langbein,  The  Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra
note 91,  at 646-49; Halbach,  Trust Investment, supra note  147, at 424-45;  see also In  re Estate
of Janes, 681  N.E.2d  332  (N.Y.  1997)  (holding  that a fiduciary  may be surcharged  for an
imprudent lack of diversification).
184  See  UNIF.  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  ACT  §  2,  7B  U.L.A.  289-90  (2000);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS:  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  RULE  §  227  cmt.  e  (1992);  Halbach,  Trust Invest-
ment, supra note  147, at 436-37, 444-45;  Langbein,  The Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra
note 91,  at 650.
185  UNIF.  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  AcT §  2  cmt.,  7B  U.L.A.  291  (2000);  see  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS:  PRUDENT  INVESTOR  RULE  §  227(a)  (1992).  See  generally Ogus,  supra
note 3,  at 196  ("The diversification objective of individuals  will  reflect their degree of risk-
aversion.").
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settled by  S for the benefit of BI  and B2  (collectively the "Bs")  with T
as  trustee.  The nub of the problem  is  that the Bs  bear the marginal
costs and benefits  of T's managerial decisions, but the ex ante prefer-
ences  of S  trump  the  later wishes  of the  Bs  in  guiding T's  manage-
ment. 1 8 6  A variant of the well-known  dead  hand  problem  (which  is
perhaps  a  pejorative  aphorism  for  the  idea  that  the  settlor's  intent
controls),18 7 this  tension  has been  exacerbated  by the  modern trend
toward the use of the  trust as a vehicle for asset  management by pro-
fessionals.  The  modern  managerial  trust vests  greater  discretion  in
the hands  of the  trustee,  which  broadens  the  range  of the  trustee's
hidden  action.  Moreover,  the  ongoing  erosion  of the  Rule  Against
Perpetuities  is expanding  the temporal  scope of the  trustee's  discre-
tionary authority and hence  the likelihood  of later circumstances  un-
anticipated  by the settlor.188
1.  Modification and Termination
A useful example of the potential for divergent interests between
the settlor and the beneficiaries  involves  the possibility  of the benefi-
ciaries  seeking premature  termination of the  trust.  This  problem  in-
cludes  the  issue  of  whether  the  beneficiaries  can  obtain  judicial
modification  of the trust's terms, because the power to terminate sub-
sumes  the power to modify.'8 9  The American  rule, which originated
with  Claflin v.  Claflin, 19°  is  unfriendly  to  termination  and  modifica-
186  See Ogus,  supra note  3,  at 214-16.
187  There  is  a considerable  literature  on  the dead  hand  problem.  See,  e.g.,  RONALD
CHESTER,  INHERITANCE,  WEALTH AND  SOCIETYpassim  (1982);  POSNER, supra note  113, §  18.3,
at 518-20; Alexander,  supra note  20,  at 1254-64;  Hirsch & Wang, supra note  3;  Gareth  H.
Jones,  The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH,  TAXES  AND  FAMILY  PROPERTY  119
(Edward  C. Halbach,Jr. ed.,  1977);Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumen-
talist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999  U.  ILL. L.  REV.
1273.
188  See LAWRENCE  W.  WAGGONER  ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY  LAW:  CASES AND  MATERIALS ON
WILLS,  TRUSTS,  AND  FUTURE  INTERESTS  900-01,  1251-52  (3d  ed.  2002);  Dukeminier  &
Krier, supra  note  11,  at 1327-35; Sterk, supra note 3, at 2111-14;  see also Richard A. Epstein,
Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,  64 WASH.  U.  L.Q. 667  (1986)
(discussing temporal  uncertainty  and  property  law).  An  interesting  question  is  whether
private trusts  might soon face  the sort of dead-hand  problems that are familiar  in charita-
ble  trusts, as the latter have  long been exempt from  the Rule Against Perpetuities.  See, e.g.,
POSNER,  supra note  113,  § 18.4, at 520; Alex  M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control  of
Charitable Trusts: Expanding the  Use of the Cy  Pres Doctrine, 21  U.  HAw.  L.  REV.  353,  356
(1999);  Macey,  supra note 3,  at 300-06.
189  Cf  2  SCOTT  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  § 107.3,  at  124-25  (discussing  removal  of
trustee  by beneficiaries).  Note, however, that the relevant  considerations for modification
versus  termination  are not entirely  the  same.  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  § 65
cmt. f (2003).  In practice, termination  usually pits the current against the remainder bene-
ficiaries whereas  modification  usually  touches only the settlor/beneficiary  tension.
190  20  N.E.  454  (Mass.  1889);  see RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  65 cmt. a  (2003).
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tion. t9t  Under the  Claflin doctrine, a trust may be terminated prema-
turely only with the settlor's consent or, in the absence of the settlor's
consent, if termination would not frustrate a "material purpose" of the
trust.
192  Settlor's consent, however, is  by definition unavailable  when
dealing with  testamentary  trusts,  and  courts  have  had little  difficulty
finding a "material purpose" that would be offended by a modification
or termination. 193  Thus, as a practical matter, unless the trustee  con-
sents,194  American  trusts are difficult to  amend or terminate  once es-
tablished.  Even if all the competent beneficiaries and the trustee were
inclined  to strike a deal, the frequency of unidentified or minor bene-
ficiaries  reduces  the viability  of this alternative.
The  upshot of the  Claflin doctrine  is that it helps align  the inter-
ests of the settlor and the  trustee.  The rule allows the trustee  to pre-
serve  the  settlor's  original  design,  regardless  of  the  beneficiaries'
wishes, which is what the settlor likely would have wanted.  The settlor,
after  all, chose  a trust rather than  an outright transfer or another or-
ganizational  form. 195  Thus the  Claflin doctrine  is consistent with  the
model  of the  settlor  as  the  primary  principal.  Moreover,  though  a
particular  beneficiary  might prefer  the  power  to  terminate  the  trust
once it is established, the  Claflin doctrine is advantageous  to potential
beneficiaries  as a class because it increases the willingness of grantors
to create a trust in the first place.1 9 6  The idea is that, in the aggregate,
beneficiaries  fare  better with  more  trusts,  and  thus more  gifting,197
191  See Dukeminier  & Krier,  supra note  11,  at 1328  (observing that, under  Claflin, "ter-
mination  or modification  by  a court[  ]  is only grudgingly available").
192  See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF TRUSTS  § 65  & cmt. a (2003);  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)
OF  TRUSTS  §  337  (1959);  4 ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note 5,  §§ 337-340.2.
193  See  generally 4  ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS,  supra  note  5,  §§ 337.1-337.8  (collecting  and
describing cases).  For a specific example, see In  re Estate of Brown, 528 A.2d 752, 755  (Vt.
1987)  ("We  believe that the settlor's intention to  assure  a life-long  income to  [the benefi-
ciaries]  would  be defeated  if termination of the  trust were  allowed.").
194  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  342  (1959);  ROGER  W.  ANDERSEN,  UNDER-
STANDING  TRUSTS  AND  ESTATES  110-111  (3d  ed.  2003);  4 SCOTT  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,
§ 342,  at 529-32.
195  Cf  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 632  ("The donor  who structures  a gift in  this way
expects compensating  advantages.").
196  That  the trust is less easily modified  than a contract might help solve  the  so-called
Samaritan's  dilemma.  Because  of its  rigidity ex post, the  trust provides  a mechanism  for
the parties to commit to a particular donative structure.  On the Samaritan's dilemma  and
related  issues, see James  M.  Buchanan,  The  Samaritan's  Dilemma, in ALTRUISM,  MORALIrY,
AND  ECONOMIC  THEORY  71-85  (Edmund  S.  Phelps  ed.,  1975); Ogus,  supra note  3,  at  189;
Shavell,  supra note  136,  at 402, 406-08,  419;  CharlesJ. Goetz  & Robert E.  Scott, Enforcing
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE  L.J.  1261,  1276-83  (1980);  Posner,
supra note  136, at 412-13.  If S is willing to transfer resources to  B, but B anticipates that S
will do so,  then  B might behave more  recklessly  because  S has  provided a safety net.  For
further discussion  of altruism  and  deferred  gifts  from  an economic  perspective,  see  also
sources cited in  supra note  136.
197  The  further assumption  here  is  that in  the absence  of these  rules, the overall  vol-
ume  of gifting would  fall.  If the  level of overall  gifting remained  constant,  then benefi-
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albeit  with  potentially  greater  managerial  agency  costs,  than  they
would fare with fewer trusts, albeit with reduced potential for manage-
rial  agency costs.
The downside of the Claflin doctrine  is that it entrenches the trus-
tee and  locks in a certain  minimal level  of beneficiary-trustee  agency
costs.  Under  the  classic  American  approach,  even  if all  the  benefi-
ciaries are identifiable adults who would be better off if the trust were
terminated  (perhaps because  its  consequent administrative  expenses
would  be  eliminated),  the  trustee  need  not assent  to  their  wishes.
Against the rule,  therefore, it might be argued that the fundamental
decision whether  or not to continue  the trust is  not in the  hands of
those who bear the  marginal  costs and benefits of that decision.
At its most extreme, this criticism amounts to nothing more than
a statement that the beneficiaries  cannot override  the settlor's choice
of form.  As  suggested  above,  however,  the  doctrine  rests  on  the  as-
sumption  that  all  the  relevant  parties  fare better in  the aggregate  if
settlors are  allowed  to  bind the beneficiaries  to  the  trust form of or-
ganization.  And yet, if we assume  that settlors of today's  managerial
trusts  ultimately  want  to  maximize  the  welfare  of the  beneficiaries,
then a different rule  might be  preferable-especially  in  view  of the
ongoing erosion  of the  Rule  Against Perpetuities  and hence  the  in-
creasing  temporal durability  of modern  trusts.1 98  On  this view,  one-
time  settlors  do  not  know  to opt  out of the  default  Claflin regime,
perhaps because their advisors are failing to call this to their attention
(an  altogether  different  agency  problem 99)  or they  did  not  obtain
expert advice.
200
It is hardly surprising,  therefore,  that there is  a strong academic
and  slowly  emerging  decisional  trend  toward  liberalizing  these
rules.20 1  As  in  the  classic  (if  then  extraordinary)  Pulitzer case, 2 0 2
courts are beginning to show a willingness to authorize deviation from
the settlor's specific instructions  that, over time, conflict with the set-
ciaries might fare better without the rule,  provided that the alternative  modes  of transfer
imposed fewer restrictions.  But with  fewer restrictions,  these alternatives would  be imper-
fect substitutes,  so it is  unlikely  that the overall  level  of gifting would remain constant.
198  See supra note  188  and accompanying  text.
199  See supra note  115.
200  See Dukeminier  & Krier,  supra note  11,  at  1331-32.
201  See  Halbach,  Significant Trends, supra note  147,  at  538;  Halbach,  supra note  8,  at
1899-1901;  see, e.g.,  CAL.  PROB. CODE  § 15409  (West 1991);  see also Gail  Boreman Bird, Trust
Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands-Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS
L.J.  563  (1985)  (suggesting  reforms  to  increase  flexibility  of  trusts  over  time);  Ronald
Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The  Uniform  Trust Code
Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL  PROP. PROB.  & TR.J. 697  (2001)  (arguing that the increase
in long-term  trusts requires  loosening of the rules of modification  and termination).
202  In re Pulitzer's Estate, 249 N.Y.S. 87  (Sur. Ct. 1931),  affd mem.,  260 N.Y.S. 975  (App.
Div. 1932).  For further discussion  of Pulitzer, see Langbein,  supra note 98.
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dor's  assumed  broader  aim  of benefiting  the  beneficiaries. 2 0 3  Cer-
tainly  the  recent  Uniform Trust Code and  Restatement (Third) of Trusts
embrace this view.20 4  In fact, they extend it to the power of "equitable
deviation"-the idea  that courts  should  permit modification  of even
the dispositive  instructions  of the  trust instrument in light of circum-
stances not anticipated by the settlor.2 0 5  Likewise, there is burgeoning
authority,  perfectly  sensible  from  an  agency-costs  contractarian  per-
spective,  for trust  modifications where  tax  exigencies  arise  after the
settlor establishes the  trust.20 6
Note,  however, that these liberalizations  are designed to  advance
the settlors'  probable intent.207  If, at the time of the trust's creation, a
particular  type  of tax  savings  was  not possible,  then  the  reasonable
assumption  is that the settlor would want the  trust later  modified  to
minimize taxes in light of subsequent changes to the  tax law.208  Simi-
larly, the  typical settlor would want  the court to  modify even  the  dis-
tributive  provisions  of the  trust when,  as  a  result  of unanticipated
circumstances,  the settlor's prior regime  is  no longer sensible.2 0 9  Re-
203  See, e.g.,  In reTrusteeship Agreement with Mayo,  105  N.W.2d 900, 91  (Minn. 1960);
Carnahan  v.  Johnson,  711  N.E.2d  1093,  1096-98  (Ohio  Ct.  App.  1998);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  rep. note  §  66 cmt. b  (2003)  (collecting  illustrative  authority);  ROGER
W. ANDERSEN & IRA MARK  BLOOM,  FUNDAMENTALS  OF  TRUSTS AND  ESTATES  § 8.04, at 392 (2d
ed.  2002).
204  See UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §§ 410-12,  7C  U.L.A.  164-68  (Supp.  2003);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §§  65-66  (2003);  In  re Harris  Testamentary  Trust,  69  P.3d  1109,
1114-20  (Kan.  2003)  (upholding various reformations and modifications under the Kansas
adoption of the UTC);  Chester, supra note 201,  at 724-28; Dukeminier & Krier, supra  note
11,  at 1329-31;  English, supra note 98,  at 27-28;  David M.  English,  The  Uniform Trust Code
(2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 Mo.  L.  REv.  143,  169-76  (2002); Julia C.
Walker,  Get  Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries' Right to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under
the Uniform Trust Code, 67 Mo.  L.  REv.  443, 459-62  (2002).
205  See UNIF. TRUST CODE §  412, 7C U.L.A. 167  (Supp. 2003);  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF
TRUSTS  §  66  & cmt. a  (2003);  Halbach,  supra note  8,  at  1900-01;  cf  N.Y. EST.  POwERS  &
TRUSTS  LAW § 7-1.6(b)  (McKinney  2002); Paul G.  Haskell,Justifying  the Principle of Distribu-
tive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18  HASTINGS  L.J.  267,  294  (1967)  (arguing in  favor  of
flexibility  to  modify  dispositive  trust terms  that would  cause  hardship  without modifica-
tion); Peter J.  Wiedenbeck,  Missouri's Repeal of the Claflin  Doctrine-New View  of the Policy
Against Perpetuities?, 50  Mo.  L.  REv.  805  (1985)  (analyzing  recent statutory reforms).
206  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  PROPERTY.  WILLS  AND  OTHER  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS
§  12.2  & rep.  note  (2003)  (stating the  rule and collecting authority);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE
§ 416,  7C U.L.A. 171  (Supp. 2003); see also 2A Scorr ON  TRUSTS,  supra  note  5,  §  167, at 281
n.27 & 2003 Supp. at 329-34  (collecting authority); Halbach, supra note 8, at 1887; cf Mary
Louise  Fellows,  In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA  L.  REv.  611,  613  (1988)  (arguing  that
courts should  construe  intent by reference to  "competent estate  planning techniques").
207  See Langbein,  supra note  59,  at 68-69.
208  The  qualification  allows  for the scenario  in  which  the settlor  opts  for a  less  tax-
efficient trust  in order  to maintain  more control-for  example,  the use of a nonexempt
generation-skipping  trust.
209  These  liberalizations  are therefore  different from reformation  (which  the English
call  rectification  of documents  in  equity).  See In re Harris  Testamentary  Trust,  69 P.3d
1109,  1114  (Kan.  2003)  (distinguishing  reformation  and modification);  Langbein,  supra
note  59, at 69 (describing reformation  and rectification).  Reformation conforms the docu-
2004]CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  89:621
turning to  the  exemplary  trust described  above,  settled  by S for the
benefit of BI and B2, the supposition  is that S would have preferred to
favor  B2  over  BI  if subsequent  to  settling the  trust  the  former  was
disabled in an accident while the business of the latter proved unusu-
ally  successful.2 1 0  All  of  these  liberalizations,  if understood  as  de-
signed to effect a substituted judgment for what the settlor would have
wanted, are consistent with a model of the trust in which the settlor is
the  primary  principal.  These  liberalizing  trends  fulfill  the  benefi-
ciaries'  desires, but only when  doing so would  approximate  what the
settlor would have  wanted.  They add the  nuance of a standard, as  it
were,  to the hard-edged  Claflin rule.
The  more  liberal English approach,  in contrast, reflects  a differ-
ent dead-hand  calculus.  The  leading English case  on the question  of
premature termination, Saunders  v.  Vautier, 211 reaches the opposite  re-
sult from Claflin.212  Beneficiaries  of English trusts, if they are all iden-
tifiable adults, can force the premature termination  of a trust over the
dissent of the trustee.21 3  Indeed,  owing not only to Saunders but also
(and even more clearly)  to the Variation of Trusts Act of 1958,214 En-
glish law  resolves  significantly more of the  settlor-beneficiary  tension
raised  by questions  of trust termination  and modification  in  favor  of
ment to what was  actually  intended  at the time  of execution.  The innovation  here  is the
extension of the reformation concept to testamentary  trusts.  See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF
PROPERTY:  WILLS  AND  OTHER  DONATIVE  TRANSFERS  §  12.1  & cmt.  a  (2003);  UNIF.  TRUST
CODE  § 415,  7C U.L.A.  171  (Supp. 2003);  see, e.g.,  Pond  v.  Pond, 678  N.E.2d  1321,  1324
(Mass.  1997)  (reforming trust where settlor's  intent was  frustrated  by drafting error).
210  For an  example of the traditional,  contrary approach,  see  In  re Stuchell,  801  P.2d
852, 854 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)  (refusing to modify a trust so as to preserve  a disabled benefi-
ciary's eligibility for public assistance  on the ground that the modification's  "only purpose
...  [was]  to make the trust more advantageous  to the beneficiaries").  But see Macey, supra
note  3, at 300-02  (defending  narrower  interpretations  of settlor's intent).
211  49 Eng. Rep. 282  (1841);  see also Goulding v.James,  2 All  E.R. 239, 247 (C.A.  1997)
("The principle  recognises the rights of beneficiaries, who are  sui juris and together abso-
lutely  entitled  to  the  trust property,  to exercise  their proprietary  rights  to overbear  and
defeat  the  intention of a  testator  or settlor  to  subject property  to  the continuing  trusts,
powers and limitations of a will  or trust instrument.").
212  For a comparative  discussion  of Saunders and Claflin in their historical context, see
Alexander,  supra note  20, at  1200-04.
213  See  DJ. HAYrON,  THE  LAW  OF TRUSTS  93-96  (3d  ed.  1998);  MOFFAT  ET AL.,  supra
note  20,  at 249-52.
214  VARIATION  OF TRUSTS AcT,  1958,6 & 7 Eliz.  2, c.  53, §  1 (Eng.).  Well-drafted  instru-
ments can  easily circumvent Saunders, for example  by ensuring the existence of contingent
interests.  The  1958 Act, however,  is mandatory-and  it allows for the  ex  post variation of
even discretionary  trusts.  See Dukeminier &  Krier, supra note  11,  at 1329;  see also EDWARDS
& STOCKWELL,  supra note  20, at 156-58  (collecting  English cases which  hold that settlor's
intent  is not determinative  and indeed  often  irrelevant);  MOFFAT  ET AL.,  supra note  20,  at
272  (noting  the  "'triumph  for  the  doctrine  of equitable  property  over  the doctrine  of
fidelity  to the setlors'  intentions"'  (citation omitted));  PEARCE &  STEVENS,  supra note  25,
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the  beneficiaries. 215  Unlike  the  recent  liberalizations  to  American
law, however, English law places little emphasis in resolving these mat-
ters  on evidence  of what  the settlor would have  wanted.216
In the English trust, therefore, the settlor is not the primary prin-
cipal and  the settlor's  interests  are subordinated  to  the goal  of mini-
mizing managerial  agency  costs  ex post:  "[A]fter  the  settlor's death,
the trust is regarded as the beneficiaries'  property, not as the settlor's
property-and the dead hand continues to rule only by the sufferance
of the beneficiaries. ' " 21 7  A powerful  criticism of this approach, at least
since the  1958 Act, is that it is mandatory.  English  settlors cannot opt
for the American or any other more restrictive  approach.  The Claflin
doctrine,  in contrast, is default.  American  settlors can choose  the En-
glish or any other more permissive  regime.
2.  Trustee Removal
The  question  of on what  grounds  beneficiaries  may  obtain  the
removal  of a  trustee  is another  example of the  potential for tension
between  the interests of the settlor and those of the beneficiaries.  To
return  yet  again  to  the  exemplary  trust  discussed  above,  which  was
settled by S for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee, the question
is when, if ever, a court will remove and replace T at the request of the
Bs.
On the one  hand, an important  consideration for settlors when
choosing a trustee is the trustee's expected fidelity to the wishes of the
settlor in  the  future exercise  of discretion.  On  the  other hand,  it is
the  beneficiaries  who,  as residual  claimants,  bear the  marginal  costs
and benefits of the trustee's  decisions.  Hence  the beneficiaries  have
an  incentive  to monitor  the  trustee's  performance  and,  under stan-
dard doctrine,  only the beneficiaries  have standing to bring an action
against the  trustee for breach  of trust.21 8  The  difficulty,  then,  is set-
ting the threshold for trustee removal high enough so that the trustee
can  carry  out the settlor's wishes  (including the  protection  of future
215  See HAYTON,  supra note 213, at 174;  MOFFAT ET AL.,  supra note 20, at 248-73; PEARCE
&  STEVENS,  supra note  25, at 450-66; Hayton,  supra note  116,  at 598-600; Jones, supra note
187,  at  124-26;  Ogus,  supra note  3,  at  202-04.  See  generally Chester,  supra note  201,  at
709-22  (discussing  the history  of English  and American  trust law).  Canada  is  also  more
liberal  than  the  American  states.  See  Keith  B.  Farquhar,  Recent  Themes  in the  Variation of
Trusts, 20  EST.  TR.  &  PENSIONSJ.  181  (2001).
216  See MOFFAT  ET  AL,  supra note 20, at 248-57, 273-86; TODD  & WILSON,  supra  note  20,
§  18.3.3.3, at 434; Farquhar, supra note 215,  at 186-91;  sources cited supra notes 211,  214-
15; see also Wiedenbeck,  supra note 205,  at 817  (noting that Saunders  permits  termination
"without regard  to the settlor's  purposes").
217  DUKEMINIER  &JOHANSON,  supra note  28,  at 651;  cf Jones,  supra note  187,  at  120
("[American  courts]  have accepted  the full implications of the principle that the property
is  the settlor's, even  though  settled on trust.").
218  See infra Part JV.B.3.
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beneficiaries)  in the teeth of a contrary preference of the current ben-
eficiaries without setting it so high as in effect to sanction  shirking or
mismanagement.  The  goal,  in  otherwords,  is  to  minimize  trustee-
beneficiary agency costs, subject to the ex ante constraints imposed by
the settlor.
The law's  default approach  authorizes  courts  to  remove trustees
who are dishonest or who have engaged  in a "serious breach of trust,"
but  it does not necessarily  permit removal  for breaches  that are  not
"serious" or for simple  disagreements. 2 1 9  Trustees  who were  chosen
by the settlor, as compared  to those named by a third party or a court,
are  even  less readily removed;  there  is something  of a thumb on the
scale  for  them.22 0  Further,  if the  settlor  was  aware  of  an  asserted
ground for removal at the time of naming the trustee, that ground will
not serve as a basis for the later removal of the trustee unless the trus-
tee  is  entirely unfit to serve.221
These  default  rules  appear  to  reflect  the bargain  to  which  the
settlor and trustee would have agreed when trusts were  used predomi-
nately for the preservation  of family land and when the typical trustee
was an amateur rather than a fee-paid professional. 222  When the trus-
tee's  mission was simply  to hold  ancestral  land, there were fewer  op-
portunities for conflict between  beneficiaries and trustees  (where the
agent's  tasks are fewer and are readily observable,  shirking  is less of a
problem).  And, in  the aggregate,  beneficiaries  fare  better when  set-
tlors are  comfortable  establishing  trusts if the  alternative  is  that set-
tlors would not make the transfer at all.223  Thus the traditionally high
threshold for trustee  removal served  the  interests of the settlor while
imposing a tolerable  level of agency  costs on the beneficiaries.
Today,  however,  modern  prudent  investor  standards  allow  for
greater discretion  in portfolio  management  and the overarching aim
has shifted  to maximization  of total return.  Consider also  the appar-
ent shift toward  use of professional  trustees,224 which  suggests a weak-
ened personal link between  the settlor and the trustee.  Both of these
developments are related to the larger trend toward use of the trust as
an organizing device for the professional management of financial as-
219  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  107  cmts. b-c  (1959);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  § 37  cmt.  e(1)  (2003);  2  SCOTT ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  §  107, at
108-09.
220  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  107  cmt.  f  (1959);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF TRUSTS  §  37 cmt. f (2003); 2 ScoTT  ON  TRUSTS, supra note 5, §  107.1,  at 117-18;
cf.  English,  supra note  204,  at  197-99  (discussing  removal  under  the  UTC  in  situations
"where  the  personal  link between  the settlor  and trustee  has been  broken").
221  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  107  cmt.  g  (1959);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  37 cmt. f (2003);  2 ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  §  107.1,  at 118.
222  See,  e.g., Langbein,  supra note  8, at 632-33, 637-39;  see also supra note 57.
223  See supra note  197 and accompanying  text.
224  See supra note  57 and accompanying  text.
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sets.  With  these  changes,  fiduciary  law  has  replaced  limited  trustee
powers as the beneficiaries'  chief protective device. 225  Although mod-
ern  trustees  can,  and  in fact  often  should, delegate  to  specialists, 226
the  trustee  remains  ultimately  responsible  for  the  exercise  of  the
broader discretion afforded by modern  law. This means that not only
has  the  potential for managerial  agency costs  increased,  but the im-
portance  of removal  as a  check on these costs  has likewise  increased.
Consistent  with  this  analysis,  anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that
modern settlors regularly contract out of the default removal rules in
favor of easier substitution  of trustees, 227 sometimes even  authorizing
a  third-party  (the so-called  trust protector)  to  replace  the trustee. 228
Consider also the analogy to the robust econometric evidence regard-
ing the negative impact on shareholder welfare  of corporate takeover
defenses such as classified boards.229  Putting aside concern about the
effect of deterring the settling of trusts in the first place, this analogy
lends support to the view that reducing the threshold for the removal
of trustees should  improve  beneficiary  welfare.
The foregoing  therefore  provides  an  argument  in  favor  of the
somewhat  more  liberal  removal  standards  stated  in the  new  Uniform
Trust Code and  Restatement (Third) of Trusts.23 0  The argument  is partic-
ularly  strong with  respect  to  removal  of large  (as  compared  to  bou-
225  See Langbein, supra note  8, at 640-43; Langbein,  supra note  59, at 71;  see also Alex-
ander, supra note 24,  at 775  (arguing that the rise of institutional trustees  required  "trust-
inducing mechanisms" such  as fiduciary  law); Jones, supra note  187, at 121-23  (noting the
historically  limited powers of trustees).
226  See supra note  91.
227  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  34 cmt.  c  (2003)  ("It  is  also common
for  the terms of trusts  to  provide for  the appointment of new trustees.");  AM.  JUR.,  Legal
Forms-Trusts  §§  251:370-251:373,  251:388  (2d  ed.  2001); JOHN  R. PRICE,  PRICE  ON  CON-
TEMPORARY  ESTATE  PLANNING  §  10.41,  at  1152  (2d  ed. 2000).  In correspondence  with the
author about an earlier draft of this Article, Jeffrey Schoenblum  observed  that the benefi-
ciaries are commonly given authority to replace the trustee with another, provided that the
substitute  is also  independent.  See,  e.g.,  7 JEFFREY  A.  SCHOENBLUM,  PAGE  ON  THE  LAw  OF
WILLS 497-98 (2d.  ed.  2000).  This limitation is  important not only to maintain  the broad
structure of the setdor's plan, but also to avoid  a finding under agency law that the trustee
is an agent of the beneficiaries.  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  AGENCY  §§ 14,  cmt. c,  14B,
cmt. c  (1958).
228  See discussion  infra Part  IV.B.4.
229  See generally Lucian  Arye  Bebchuk et  al.,  The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory,  Evidence, and Policy, 54  STAN.  L.  REV.  887  (2002)  (finding that  staggered
boards  have a  negative impact on shareholder welfare);  Robert M.  Daines,  Do Classified
Boards  Affect Firm Value?  Takeover  Defenses After the Poison  Pill (2002)  (unpublished
manuscript,  on file with the Cornell  Law  Review)  (same).
230  See  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §  706,  7C  U.L.A.  194-95  (Supp.  2003);  RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)  OF TRUSTS  §  37  & cmt.  e  (2003);  English,  supra note  98, at  28  (noting  that the
UTC  provisions  on  trustee  removal  were  "among  the more  significant"  deviations from
traditional  doctrine);  English, supra note 204,  at  197-99;  Langbein,  supra note 59,  at 76
(noting that  the UTC  "responds to  the  concern  that under  traditional  law  beneficiaries
have had  little recourse when  trustee performance  has  been  indifferent, but not so egre-
gious  as to be in breach  of trust").CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tique)  institutional fiduciaries. 23 1  Unlike an individual with whom the
settlor might have had a personal connection, one institutional fiduci-
ary is unlikely to have  a comparative advantage  over another in effect-
ing the settlor's intent, especially  after a corporate  reorganization  or
turnover  in  the  company's  account managers.2 32  This  is not to  sug-
gest  that  reputational  concerns,  particularly  with  respect  to  large
banks  and  trust companies,  do  not militate  toward  fidelity.  Rather,
the point is that making it easier, at least as a default matter, for bene-
ficiaries to substitute  one institution for another might help create  an
ex post competition between institutional  fiduciaries for trust control
that would complement the current ex ante competition for selection
by the settlor.
233
3.  Settlor Standing
The question of settlor standing to enforce  the terms of the trust
provides  a further example  of the settlor-beneficiary  tension.  Tradi-
tionally, because the creation of a trust was viewed as a conveyance  of
property after which  the settlor had  no further  legal  interest, courts
held that  only beneficiaries  had standing  to  bring an  action  against
the  trustee  for breach  in an  irrevocable  trust.234  As  a policy  matter,
this  rule  plausibly  follows  from  the  position  of the  beneficiaries  as
residual claimants;  certainly it mirrors the  similar approach  in other
organizational  forms,  most  obviously  the  corporation. 2 3 5  Once  the
settlor establishes the trust, neither she nor any other non-beneficiary
has a  tangible stake in  enforcing its  terms.  The beneficiaries,  in con-
trast, bear  the marginal  costs  and benefits  of the  trustees'  decision-
231  See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 20,  at 247  (analyzing "the problem  of beneficiary
removal  of a  corporate  trustee").
232  See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF TRUSTS  §  37  cmt. f (2003)  ("[D]eference  . . . may  no
longer be justified  if, after being  designated, a  corporate  trustee undergoes  a significant
structural  change, such  as by  merger.");  Chester & Ziomek,  supra note  20,  at 274;  see also
PRICE,  supra note  227,  §  10.43.1,  at  1161-62  (describing trust management  by  corporate
trustees).
233  Cf  DUKEMINIER  &  JOHANSON,  supra note  28,  at  661  (considering whether benefi-
ciaries should  be permitted  to  change trustees under certain circumstances).  Note,  how-
ever, that this approach  would further burden the fiduciary  apparatus that protects future
beneficiaries  from excessive favoring of the current beneficiaries.  See discussion  supra  Part
W.A.1.
234  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  § 200 (1959);  3 SCOTT  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note
5,  §§  200-200.1,  at 207-12;  Langbein,  supra note  8, at 664.  See generally John T. Gaubatz,
Grantor  Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private  Law Setting, 62  N.C. L. REv.  905  (1984)
(discussing  instances where courts allow settlors to maintain  an action  to enforce a trust);
Note,  Right ofa Settlor to Enforce a Private Trust, 62 HARv.  L. REv.  1370 (1949)  (arguing that a
settlor's  remedial  fights should include  the right to bring suit against  the trustee).
235  See BAINBRIDGE,  supra note  1, §  9.2,  at 410-18;  EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note
1,  at 36-38; Jonathan  R.  Macey,  An  Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate  Fiduciary Duties, 21  STETSON  L.  REv.  23,  23
(1991).
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making.  Accordingly, it is the  beneficiaries who  have an incentive  to
bring litigation  only when it is cost justified, provided  that there is at
least  one  competent  beneficiary  and  his  stake  is  large  enough  to
counter  the problem  of collective  action.236
But this analysis  is too  simple.  The  rule's origin in the property
law,  conveyance-based  conception of the  trust has obscured  the rele-
vance  of the  parties'  probable intent.  Thus, because he  believes that
most settlors would  prefer  to  retain  the  right  to bring enforcement
actions  against  the  trustee,  Langbein  argues  that the  underlying  de-
fault  rule  should  be  reversed  in  favor  of settlor  standing  in  the  ab-
sence  of a contrary instruction in the trust instrument.237  There are,
however,  two  further relevant  considerations,  the second  of which  is
most clearly  brought into  view  by the  agency-costs  approach  and  its
nexus  of contracts  analogy.
First, because  of an  exogenous  tax  consideration,  this  is a  ques-
tion  on which  evidence  of the actual  bargains  struck  by settlors  and
trustees  is  not necessarily indicative  of their  preferences.  Under cur-
rent doctrine,  the settlor must retain  some sort of beneficial  interest
in the  trust in order to  have  standing  to sue. 238  But doing  so would
likely  subject  the  trust  to  undesirable  tax  consequences.239  This
means that the general failure by settlors in practice to retain standing
rights  is  not good  evidence  of their preferences.  In particular,  this
failure does not prove  that increased trustee  commissions, which such
standing would likely prompt, have  deterred settlors from retaining a
beneficial  interest.  In  fact,  the  proliferation  of the  trust protector,
which  will be discussed  below,  is evidence  to  the  contrary.
236  See Gordon,  supra note  12,  at 76-79  (discussing beneficiary free-rider  problems).
237  Langbein,  supra  note 8,  at 664; see also Hayton,  supra note 20, at 103-07  (discussing
settlors  as trust enforcers).  A similar analysis  might apply  to the  question of whether  the
settlor of an inter vivos trust has the power  to revoke or to amend the trust in the absence
of express  authority  in  the  trust  instrument  to  do so.  See  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §  602,  7C
U.L.A.  182-83  (Supp.  2003);  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  § 63  &  cmt.  b  (2003);
Halbach, supra note 8, at 1898-99;  Langbein, supra note 59, at 70-71.  There is also overlap
with the question  of standing under the Uniform  Management of Institutional Funds Act,
7A U.L.A.  485  (1999).  which  is  currently being  revised.
238  See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  § 200  cmt.  b  (1959);  3  SCOTT  ON  TRUSTS,
supra note  5,  §  200.1,  at  211-12.
239  See I.R.C.  §§ 2036,  2038  (2001);  GEORGE T.  BOGERT,  TRUSTS  §  145,  at  516  & n.16
(6th ed.  1987).  In correspondence with the author, Joel Dobris suggested that another way
to  look  at  the  question  is  to  ask  whether  a  narrowly  crafted  power  to  enforce  state law
fiduciary  duties would qualify  as a string under I.R.C.  sections  2036 and 2038.  Note  also
that recent authorities suggest  that a reservation  of power  to replace  a trustee  would not
trigger liability  under sections  2036  or 2038.  See Estate of Wall  v.  Comm'r,  101  T.C. 300
(1993);  IRS Rev.  Rul. 95-58.  If stable,  this might provide  an alternative  means to  achieve
the benefits  of settlor standing without the tax  risk.  See Michael  Houston, Estate of Wall v.
Commissioner:  An Answer to  the Problem of Settlor Standing in Trust Law?  (unpublished
manuscript, on file with  the Cornell Law  Review).
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Second, the agency cost implications of settlor standing are not as
obvious  as suggested  at the  outset of this subsection.  True,  it is possi-
ble that settlor standing would increase agency costs  by introducing a
second  master  over the trustee:  "[A]  manager  told  to serve  two mas-
ters ...  has been freed -of  both and is answerable  to neither. '240  This
is  the usual argument in  the corporate law  discourse against allowing
managers  to justify their  decisions by reference  to the welfare  of any
constituency  other  than  shareholders. 24 1  And  this  objection  might
have particular salience in the trust context, because  the fear of litiga-
tion with  parties other than the beneficiaries might further inhibit al-
ready overly cautious trustees.  After all, an important rationale for the
recent reforms to the standards of prudent investing was to encourage
trustees  to  be less  conservative.
242
On the other hand, the donative settlor's motivation for interpos-
ing a trustee between the trust assets and the beneficiary, tax consider-
ations  aside,  is  often  a  lack  of faith  in  the  beneficiaries'  judgment.
Given  the  likelihood  of feckless,  unborn,  minor,  unidentifiable,  or
otherwise  incompetent beneficiaries, 243  and given  the possibility  of a
free-rider problem among the  beneficiaries,244 settlor standing might
minimize  agency costs  by making the  threat of litigation more viable
as  a deterrent  against  actions  by  the  trustee  that are  not in  the  best
interests of the  beneficiaries  or that breach  a contrary  instruction  of
the  settlor.  Many  trust  beneficiaries,  as  other  commentators  have
noted, are not particularly effective monitors,245 and  even when  they
are, their preferences  are not necessarily congruent with the settlor's.
The  foregoing  analysis  therefore  contributes  to  Langbein's  dis-
cussion  by highlighting the  importance  of two  inquiries:  first, whose
240  EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note  1,  at 38.
241  See, e.g.,  BAINBRIDGE,  supra note 1, § 9.2, at 414-17; Macey,  supra note  235, at 31-36.
242  See,  e.g.,  Halbach,  Trust Investment, supra note  147,  at 407,  411-14; Langbein,  The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act,  supra note  91,  at  641-42; supra note  176  and  accompanying
text.
243  The doctrine of  virtual  representation and the appointment of a guardian ad litem
are at best partial solutions.  Guardians ad litem are often  highly inflexible.  See, e.g.,  Espi-
nosa  v.  Sparber,  Shevin,  Shapo,  Rosen  & Heilbronner,  612  So.  2d  1378,  1379  n.1  (Fla.
1993)  (noting the rigidity of the guardian ad litem's decisionmaking);  see also UNIF.  TRUST
CODE §  305(c)  & cmt.,  7C U.L.A.  154 (Supp. 2003)  (stating a more liberal rule of represen-
tation);  Martin D. Begleiter,  The Guardian  Ad Litem in Estate Proceedings, 20 WILLAMETTE  L.
REv.  643 (1984).  The doctrine of virtual representation  requires an alignment  of interests
across  generations.  See,  e.g.,  N.Y.  SURR.  CT.  PROc.  ACT  §  315(4)  (McKinney  1994);  In  re
Wolcott,  56  A.2d  641  (N.H.  1948);  UNIF.  PROBATE  CODE  § 1-403(2)(iii),  8  U.L.A.  69
(1998);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  § 304,  7C  U.L.A.  153  (Supp.  2003);  Lawrence  B.  Rodman  &
Leroy E.  Rodman,  Virtual Representation: Some Possible  Extensions, 6 REAL  PROP. PROB.  & TR. J.
281,  281-82  (1971).  See generally VOLLMAR  ET AL.,  supra note  101,  at 345-47  (discussing
guardians  ad litem and virtual representation).
244  See discussion  infra Part IV.D. 1.
245  See,  e.g.,  Fischel  & Langbein,  supra note  152,  at 1114-15,  1118-19;  Gordon,  supra
note  12,  at 82.
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claim the settlor would be permitted to advance,  and second, whether
the  settlor's  approval  of an action  would  insulate  the  trustee  from a
later suit by the beneficiaries  (or a beneficiary's guardian ad litem).246
These  questions  are specific  manifestations  of the  larger issue  of de-
termining whether the settlor is,  or the beneficiaries are, the trustee's
dominant principal.  If the  aim of trust law were  simply  to  maximize
the welfare of the beneficiaries, then settlor standing should be quali-
fied so as to require  that any claim brought by the settlor be resolved
from  the  perspective  of the  beneficiaries.  Our  model  of the  trust,
however, is one  in which  the trustee  should  maximize  the welfare  of
the beneficiaries subject to the initial constraints of the settlor.  Under
this  approach,  recognition  of unqualified  settlor  standing could  re-
duce  two very different types of agency costs.
First,  returning  again  to  the  exemplary  trust  discussed  above,
which  S  settled for  the benefit  of B1  and  B2  with  T  as  trustee,  T is
more  likely  to  act  appropriately  if S, in  addition  to  BI  and  B2,  had
standing to sue.  Here S's standing would provide a backstop check on
managerial agency costs.  Second, if S had standing to sue, T would be
less likely to enter into a side bargain with  the Bs to avoid the ex ante
constraints imposed by S.  For example, the Bs might offer to pay T to
disburse the  corpus of the trust.  This would  raise no duties of loyalty
or  impartiality  problems  if Bi  and  B2  were  competent  adults  who
agreed to the transaction. 247  In this scenario,  S's standing would help
ensure that T respects  S's limitations on the use  of the trust funds.248
246  For a  complementary  doctrinal analysis,  see  Hayton,  supra note  20,  at 103-05.
247  See supra note  194 and  accompanying  text.
248  Given the lack of identifiable beneficiaries  in charitable  trusts, the foregoing  analy-
sis  may be relevant to the ongoing debate  over donor standing in that context as well.  See
UNIV.  TRUST CODE  §  405(c),  7C U.L.A. 160  (Supp. 2003); Ronald Chester, Grantor  Standing
to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(C) of the  Uniform Trust Code and Related Law:
How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP.  PROB.  & TR. J. 611,  628-29
(2003);  English,  supra note  204,  at  180;  Paula  Kilcoyne,  Note,  Donor Standing Under the
Uniform Management of Institutional  Funds Act  in Light of Carl J. Herzog  Foundation,  Inc. v.
University  of Bridgeport,  21  W.  NEW  ENG.  L.  REV.  131,  147-48  (1999);  see  also Ilana  H.
Eisenstein,  Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation  and the
Case  for Consideration of Public  Interest in Administration of Charitable  Trusts, 151  U.  PA.  L. REv.
1747  (2003)  (arguing that charitable trust law would benefit from consideration  of public
interest);  Henry B.  Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation  Law, 129  U. PA. L. REv.  497,
606-11  (1981)  (advocating for patron enforcement against nonprofit corporations);  Geof-
frey A. Manne,  Agency  Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999  Wis.  L. REv.
227  (advocating  the  creation  of  for-profit  monitoring  companies  to  reduce  the  agency
costs  associated  with  oversight  of nonprofit  charitable  organizations);  Symposium,  The
Bishop Estate Controversy, 21  U. HAw.  L. REv.  353 (1999)  (discussing the problems associated
with  the Bishop  estate  charitable  trust).
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4.  Trust Protectors
An emerging feature of modern managerial trusts is the appoint-
ment of a trust "protector. ' 249  To return again to the exemplary trust,
which  S settled for the benefit of B1 and B2 with T as trustee,  S might
also  name  her trusted  friend  P as  the  trust protector, frequently  an
uncompensated  position.  Among  other  things,  P  might be  granted
the authority to replace T, to approve modifications  to the trust terms
because of developments  in the tax law or changes  in the Bs'  welfare,
and otherwise  to make the sort of decisions with respect to the  trust's
management that S would have made if S had been able.250  Although
originally conceived as a check on local trustees  in offshore  asset-pro-
tection  trusts, 251  the trust protector has today migrated  into ordinary
trusts, an unsurprising  result in  light of the protector's  usefulness  in
minimizing agency costs.
Putting aside  the doctrinal question of when,  if ever,  protectors
should  be  held  to  stand in  a fiduciary  relationship  with  the benefi-
ciaries, 252 the ability of the protector to check agency costs is relatively
straightforward.  An office  of the  trust protector allows  the  settlor  to
appoint a trusted friend or confidant to monitor the trustee's manage-
ment.253  Thus, for all the  reasons that settlor standing might reduce
agency  costs, the appointment  of a trust protector  might similarly  re-
249  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  § 64  rep.  note  cmts.  b-d  (2003); James  L.
Dam, More Estate Planners  Are Using 'Trust Protectors', LAW.  WKLY.  U.S.A. (Oct. 29,  2001),  at
14, 14; William A. Ensing, Using a Trust Protector  in Asset Protection  Planning,  in ASSET PROTEC-
TION  STRATEGIES:  PLANNING  WITH  DOMESTIC  AND  OFFSHORE  ENTITIES  87, 88  (Alexander  A.
Bove,  Jr.  ed.,  2002);  Hayton,  supra note  116,  at  579-90;  see  also S.D.  CODIFIED  LAWS
§ 55-1B-1(2)  (defining "trust protector")  (Michie  2001);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  § 808(c)  &
cmt., 7C U.L.A. 207 (Supp. 2003)  (discussing trust protectors); Donovan W. M. Waters, The
Protector: New  Wine in Old Bottles?, in TRENDS  IN  CONTEMPORARY  TRUST  LAW  63,  66,  104-05
(A. J.  Oakley ed.,  1996)  (discussing  the increased use  of trust protectors).  A related phe-
nomenon  is  the  so-called  "letter of wishes,"  on  which  see  Antony  G.D.  Duckworth,  The
Trust Offshore, 32 VAND.  J. TRANSNAT'L  L. 879, 910  (1999); David Hayton,  The Irreducible Core
Content of  Trusteeship, in  TRENDS  IN  CONTEMPORARY  TRUST  LAW  47,  52-53  &  n.35  (A.J.
Oakley ed.,  1996); see alsoJAMES WADHAM,  WILLOUGHBY'S  MISPLACED  TRUST 141-54  (2d ed.
2002)  (discussing  protectors  and letters  of wishes).
250  See, e.g.,  S.D.  CODIFIED  LAWS  § 55-IB-6  (Michie  2001)  (listing potential  trust pro-
tector  powers);  Dam,  supra note  249,  at  23  (same);  Hayton,  supra  note  116,  at  583-84
(same); see also Halbach, supra note 8, at 1916-17 (considering  how American trust law will
receive  trust protectors).  See generally Antony Duckworth,  Protectors-Fish  or Fowl? Part  I, 4 J.
INT'L  TR.  &  CORP.  PLAN.  131  (1995)  (discussing the  various  powers  that protectors  may
exercise);  Antony Duckworth,  Protectors-Fish  or Fowl? Part II, 5J. INT'L TR.  &  CORP.  PLAN.
18  (1996)  (discussing the administrative  powers of trust protectors); Paul Matthews,  Protec-
tors: Two Cases, Twenty Questions, 9 TOLLY'S TR.  L. INT'L 108  (1995)  (suggesting that the role
of trust protectors be considered  from  a power-based  perspective).
251  Not surprisingly, offshore jurisdictions typically require the appointment of a local
trustee, and doing  so is  critical to avoiding the jurisdiction of mainland courts.  See Sterk,
supra note  11,  at 1089-1104; FTC v. Affordable Media,  LLC, 179  F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999).
252  On  this question,  which  is  beyond  the scope of this Article,  see, for  example,  RE-
STATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  § 64 rep. note cmts.  b-d (2003);  Waters, supra note  249.
253  See Waters, supra note  249,  at 63.
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duce agency costs.  Unlike settlor standing, however, it does not trig-
ger undesirable  tax  consequences  and it continues  to  function  even
after the  settlor's  death.
True, an appointment of a trust protector opens the door to new
sources  of agency  costs-the  settlor-protector  and  the  beneficiaries-
protector relationships.  But the net reduction in agency costs is likely
to outweigh  these  costs.  By giving the  protector  the  authority  to  re-
place the  trustee, but not appointing the protector to be the  trustee,
the settlor is freed to appoint a trusted and loyal friend as the protec-
tor  even if this friend  otherwise  lacks  the administrative  or portfolio
management  skills  necessary  to  be  a  good  trustee  or  co-trustee. 254
Moreover,  by giving  the  protector  the power  to select her successor,
the  office  of the  protector  will  continue  to  be  occupied  by  persons
connected  to the  settlor  (albeit those  connections  become  more  at-
tenuated over time).  This is especially  important in  light of the  ero-
sion of the Rule Against Perpetuities  and the  emergence  of so-called
perpetual  trusts.255
The  broader point is that the  emergence  of trust protectors  is a
response to the settlor's uncertainty  about the future.  Like powers  of
appointment,256 a trust protector can be used to build flexibility into a
trust.
C.  Internal  Governance  and External  Transactional Authority
By including creditors within its scope, the agency costs model  of
the trust as an organizational form highlights the interrelationship be-
tween internal governance  and the scope  of the authority of insiders
to transact with  outsiders.  The agency cost considerations  relevant to
the substantive content of the rules of internal  trust governance  are a
function of the scope of the authority of the principal parties to trans-
act  with  outsiders.  Similarly,  the  extent  to  which  the  trust  insiders
might safely be granted authority to transact over trust assets with out-
siders  is  a  function  of the  effectiveness  of the  internal  governance
structure.257  Thus the agency costs approach  to the trust advanced  in
this  Article  should not be understood  as  embracing the  sort of con-
254  The  evolution  of  the  protector  might  thus  be  understood  as  falling  within  the
framework  of Langbein's predicted  "fractionation  of trusteeship."  See Langbein,  The  Uni-
form Prudent  Investor Act, supra note 91,  at 665-66.
255  See sources cited  supra notes  11,  188.
256  See GEORGE  GLEASON  BOGERT  & GEORGE  TAYLOR  BOGERT,  THE  LAW OF TRUSTS  AND
TRUSTEES  §  299  (2d  rev. ed. 1992);  Dukeminier  & Krier,  supra note  11,  at  1331-33.
257  Thus, just as one would not study the rules of an agent's (legally defined) authority
to bind the principal without reference  to the  effectiveness of the governance  devices pro-
vided by the law of agency  (and vice versa),  one should not study the rules of the external
relations  of the  principal  parties  with respect  to trust  property without  reference  to the
rules of internal  trust governance  (and vice versa).
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tractarian  nihilism  that  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  organizations
have  no  boundaries.258  On  the  contrary,  the  approach  recognizes
that  the  existence  of boundaries  and  asset  partitioning  (i.e.,  the  de
facto separate legal  entity of the  trust or its equivalent-the trustee as
trustee)  are crucial  features  of trust law. 259
This section advances  the claim that the rules of internal govern-
ance  are  necessarily  intertwined  with  the  rules  of external  relations.
Any change in one set of rules will have a ripple effect on the terms to
which  the relevant  parties would  have  agreed  concerning  the  other.
Accordingly, agency  cost analysis of trust law speaks not only to  mat-
ters of internal governance  and external  relations,  but it also  brings
into  view the interrelationship  between  the  two.
1.  Equitable Tracing
Perhaps the best example  of the interrelationship  between  inter-
nal governance and external transactional authority is the principle of
equitable  tracing.  Under standard  doctrine,  beneficiaries  may  assert
an  equitable  lien  on property  transferred  by  the  trustee  to  a  third-
party in breach of trust, provided that the transferee  is not a bona fide
purchaser  for  value  without  notice.2 60  Recourse  for  a  broken  con-
tract, however,  does not normally include  a suit against  the outsider
who benefited by  the breach. 261 Hence  there  is  tension  between  this
doctrine  and the  notion  of the  trust as a  third-party  beneficiary  con-
tract.  Langbein's response,  in addition to concluding  that the trust is
a hybrid of contract and property,262 is to characterize  the  rule as em-
bodying  "a judgment  about  how far to  impinge  on  outsiders  to  the
trust  deal  between  settlor  and  trustee  in  order  to  vindicate  that
deal. "263
In contrast,  there  is  no  tension  between  this  doctrine  and  the
agency costs model of the trust as  an organizational  form.  By includ-
ing  those  who deal  with  the  trustee  in  the  relevant  set  or  nexus  of
258  See, e.g.,Jensen  & Meckling, supra note  1, at 311  (contending that "it makes little or
no sense to try to distinguish those things which  are 'inside'  the firm  (or any other organi-
zation)  from those  things that are  'outside'  of it").
259  See Hansmann  &  Mattei, supra note 6,  at 438.
260  See,  e.g.,  Kline v.  Orebaugh, 519 P.2d  691,  696  (Kan.  1974)  (discussing the rule  of
equitable tracing); see RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §§ 283-295  (1959).  See generally 4
SCOTT  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  §§ 283-95  (discussing  liabilities of third parties).
261  The qualification  is for fraudulent conveyances,  see UNIF.  FRAUDULENT  CONVEYANCE
ACT,  7A U.L.A.  6 (1999);  UNIF.  FRAUDULENT  TRANSFER ACT,  7A U.L.A.  274  (1999),  and for
tortious interference  with  a contract, see Speakers of Sport, Inc.  v.  Proserv, Inc.,  178  F.3d
862,  865-66  (7th  Cir.  1999);  Fred  S.  McChesney,  Tortious Interference with  Contract Versus
"Efficient" Breach: Theory and Empirical  Evidence, 28 J.  LEG.  STUD.  131,  164-66  (1999).
262  See supra note 44 and accompanying  text.
263  Langbein,  supra note 8, at 647-48;  see also Hansmann & Kraakman,  supra note  31,
at 378-79  (discussing contract and property rights as imposing distinct sets of liabilities on
outsiders).
672 [Vol. 89:621AN AGENCY  COSTS THEORY OF TRUST LAW
relationships,  the  rule of equitable  tracing  appears to reflect the par-
ties'  presumed intent in light of the comparative  advantage of the out-
sider to  bear the agency costs associated  with this particular potential
breach  by  the trustee.  Thus, even  though  Hansmann  and Mattei  re-
gard the default rules of internal trust governance  as "relatively unim-
portant" when compared  with  the  rules  that control  the  relations  of
the  principal  parties with  outsiders, 264  their explanation  of equitable
tracing  likewise  acknowledges  the  interrelationship  between external
relations and internal governance:  When "the rule  [of equitable  trac-
ing]  operates,  the  third  party  transferee  is  almost  by  definition  a
lower-cost monitor of the  [trustee's]  breach of duty than is the  [bene-
ficiary] ."265  In  the  absence  of a contrary  agreement,  efficiency mili-
tates  toward allocating  this risk to the outsider rather than increasing
the  burden  on the  trust's internal governance  devices. 266
This analysis  not only provides a functional explanation for equi-
table tracing as a positive matter, but it also brings into view pertinent
normative  considerations for trust law reform.  Recognition of the in-
terrelationship  between  internal  governance  and the  scope  of exter-
nal transactional  authority reveals that the price for relaxing one  is an
increase  in  the  problems  associated  with  the  other.  Recognition  of
this  tradeoff offers a means  of ascertaining the  costs and  benefits of
law  reform on the  margins  of this issue.
Recent efforts to liberalize the rules that govern the dealings with
third parties  of the trustee  as  trustee  provide  a concrete  example.267
The foregoing  analysis  suggests  that the  price  for enlarging  the trus-
tee's  transactional  authority  will  be an  increase  in  potential  agency
costs  and  so a greater  burden  on  the  trust's internal  governance  de-
vices.  Thus, when  David  English,  the  Reporter for the  Uniform Trust
Code, wrote  that  "beneficiaries  are  helped  more  by  the  free  flow  of
commerce than they were by the largely ineffective protective features
of former law,"268  he was in effect arguing that increasing  the value  of
property held in  trust by expanding the trustee's transactional  oppor-
tunities (the benefit of this reform)  outweighs the minimal increase in
264  Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 6, at 438;  see supra note 47 and accompanying  text.
265  Hansmann  & Mattei,  supra note  6,  at 464.
266  Cf Richard A. Posner  & Andrew  M. Rosenfield,  Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6J. LEG.  STUD.  83, 94-95  (1977)  (analyzing  the relative
abilities of various  parties to foresee, bear, and insure  against risk).
267  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §§  1010-13,  7C U.L.A. 227-31  (Supp. 2003).  These  provisions,
which  are  based  on  similar  provisions  in  the  1969  Uniform Probate Code and  the  Uniform
Trustee Powers Act, are  the culmination of a  decades-long  process  of statutory reform.  See
English, supra note  204,  at 144-49  (outlining the history of the  Code and  its  relation to
other uniform  acts).
268  See English,  supra note  204, at 209.
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the  burden  on  the  trust's  governance  regime  (the  cost  of  this
reform) .269
2.  The Spendthrift Trust
The  spendthrift  trust  provides  another  example  of the  impor-
tance  of the  interrelationship  between  internal  governance  and the
scope  of  the  principal  parties'  external  transactional  authority.
Spendthrift trusts, in comparison  to ordinary trusts, shield  the trust's
assets from the beneficiaries'  creditors.270  This is true even if the trust
instrument  requires  mandatory  payouts,  as  such  payments  could  be
made  directly  to  the  beneficiaries'  service  providers. 27'  Not  surpris-
ingly, there is a substantial body of literature on the soundness  of the
policy behind the  spendthrift trust.272  There  is  also  considerable  di-
vergence  among  the  common  law  nations  on  the  enforcement  of
spendthrift  provisions.  The majority of common  law  countries, most
prominently  England,27 3  do  not  enforce  them.  In  contrast,  spend-
thrift  provisions  are  valid  throughout  the  United  States, 27 4  are  in-
cluded  in  customary American  estate  planning  boilerplate,275 and  by
statute  the  spendthrift  trust  is  even  the  default  trust  form  in  New
York.
276
The  existing  normative  commentary  on  the  spendthrift  trust
tends to present a tradeoff between paternalistic  protection of feckless
269  See  id. at  208-11.  This  is consistent  with the  move  away  from controlling  trustees
through  limited powers and toward the fiduciary  obligation  as the trust's chief governance
device.  See Langbein,  supra note 8,  at 640-43;  text accompanying  supra notes 57-59.
270  See  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  58  (2003);  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF
TRUSTS  §§ 152-53  (1959);  UNIF. TRUST  CODE  §  502, 7C U.L.A.  175  (Supp. 2003).  State law
restrictions  on  transfer  are applicable  in  bankruptcy.  See  11  U.S.C.  §  541(c)(2).  A  few
privileged  creditors,  however,  including  children,  spouses,  and  former  spouses  seeking
support or maintenance,  may sometimes  reach the beneficiaries'  interest despite a spend-
thrift  clause.  See RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  59  (2003);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  §  503,
7C U.L.A.  176 (Supp. 2003);  Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and Starve a Child: The Effective-
ness of Trust Protective Techniques Against Claims  for Support and  Alimony,  10 GA. ST. U.  L.  REV.
691,  699-720  (1994).
271  Cf  DUKEMINIER  & JOHANSON,  supra note  28,  at 647  (noting  circumstances  under
which  the trustee  might pay third parties  directly "for the support  of the  beneficiary").
272  See,  e.g., JOHN  CHIPMAN  GRAY,  RESTRAINTS  ON  THE ALIENATION  OF  PROPERTY  (1883);
ERWIN  N.  GRISWOLD,  SPENDTHRIFT  TRUSTS:  RESTRAINTS  ON  THE  ALIENATION  OF EQUITABLE
INTERESTS  IMPOSED  BY THE  TERMS OF THE  TRUST OR  BY STATUTE  (1936);  Robert T. Danforth,
Rethinking the Law of Creditors'Rights  in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS  L.J. 287,  291-306  (2002); Anne
S.  Emanuel,  Spendthift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72  NEB.  L. REV.  179  (1993);
Fellows,  supra note 86;  Adam J.  Hirsch,  Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and
Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH.  U.  L.Q. 1  (1995);  Alan  Newman,  The  Rights of Creditors of
Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 69 TENN.  L.  REV.
771,  782-803  (2002).
273  The classic  English  case is  Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng.  Rep. 379  (Ch.  1811).  For
further discussion  and  references,  see  MOFFAT  ET AL.,  supra note 20, at 211-24.
274  See DUKEMINIER  & JOHANSON,  supra note  28, at  632.
275  See Hirsch,  supra note 272,  at 3  & n.7.
276  N.Y.  EST.  POWERS  & TRUSTS  LAW  §  7-1.5  (McKinney  2002).
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beneficiaries  on  the  one  hand and the  protection  of voluntary  and,
more  clearly, involuntary  creditors  on the other.277  The  usual focus,
in other words, is on the soundness of limiting the scope of the benefi-
ciaries'  external transactional  authority in view of how this limitation
impacts both the beneficiaries and the outsiders with whom the bene-
ficiaries  might transact.  This approach, however, overlooks the  inter-
relationship  between  the  ability of the  trust insiders  to  transact with
third parties and the details of the trust's internal governance  regime.
One  governance  benefit  of enforcing  spendthrift  provisions  is
that payouts  may safely  be  made  mandatory.  This  reduces  the  trus-
tee's discretion and so diminishes the potential for managerial agency
costs.  But the cost is that a potential check on agency costs-the theo-
retical  possibility  of the  residual  claimants'  exit-is  foreclosed  as  a
matter of law.  Although  exit is,  in theory, a powerful  governance  de-
vice,  in  practice  its potential  has not been  realized  in the  context  of
donative  trusts  because  there  is  no well-developed  market for  trust
residual interests.278  Such a market, however, would provide  price sig-
nals about  the  quality  of the  particular  trust's  management.  Unlike
the  initial gratuitous  transfer by the  settlor, a subsequent  sale  by the
beneficiary  of her interest would  indeed involve reckoning a price.
2 79
Moreover,  alienable  residual  claims  offer  the  possibility  of wel-
fare-improving  secondary  transactions.  For example,  if in the  hands
of the beneficiary the  discounted  present value of the future  income
stream from the  trust is worth  $10,  but in the hands of someone  who
is  more  adept  at  monitoring  and  at fiduciary  litigation  the  present
value  of the  beneficiary's  interest would  be  $15,  then  a  spendthrift
provision results in a $5 residual loss.  This is  the agency costs price of
honoring the settlor's dead-hand  interest  in disabling the beneficiary
from alienating  her interest.2 80
In  the  absence  of spendthrift recognition,  settlors  who  wish  to
guard  the  trust's  assets  against  an  insolvent  beneficiary's  creditors
277  See,  e.g.,  POSNER,  supra note  113,  §  18.7,  at 523-24;  Emanuel,  supra note  272,  at
186-94;  Hirsch,  supra note  272, at 44-56;  Ogus, supra note  3, at  217-18.
278  Perhaps  this is  a consequence  of the frequency of spendthrift,  discretionary,  and
protective  provisions.  Indeed,  the  availability  of  the  latter two  also  helps to  explain  the
narrowness of the corresponding  English market  notwithstanding  the unenforceability  of
spendthrift  clauses  in  England.  See  supra note  273  and  accompanying  text;  infra notes
281-82  and accompanying  text.
279  See Easterbrook  &  Fischel,  supra note  81,  at 274-77;  Fama,  supra note  1,  at  292;
Fama & Jensen,  Separation,  supra note  1, at 312-15;  cf Robert D. HersheyJr.,  Birthrights Up
for Auction as Investments in London, N.Y. TIMES,  Mar.  6,  1978, at DI  (reporting on the En-
glish  auction market in  reversionary  interests);  see supra notes  118-23 and  accompanying
text.
280  The  settlor, in  other words, must have  figured that the beneficiary  would alienate
her interest  for less than  $10  if given  the chance  to do so.  As Richard  Posner  has aptly
remarked,  such "[t]rusts  are based on mistrust."  POSNER,  supra note  113,  §  18.7,  at 524.
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would  be channeled,  as  they  are  in England,28 1 toward  discretionary
trusts.282  Discretionary  trusts are common  in American  practice  too,
but American settlors who are concerned  about a beneficiary's future
insolvency  also  have the spendthrift alternative.  At any  rate, because
discretionary trusts leave the payment decision  to the discretion of the
trustee, neither the beneficiary nor her creditors have a right to a pay-
out.283  The cost of this alternative  disabling restraint is that the inter-
nal  governance  regime,  primarily  the  fiduciary  obligation,  is  further
burdened with  the task of regulating the trustees'  exercise of this dis-
cretion  over  disbursements.284  Since  the  remedy  for  an  underpay-
ment  is  merely  an  order  that  the  payments  out  of  the  trust  be
increased,285 but the remedy  for an overpayment  is to  surcharge  the
trustee  personally  for  the  excess  amounts  disbursed,286  trustees  are
skewed  toward caution. 287  Moreover,  as there  is  no guarantee  of fu-
ture  payment,  it  is  difficult  for  beneficiaries  to  sell  their  interests.
Thus discretionary  trusts, like  spendthrifts, do not allow for exit.
These differing  routes  to giving  effect to  the settlor's  interest in
limiting the right of a beneficiary to alienate her interest in the trust-
a mandatory  trust with a spendthrift limitation versus a discretionary
281  See  Hansmann  &  Mattei,  supra note  6,  at  452  n.57;  Halbach,  supra note  8,  at
1893-96.
282  See, e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF TRUSTS  §  155  (1959);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE  § 504,
7C  U.L.A.  177  (Supp.  2003);  Evelyn  Ginsberg Abravanel,  Discretionary Support Trusts, 68
IOWA L. REv. 273, 277-80  (1983);  Newman,  supra  note 272, at 803-17.  Yet another alterna-
tive, also common  in England, is a trust with  a "protective provision"-a  clause that condi-
tions the beneficiary's interest on her solvency or the nonoccurrence of any event that, but
for  the  protective  provision,  would have  allowed  a  third  party to  reach  the  beneficiary's
interest.  See TRUSTEE  ACT  1925  §  33  (Eng.);  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF TRUSTS  §  57  (2003);
BOGERT,  supra  note 239, §  44;  TODD & WILSON,  supra note 20,  § 2.6, at 74-75; Hayton, supra
note 116, at 590-92;  Ogus, supra note 3, at 205; see also Emanuel, supra note  272, at 185-88
(discussing  protective  clauses  and discretionary  trusts).
283  See,  e.g.,  Goforth  v.  Gee,  975  S.W.2d  448,  450  (Ky.  1998);  United  States  v.
O'Shaughnessy, 517  N.W.2d 574, 577  (Minn.  1994); Hamilton v.  Drogo, 150 N.E.  496, 497
(N.Y.  1926);  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §  155  & cmt. b (1959);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE
§  504(b),  7 U.L.A. 177 (Supp. 2003); 2A SCOTT  ON  TRUSTS,  supra note 5,  §  155.1,  at 159-64;
see also  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF TRUSTS  § 60 cmt. e (2003)  (explaining when creditors can
compel  distribution).
284  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (THIRD)  OF  TRUSTS  §  50  (2003);  Edward  C.  Halbach, Jr.,
Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61  COLUM.  L. REv.  1425,  1426-27  (1961).
285  See Kolodney v. Kolodney, 503 A.2d 625, 628  (Conn. App. Ct. 1986); In re Estate of
Lindgren,  885 P.2d  1280,  1283  (Mont. 1994);  WILLIAM  M.  McGOVERN, JR.  & SHELDON  F.
KURTZ,  WILLS,  TRUSTS,  AND  ESTATES  §  9.5, at  339-40  (2001);  Halbach,  supra note  284, at
1427.
286  See Feibelman  v.  Worthen  Nat'l  Bank,  20  F.3d  835,  836-37  (8th  Cir. 1994);  In  re
Murray,  45  A.2d  636, 639  (Me.  1946); Austin  v.  U.S.  Bank of Wash.,  869  P.2d  404,  415
(Wash. App.  1994); McGovERN  &  KURTZ,  supra  note  285,  § 9.5,  at 339-40; Halbach,  supra
note  284, at 1427.
287  A further (albeit illegitimate)  reason for trustee conservatism  is that fees are often a
percentage of the trust corpus, though this schedule  based approach  is now giving way to a
reasonableness  standard.  See supra note  172.
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trust-present different agency costs consequences.  It is not obvious
that disapproval  of the spendthrift trust either decreases  agency costs
or improves  the position of the beneficiaries'  creditors  (though credi-
tors of discretionary trust beneficiaries  have  leverage  that creditors  of
spendthrift trust beneficiaries  lack).  Perhaps the divergence  of opin-
ion among the common law jurisdictions in part reflects  the difficulty
in  reckoning the  magnitudes  of the foregoing  effects.
Even if it does not help resolve the policy question of which form
of protective  measure  is preferable,  agency cost analysis does help ex-
plain  the  continued  existence  of one  or  more  of these  protective
mechanisms in all common law jurisdictions.  Without the option of at
least one enforceable  protective  measure,  settlors who are  concerned
about a beneficiary's future insolvency would be channeled  toward in-
formal  arrangements,  such  as  outright  transfers  to  trusted  kin  or
friends with a wink and a nod that the transferee  will take care of the
would-be  beneficiary.2 88  The  potential  agency  costs  to  the  benefi-
ciaries and to the settlor of this approach, which would hardly benefit
the  beneficiaries'  creditors,  are manifest.
2 89
D.  Fiduciary  Litigation
The possibility of market-based  governance  devices for the  dona-
tive  trust is limited by the impediments-central  to its often paternal-
istic function-to  the  beneficiaries'  ability  to  alienate  their  stake  in
the trust and to their ability to replace  the trustee.  In today's trusts, in
which  the limits of yore on the trustee's powers have yielded to broad
grants  of discretion,  this places  much  of the governance  burden  on
the fiduciary  obligation.290  It  is here  that the  agency costs approach
to the trust most closely converges  with  Langbein's  contractarianism:
both point strongly  toward  a contractarian,  hypothetical-bargain  un-
derpinning for the fiduciary obligation.291  Indeed, drawing on earlier
288  See Hirsch,  supra note  272,  at 70-71.
289  See  id. at 71  & n.264.
290  See Langbein,  supra note 8, at 640-43  (discussing the decline of powers law and the
rise of fiduciary  law for protecting the interests  of the beneficiaries).
291  There is no shortage of commentary on fiduciary duties generally.  See, e.g., Alexan-
der, supra note 24;  William W. Bratton,  Game Theory and the Restoration  of Honor  to Corporate
Law's Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE  CORPORATE  LAw  139 (Lawrence E.  Mitchell ed.,  1995);
Henry  N.  Butler  & Larry  E.  Ribstein,  Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A  Response to the Anti-
Contractarians,  65  WASH.  L. REv.  1  (1990);  Brian  R. Cheffins,  Law, Economics and Morality:
Contracting  Out of Corporate  Law Fiduciary  Duties, 19  CANADIAN Bus. LJ. 28  (1991);  Robert C.
Clark,  Agency  Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS  AND  AGENTS,  supra note 67, at 55;
Cooter  & Freedman, supra note  69;  Deborah  A. DeMott,  Beyond Metaphor: An  Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE LJ. 879; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra  note  173; Tamar Fran-
kel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74  OR. L.  REv.  1209  (1995);  Tamar Frankel,  Fiduciary
Law,  71  CAL.  L.  REV.  795  (1983);  Oliver Hart, An Economist's View  of Fiduciary Duty, 43  U.
TORONTO  LJ. 299  (1993);  Larry E.  Ribstein,  The  Structure  of the  Fiduciary Relationship
(Oct.  11,  2003)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law  Review);  L.S. Sealy,
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economic  analyses  of  the  fiduciary  relationship  more  generally,292
Langbein  persuasively  shows  that  notwithstanding  "pulpit-thumping
rhetoric  about  the  sanctity  of fiduciary  obligations,"293  the  fiduciary
duties  imposed  by  the  law  of trusts  are  simply  majoritarian  default
rules.
294
Thus,  this  section  will  neither  engage  the  debate  over the  con-
tractarian  basis for trust fiduciary law nor explore  the congruence be-
tween  the  structure  of  the  trust  law  fiduciary  obligation  and  the
agency  problems  embedded  in  the  private  trust  (though  I  have  of-
fered some discussion of this earlier in this Article and elsewhere).295
Instead,  this  section will  briefly explore  two  possible  answers  to  the
question  of why the fiduciary obligation  appears  to have  succeeded as
the  private trust's primary  check on managerial  agency costs.296  The
question  is brought into sharp  relief by the widely-held  view that the
fiduciary obligation  has proved  to be a less successful governance  de-
vice  in the cognate  field of corporate  governance. 297
Fiduciary Relationships, 1962  CAMBRIDGE  L.J.  69; J.C. Shepherd,  Towards a Unified Concept of
Fiduciary Relationships,  97 L.Q. REV.  51  (1981);  D.  Gordon Smith,  The Critical  Resource Theory
of Fiduciary  Duty, 55  VAND.  L.  REV.  1399  (2002); Ernest J.  Weinrib,  The Fiduciary Obligation,
25  U.  TORONrO  L.J.  1  (1975).
292  See Langbein, supra note 8, at 655-60  (citing Easterbrook & Fischel,  supra  note  173
and Cooter  & Freedman,  supra note  69);  see also Fischel  & Langbein,  supra note  152,  at
1113-17  (describing trust law fiduciary duties from  an economic  perspective).  Alexander
noted this point.  See Alexander,  supra note  24, at 767-68.
293  Langbein,  supra note  8,  at 629.  This  is not  to say  that moral  condemnation  does
not have  utility  as  an expressive  sanction, especially  for institutional  fiduciaries for which
reputation  is  a valuable asset.  See Cooter & Freedman,  supra note 69,  at 1073-74;  see also
Langbein,  supra note 8,  at 658  (noting that, "[e]ven  though fiduciary  duties are contractu-
ally assumed,  they embody deep  moral precepts about the behavior  appropriate  for a trus-
tee or other fiduciary");  cf Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions  Mean?, 63  U. CHI.  L.
REV.  591  (1996)  (discussing  the  "expressive  dimension  of punishment").
294  "Loyalty and prudence, the norms of trust fiduciary law, embody the default regime
that the  parties  to the  trust deal would choose  as  the  criteria for regulating  the trustee's
behavior  in these settings in which it is impractical to foresee precise  circumstances  and to
specify  more exact terms."  Langbein,  supra note  8, at  658.
295  See supra  Part LV.A.1  (discussing the duty of impartiality); supra Part IV.A.3  (discuss-
ing the duty of  care);  see also Sitkoff, supra note  15, at 572-74, 579-80  (discussing the duties
of loyalty and disclosure).  For further discussion  of fiduciary  duties  informed  by  agency
theory, see W. Bishop  & D.D. Prentice, Some Legal and  Economic Aspects of Fiduciary  Remunera-
tion, 46 MOD.  L. REv.  289  (1983); Cooter & Freedman,  supra note 69, at 1047; Easterbrook
&  Fischel,  supra note  173,  at 426-27;  Fischel  & Langbein,  supra note  152,  at  1113-17.
296  For  a behavioral  decision  theory  approach  to  this  question,  see  Alexander,  supra
note  24.
297  See  BAINBRIDGE,  supra note  1, §  8.3,  at 365-68; John  C.  Coffee, Jr.,  The  Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff  as Monitor in Shareholder  Litigation, LAw  & CoNTEMP.  PROBS.,  Summer
1985,  at 5,  12; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald  E. Schwartz,  The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposal  for Legislative Reform,  81  COLUM.  L.  REV.  261,  264-65  (1981);
Fischel  &  Bradley,  supra note  82,  262-63;  Reinier  Kraakman  et al.,  When  Are Shareholder
Suits in Shareholder  Interests?, 82  GEo.  L.J.  1733,  1735-37  (1994);  Roberta  Romano,  The
Shareholder  Suit: Litigation Without Foundation  ?,  7 J. L.  ECON.  &C  ORG.  55,  84  (1991);  see also
Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 570-82  (comparing  the governance  of public  corporations  with
that of donative  trusts).AN AGENCY COSTS THEORY OF TRUST LAW
1.  Litigation Incentives
When liability rules are the chief check on agency costs, there is a
practical  limit  to the number of residual claimants  that the  organiza-
tion can support.  The greater  the number, the more serious the col-
lective  action  dynamic  that will  weaken  any  individual's  incentive  to
monitor  and, if cost justified,  to  litigate.29 8  Consider,  for  example,
that  the  paradigmatic  shareholder  in  a  publicly-traded  corporation
has only a trivial stake in the company.  So the typical shareholder has
little  incentive to  reckon the  costs and benefits  of litigation from the
perspective of all the shareholders.  Consequently, in corporate fiduci-
ary litigation the  real  party in interest  is often the  lawyer.299
Litigation incentives are likely to be different in the world of don-
ative  trusts,  however,  thanks  to  the  typically  smaller  number  of
residual claimants.300  Donative  trust beneficiaries  are  likely to have a
nontrivial stake when  measured either by the fraction of their wealth
held in  the  trust or the fractional  share of the  trust to which  each  is
entitled.  Accordingly, fiduciary litigation  in trust law is more likely to
be  prompted  by  the  merits  than  in  corporate  law.  The  relatively
smaller number of residual claimants  and their relatively larger stakes
lessens  the  impact of the  collective  action and free-rider  dynamics.
Of course, trust beneficiaries do not have perfect litigation incen-
tives.  Some  beneficiaries  lack  a  sufficient  stake  to reckon  the  costs
and  benefits  of bringing  suit. 301  Moreover,  awards  of attorneys'  fees
(out of the trust corpus)  to one or both sides in suits over trust admin-
istration  are not uncommon.30 2  Even though courts can  use this as a
tool  to encourage  meritorious  litigation,  reimbursement of attorneys
fees  out of the  trust might  nevertheless  encourage  strike  suits  or dis-
courage  meritorious  claims;  the  beneficiaries  often  wind  up  paying
298  See Gordon, supra note  12,  at 76-79.
299  See ALLEN  &  KRAAKMAN,  supra note  10,  §  10.2,  at  351,  355-57;  BAINBRIDGE,  supra
note  1, § 8.3, at 367;  EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL,  supra note  1, at 100-02.  See generally  John C.
Coffee, Jr.,  Understanding  the Plaintiff's  Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and  Derivative Actions, 86  COLUM.  L. REv.  669  (1986)  (not-
ing  that plaintiffs  attorneys  are  often  risk-taking  entrepreneurs);  Jonathan  R.  Macey  &
Geoffrey  P. Miller,  The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:  Eco-
nomic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58  U.  CH.  L.  REV.  1 (1991)  (proposing re-
forms to reduce  the agency  costs that necessarily  result where  the attorney, not the client,
controls litigation).
300  See Macey,  supra note  3,  at 319;  see also Hirsch  & Wang,  supra note  3,  at 29 n.l0
("Agency  costs  are  probably  lower in  a  trust  than  in  a  corporation  (or  a  government),
because its principals  are fewer and so have  an  incentive  to monitor.").
301  See Gordon,  supra note  12,  at 76-79.
302  See,  e.g.,  Allard v.  Pac. Nat'l Bank, 663 P.2d  104,  111-12  (Wash.  1983);  UNIF.  TRUST
CODE  §  1004,  7C U.L.A. 224  (Supp. 2003)  (noting that a court may award  fees);  3 ScoTr
ON TRUSTS,  supra note  5,  §  188.4, at 62-69 (discussing trustees' authority  to pay fees out of
the trust corpus);  Gordon, supra note  12, at 76-77 n.103  (analyzing when beneficiaries  can
recover litigation  costs).
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the  litigation  costs  for both  sides.3 t °3  Still,  the  more  modest  claim
holds:  fiduciary  litigation  is  a viable  governance  option  in  trust  law
because  there  are  fewer  residual  claimants  and the  collective  action
pathology  is  thereby minimized.
A separate objection to relying on liability rules to police trustees
is that beneficiaries are often unsuited to monitor the trustee, perhaps
because they are unborn, incapacitated,  or simply irresponsible.  After
all,  tax  exigencies  to  one  side,  the settlor  did  not trust  the  benefi-
ciaries  enough  to  make  an outright transfer, favoring  instead  a trust
despite  its inherent agency costs.  Nevertheless,  trust fiduciary  law, es-
pecially the duty of loyalty,  is stricter and more prophylactic than  the
fiduciary  law  of other organizational  forms.304  Thus,  as  Fischel  and
Langbein  have  suggested, many of these  duties can  be understood as
"substitutes  for  monitoring  by  the  directly  interested  parties. ° 3 0 5
Moreover,  the modern trend is toward further expansion  of the duty
to furnish beneficiaries  with relevant information regarding  the man-
agement  of the trust.
306
This  analysis  throws  light  on  the  relevance  of  the  number  of
residual  claimants  to  the  choice  of  organizational  form.3 0 7   The
agency costs-checking  mechanisms of the private trust depend on the
existence  of  relatively  few  residual  claimants.  The  corporation,  in
contrast, is constructed  so that it can-but need not, as shown by the
success  of the  close  corporation-handle  many  residual  claimants.
Unlike  the  typical  close  corporation,  the  trust separates  risk bearing
and  management;  and  unlike  the  public  corporation,  the  trust's
residual  claim is typically split among a small number of claimants. 3 0 8
303  See generally ALLEN &  KRAAKMAN,  supra note  10,  §  10.2, at  351  (noting  the role  of
attorneys'  fees  in  prompting  litigation);  POSNER,  supra note  113,  §  21.11  (discussing  the
economics  of the contingent fee system).
304  Consider, for example,  the no-further-inquiry  rule.  For references,  see  infra note
319.  See  also discussion  supra Part  IV.A.3  (comparing the  duty  of  care  in  trust  law  and
corporate  law).
305  Fischel & Langbein,  supra note  152,  at 1114.  Note the emergence of organizations
such  as Heirs, Inc.,  the purpose  of which  is to  facilitate better monitoring  by trust benefi-
ciaries.  See http://www.heirs.net/  (last visited Nov.  21,  2003); see also Lewis Beale, An Heir-
Raising  Enterprise, L.A. TIMES,  Nov.  18,  1992,  at El  (discussing  Heirs, Inc. and  its founder,
Standish  Smith).
306  See UNIF. TRUST CODE  § 813, 7C U.L.A. 210 (Supp. 2003); Halbach,  supra  note 8, at
1914-15;  see, e.g.,  Allard  v. Pac. Nat'l Bank,  663 P.2d 104,  110-11  (Wash. 1983);  Langbein,
supra note 59, at 74 (noting the "trend of the American case law to enhance the disclosure
obligations  of trustees  regarding major transactions");  Langbein,  supra note  98.  For  fur-
ther  discussion  of disclosure  in  trust law,  see  Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 579-80.
307  See generally Fama & Jensen,  Residual Claims, supra note  1,  at 328  (arguing that the
"characteristics of residual  claims distinguish"  organizational  forms).
308  In a loose sense, then, the trust is closer to the Alchian and Demsetz conception of
the firm, which imagines the residual claimant as the chief monitor, seeAlchian & Demsetz,
supra note 1, at 782, than it is to the later agency cost models of the public corporation,  see,
e.g.,  Fama, supra note  1, at  289.  But  the  trust  is  not as  close  to  Alchian  and  Demsetz's
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The relevance of the number of residual claimants to the agency-
costs-checking utility of the fiduciary obligation is further emphasized
by a quick comparison  of the private  trust with  the  statutory business
trust.  The  chief differences  between  the  two  are  the frequency with
which statutory business  trusts provide voting rights, transferable or at
least redeemable  interests, and  less  rigorous  processes  for removing
trustees.3 0 9 These  characteristics  make  the  statutory  business  trust
look more  like  a public corporation  than a donative  trust.  Similarly,
the  governance  of numerous  commercial  manifestations  of the  com-
mon  law  private  trust, at  least  when  the  residual  claims  are  sold  to
outsiders,  also  more  closely  resembles  the  governance  of the  public
corporation  than it does  the  governance  of the  donative  trust.310  It
will therefore  be interesting  to see whether the ongoing relaxation of
the  Rule  Against  Perpetuities,  and  the  consequent  increase  in  the
number of beneficiaries  in donative  trusts,  will  eventually  move  trust
law toward  more of a corporate  governance  model.31'
It also seems likely that this agency costs analysis could be applied
to employee benefit and pension  trusts, upon which ERISA imposes a
mandatory  trust law paradigm. 3 1 2  Given  the large number of partici-
pants in many of these plans, the incentive structure and agency costs
analysis  for pension  and employee  benefits trusts might more  closely
resemble that of public corporations  than that of the traditional gratu-
itous private trust.  If so, this may explain some of the tension between
the trust law paradigm and the realities of pension and employee ben-
efit trusts in practice.
313
model  as the  close corporation, for which  the managers  tend also  to be the chief residual
claimants.  See Easterbrook  &  Fischel,  supra note  85,  at  273.
309  See Wendell Fenton & Eric A. Mazie, Delaware Business Trusts, in 2  DELAWARE  LAW  OF
CORPORATIONS  & BUSINESS  ORGANIZATIONS  ch.  19  (R. Franklin  Balotti &Jesse A. Finkelstein
eds.,  3d ed. Supp.  2004); Tamar Frankel,  The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure  as the New
Corporate Law,  23  CARDozo L.  REV.  325,  325-332  (2001);  Schwarcz,  supra note  13,  at
562-63,  568-69.
310  See  Schwarcz, supra note  13, at  562-63,  568-69, 579;  Sheldon A. Jones  et al.,  The
Massachusetts Business Trust and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J.  CORP.  L. 421,  430
(1988);  see also Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S.  144,  146-47 (1924)  (describing the business  trust
as having an ownership  form similar to the corporation);  Nathan Issacs,  Trusteeship in Mod-
ern Business, 42  HARV.  L. REV.  1048  (1929)  (discussing the popularity of the use of the  trust
form  for business affairs);  Langbein,  supra note  14, at  179-85  (discussing trust attributes
that invite  commercial  use of the trust form); Andrew  Kopans, The Business  Trust in the
Mutual  Fund Industry:  Old Arguments  in  a New Industry with Two  New Players 2-6  (May
1, 2002)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with  the Cornell Law Review).
311  See generally Dukeminier  &  Krier, supra note  11,  at  1339  (noting the potential  for
"multiplication  of beneficiaries"  in  perpetual  trusts).
312  Employee Retirement  Income Security Act of 1974 §  403, 29  U.S.C. §  1103 (2000);
LANGBEIN  &  WOLK,  supra note  152,  at 646-48.
313  See Fischel  & Langbein,  supra note  152, at 1107  (arguing  that "the central concept
of ERISA fiduciary  law, the exclusive benefit  rule, misdescribes  the reality of the modern
pension  and employee  benefit trust");  see alsoJohn  H.  Langbein,  The Supreme Court Hunks
Trusts, 1990  SuP. CT. REV. 20, 208-209  (criticizing recent Supreme Court ERISA decisions);
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The  relevance of the number of residual claimants  to the agency
costs calculus is further supported by the widely-held view that the ab-
sence of identifiable  beneficiaries  causes serious problems for charita-
ble trust governance.
3 1 4
2.  Fiduciary Sub-Rules
In other contexts,  perhaps  the  most apposite  being  the  govern-
ance of closely-held corporations,  it has been suggested that the "use-
fulness  of fiduciary  duties as  a guide  for conduct  is limited"  by their
open ended nature.31 5  But the donative trust differs importantly from
the  close  corporation  in that there  is less variance  in operating con-
text from one trust to another.  This relative  homogeneity of context
has allowed  courts to develop a detailed scheme of fiduciary sub-rules
that serve as specific agency cost-checking devices.  In contrast, the law
of close corporations  depends  instead on the  parties'  tailoring an ar-
rangement  to  their particular  circumstances.3 1 6  Trust law's  fiduciary
sub-rules include the duties to keep and control trust property, to en-
force  claims,  to  defend  actions,  to  keep  trust  property  separate,  to
minimize  costs (including taxes),  to furnish information to the benefi-
ciaries,  and so on.317
The  function of these sub-rules  is  to provide the benefits of rules
(as compared  to standards)  without inviting strategic behavior  by trust-
ees.318  When aggrieved  beneficiaries  can  squeeze  their claim  into  a
specific  sub-rule-and  for  these  purposes,  the  ban  on  self-dealing
known  as the no-further-inquiry rule can be included within the analy-
sis319-their  case  is simplified.  As  in the  application  of any rule,  the
costs  of decision  are  lower  than  they  are for  a  standard.  When  the
aggrieved  beneficiaries  cannot fit their claim  into  a specific sub-rule,
however, then the broad standards of care and loyalty serve as a back-
stop by  allowing for a contextual,  facts-and-circumstances judicial  in-
quiry into  the trustees'  behavior.  In such a  case,  courts serve  a gap-
John  H.  Langbein,  What ERISA  Means  by "Equitable": The  Supreme Court's Trail of Error in
Russell,  Mertens,  and Great-West,  103  COLUM.  L.  REv.  1317  (2003)  (same).
314  See sources cited supra notes 188  &  248;  see also Macey,  supra note  3, at  315, 319.
315  Easterbrook  &  Fischel,  supra note 85,  at 291.
316  See id. at 281-86.
317  See,  e.g.,  RESTATEMENT  (SECOND)  OF  TRUSTS  §§ 172-185  (1959);  UNIF.  TRUST  CODE
§§ 801-13,  7C U.L.A.  200-10  (Supp. 2003).
318  See,  e.g.,  Isaac Ehrlich &  Richard A. Posner, An Economic  Analysis of Legal Rulemaking,
3 J.  LEGAL  STUD.  257,  258-59  (1974);  Louis  Kaplow,  Rules  Versus Standards: An  Economic
Analysis, 42  DUKE  LJ.  557, 586-88  (1992);  see also MindGames,  Inc. v.  W. Publ'g Co.,  218
F.3d 652, 657-58  (7th  Cir. 2000)  (comparing rules and standards);  Carol  M.  Rose,  Crystals
and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN.  L.  REv. 577  (1988)  (noting  that the law  shifts back and
forth  between  hard-edged rules,  "crystals,"  and softer  standards, "mud").
319  See, e.g.,  Hartman v.  Hartle,  122 A. 615,  615  (N.J.  Ch.  1923);  2A ScoTr  ON  TRUSTS,
supra note  5,  §  170.2,  at 320.  For commentary,  see Cooter & Freedman, supra note  69,  at
1054-55;  Easterbrook &  Fischel,  supra note 173,  at 437; Sitkoff, supra note  15,  at 572-74.
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filling role  owing to  "the impossibility of writing contracts completely
specifying  the parties'  obligations." 3 20
Recall  that in  the  modern managerial  trust, the fiduciary obliga-
tion  has  eclipsed  limited  powers  as  the  chief device  for controlling
managerial agency costs. 32  The effectiveness of the trust law fiduciary
obligation  as a check on agency costs  is enhanced  by use of a mix of
sub-rules,  which  are  made  possible  by  the  relative  homogeneity  of
managerial  context  for  donative  trusts, 322   and  overarching
standards.
323
CONCLUSION
This Article's agency costs approach to  the donative  private trust
not only helps to advance the ongoing debate over whether trust law is
closer to property law or contract law, but also, and more importantly,
it provides  a  rich  positive  and normative  framework for further eco-
nomic  analysis  of trust law.  Principal-agent  economics  has  great po-
tential  to  offer further insights about  the nature  and function  of the
law  of trusts.  In particular,  the  agency  costs  analysis  of this Article
demonstrates how and why use of the private trust triggers  a temporal
agency  problem  (whether the trustee will remain loyal to the settlor's
original  wishes)  in addition  to  the  usual  agency problem  that  arises
when  risk-bearing  and  management  are  separated  (whether  the
trustee-manager  will  act  in  the  best  interests  of  the  beneficiaries-
residual claimants).
The  agency  costs  approach  offers  fresh  insights  into  recurring
problems in  trust law including, among others, modification and  ter-
mination,  settlor  standing,  fiduciary  litigation,  trust-investment  law
and the duty of impartiality, trustee removal,  the role of so-called trust
protectors,  and  spendthrift  trusts.  The  Article's  normative  claim  is
that  the  law  should  minimize  the  agency  costs  inherent  in  locating
managerial authority with  the trustee  and the residual  claim  with the
beneficiaries,  but only to  the  extent that doing so  is consistent  with
the ex ante instructions of the settlor.  This qualification gives priority
320  Easterbrook  & Fischel,  supra note  173, at 426.
321  See supra note 59  and accompanying  text.
322  On the  relevance  of ex ante  programmability  to agency  costs  analysis,  see  Eisen-
hardt, supra note  67, at 62.
323  A similar sub-rule phenomenon  exists within  the  law of agency.  See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)  OF AGENCY §§ 380-86, 388-98  (1958).  The detailed rules of legal  ethics, see, e.g.,
MODEL  RULES OF  PROF'L CONDUtCT  R. 1.1-1.18  (2003);  MODEL CODE  OF PROF'L  RESPONSIBIL-
rrv DRs  5-101-5-107  (1988),  might also  be understood as  a manifestation  of this sub-rule
phenomenon.  Each of the rules cited here reflects the sort of generic agency cost pattern
that  is likely  to recur in legal agency relationships on the one hand or attorney-client  rela-
tionships  on the other.
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to  the settlor over the beneficiaries as  the trustee's primary principal.
The positive claim is that, at least with respect to traditional doctrines,
the  law  conforms  to the  suggested normative approach.